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The concern of this thesis is to develop greater clarity in the definition of the 
terms person and relation in the light of the recent interest in relational 
ontologies. John Zizioulas'book Being as Coinintinion has had a significant 
effect on theological thought in the past ten years in both the East and the 
West. We explore his central notions of person and relation together with 
several modern theologians Nvho also seek to develop a notion of the person, 
both divine and human, through a recovery of Trinitarian theology. The 
thesis begins with a discussion of the implications of a relational ontology 
with regards to the 'substance' or 'being' of God and includes a discussion of 
the question of the continuity between God ad intra and God ad extra. From 
there we enter into the debate over Zizioulas' emphasis upon the Father as 
cause. In the second section of the thesis Nve move on to compare Zizioulas to 
Vladimir Lossky. In addressing the philosophical problem of the one and the 
many both thinkers affirm some of the concerns of existentialists and 
idealists. While Lossky attempts to balance the idealist concern for unity with 
the existentialist concern for particularity, Zizioulas seeks to establish a 
different paradigm in which unity and particularity are mutually 
constitutive. Zizioulas' use of an analogia relationis in contrast to Lossky's 
tendency to use an analogia entis has produced a more coherent model of 
theological anthropology. In the final section we discuss two crucial issues in 
the definition of persons and relations; the first is the significance of the fall 
in defining human personhood; the second is the realisation of personhood 
in the light of the relation of Christ to the Spirit in the economy of God. 
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Introduction 
The recent revival of interest in the doctrine of Trinity has had a significant 
impact on many aspects of theology. Central to this debate has been the 
attempt, of theologians in both the East and the West to recover and clarify 
the Cappadocian formula of the one ousia three hypostases. In spite of the 
vast amount of work that has been done there remains a lot that needs to be 
done. Not only are there questions with regard to the understanding of the 
Trinity advanced by the Cappadocians, but, there is also the issue of the 
significance of their theories for other areas of theology. The correlation 
between the doctrine of the Trinity and theological anthropology has proved 
particularly complex. There are, at times, huge differences between those 
who seek to redefine theological anthropology on the basis of trinitarian 
theology and there remain many who are unconvinced by any correlation 
between human and divine persons. 
In this thesis our concern is to address the development of a relational 
understanding of personal existence which finds its starting point in the 
Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity. This means that not only must we seek 
to clarify the Cappadocian understanding of the Trinity, but, we must also 
deal with the legitimacy and significance of a relational ontology. With the 
anthropocentric focus of much modern thought the danger of imposing 
presuppositions onto the doctrine of the Trinity is particularly acute. The 
Cappadocians, did not transfer their understanding of the divine persons to 
human persons. They struggled to maintain the boundaries of the use of 
analogy in its application to God. Yet, the demands of the modem age mean 
that the primary concern of many people is not to define God but to define 
ourselves. In this thesis we will seek to work with those who are committed 
to understanding the doctrine of the Trinity as fundamental to theological 
anthropology. Perceiving John Zizioulas' contribution as one of the more 
significant contributions to this debate we will work primarily with his 
approach in order to clarify some of the central issues. 
We will begin with a review of the doctrine of the Trinity and the definition 
of the terms 'person' and 'relation' in the context of that doctrine. Chapter 
one will deal with the claim that the Cappadocian understanding of the 
doctrine of the Trinity presents a challenge to substantialist notions of being 
through a relational ontology. Chapter Two continues from there to explore 
the Orthodox notion of Father as cause by comparing Zizioulas' approach to 
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that of T. F. Torrance. Exploring Zizioulas' ardent defence of the Father as 
cause brings to light the basis of the distinction of the persons and by 
implication raises the issue of the situatedness of persons through the 
question of ordering or taxis. 
In the second section of the thesis we will compare Zizioulas to Vladimir 
Lossky, in the context of modern existentialist and idealist thought, in order 
to highlight the significance of Zizioulas' commitment to a relational 
ontology in all areas of his thesis. Both Zizioulas and Lossky have entered 
into the modern debate of persons and relations and have been influenced by 
other thinkers particularly the existentialists and personalists. We will 
explore the extent and significance of that influence in seeking to describe 
some of the strengths and weaknesses in both their positions. 
In the final section of the thesis we will look at two of the more contentious 
issues which have arisen in response to Zizioulas' thesis. The first issue 
which involves the significance of the fall and human corruption is difficult 
to grapple with due to the radically different emphasises of East and West on 
theosis and redemption. Our intention is to explore how some of the 
differences need to be held together. 
The final chapter is rather broad as it involves the questions of the relation of 
Christ to the Spirit, the relation of the Church to Christ and the relation of the 
human person to the Spirit. Fundamentally, the goal of this chapter is to deal 
with the relation of God ad extra, in the Son and the Spirit, to humanity. 
Thus, the final chapter will serve to pull together and focus some of the 
issues which we will have dealt with throughout the whole thesis. 
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Section A. Establishing a Basis for the Terms 'Person' and 
'Relation' in Patristic Theology 
Chapter One: Redefining the Parameters of an Ontology of 
Personhood 
Introduction 
This century there has been an involved discussion over the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Scholars from both the eastern and western Church have returned to 
the patristic debates in an attempt to clarify and affirm an orthodox 
description of the God who is 'three in one'. The focus of the Church Fathers 
served to prevent the abstract and speculative discussion over the 'being' of 
God as a pursuit in its own right by attempting to deal xvith the question of 
how God reveals God's self to us in creation and redemption. This century 
there has been a significant amount of work done to determine exactly what 
the Fathers said and why they said it. It is surprising to discover that many of 
the parameters of the debate are just as pertinent to theology today as they 
were then. 
While desiring to be true to the doctrines and traditions of the Church, our 
focus in this chapter will be to understand them in the context of the modern 
debate. In referring to the work of the Cappadocians we will simply draw out 
some key points. As we have already noted, the modern context has refined 
and polarised the issues and yet the central questions remain the same. 
Recognising that in this paper we cannot do justice to the full content of the 
debate we will discuss the recovery of a dynamic relational understanding of 
God which allows for the mystery of the unity in diversity of the three in one; 
which in turn is grounded in how we might perceive that God can, in 
freedom, relate to humanity. 
I. I. How do We Speak of God's Being: 
The concept of 'being' has been a central concern of philosophy since the time 
of the early Greek Philosophers. There is no question that the Church Fathers 
attempted to work with the parameters of philosophy in order to establish or 
describe what kind of being' the God revealed in Jesus of Nazareth was. 
While the discussion over whether this 'hellenisation' of the gospel was 
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acceptable or not continues today, the truth is that it was inevitable., The 
Fathers turned to the philosophical categories in order to express as clearly as 
possible who God has revealed himself as. 2 However, the fact that they 
combined Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic ideas is in itself evidence that they 
were using philosophical categories for their own ends rather than simply 
asserting the categories as they stood. While many scholars would argue that 
the Fathers simply modified the categories, it seems in fact that their simple 
changes radically altered the parameters in which the debate was conducted. 3 
Zizioulas highlights two assumptions of early philosophy which are of 
particular interest: the first is the assumption that the world, indeed all being, 
was essentially a closed system; the second was that being' was the static 
unchanging and unified basis of all that exists. 40bviously these two 
assumptions are oversimplifications of the complex structures of philosophy, 
nonetheless, they are basically true of the mainstream of philosophical 
thought. The second assumption, that 'being' was the static unchanging and 
underlying basis for the world, is evident in Plato's forms and in Aristotle's 
concept of primary and secondary substance. In fact this assumption is 
directly related to and arises from the first assumption, for with a belief in the 
unity and unchanging nature of the world the description of 'god' became 
directly correlated to the unity of the world. 5 
The first assumption, that the world and all that is in it (including God) was a 
monadic system, was contradicted by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, in 
1 See the excellent discussion of this issue in Jaroslav Pelikan, Christianity and Classical 
Cidtw-e: The Metainorplists of Natural Theology in the Christian Encowiter 7171th Hellenisin 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 21. 
2 In this thesis, affirming Gunton's argument, we will use personal pronouns in speaking of God. 
It must be said that the current fashion for political correctness in theological language, like so 
many other we. 11--meaning modern enterprises, has the effect of making the cure worse than the 
disease. Colin Gunton, The Proinise of Trinitarian Theology 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1997) p. xix. 
3'We do not extend our language to God, rather, as Jungel makes clear, our language is 
commandeered by God. In other words, the revelation event includes the semantic extension of 
our language in and through a dynamic that is irreducibly Trinitarian and which is mediated 
and realised by God. ' Alan Torrance, Persons in Conzinitnion (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 
p. 172. 
4 BC p. 16 
5 Zizioulas suggests two 'leavenings' which took place in patristic theology: the first is that 
with creatio ex nihilo 'they made being -the existence of the world, existent things -a product 
of freedom; and secondly 'not only was the being of the world traced back to personal freedom 
but the being of God Himself was identified with the person'. BC p. 39-40 
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which the Fathers distinguished God from creation. 6 As many theologians 
have noted, this distinction was vital as a basis to allow 'freedom' to both 
creation and to God. Alongside of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo the Church 
Fathers affirmed a distinction between 'theologia' and I economid to address 
the issue of how Jesus Christ has revealed God, while at the same time, God 
remained greater than what had been revealed in Christ. 7 Later theological 
development focused specifically on the question of the relation of the 
humanity and the divinity in the person of Jesus Christ. However, in the 
third and fourth centuries the issue was what could be said about God in 
God's self in order to affirm a) that God is distinct from the world yet able to 
enter into it in the person of Christ -- this was to refute Arius and b) that God 
in God's self is identical with although not limited to God for us- this was to 
refute Sabellius. 
These two distinctions, creatio ex nihilo and theologialeconomia, are not one 
and the same, nor should they be confused with each other. The difficulty is 
that they do overlap in regard to the person of Christ and therefore have been 
the source of much confusion. Nazianzen's language illustrates how difficult 
it is to speak of these distinctions. 
[AInd when I looked a little closer, I saw, not the first and urumingled Nature, 
known to itself- to the Trinity, I mean; not that which abideth within the first 
veil, and is hidden by the cherubim; but only that nature, which at last even 
reaches to u. s. 8 
Nazianzen is not suggesting that God has two separate natures, although it 
may appear as though he is, rather, he is affirming that while we can speak of 
God as he has revealed himself to us, we cannot assume that this means we 
know God fully as God is in God's self. 
Arius misused the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by asserting that God remains 
distinct from the created world. The thrust of the doctrine is to insist not that 
6 It is Athanasius who brought this doctrine to a place of central prominence in establishing the 
difference between the begotten Son and the created world. 'God always had the power to 
make, yet the things originated had not the power of being eternal. For they are out of nothing, 
and therefore were not before their origination; but things which were not before their 
origination, how could these coexist with the everlasting God? St. Athanashis; Select works 
and Letters, Discourse 1: 29. 
7 Prestige, speaking of the economy, states that it is the 'providential activity of God in 
nature, human history and the sphere of grace. It need be added that the supreme instance of 
divine economy... was exhibited in the incarnation, for which the word "oekonomia" without 
any verbal qualification, is the regular patristic term from the third century onwards. ' G. L. 
Prestige, God in Patristic Thoiiglit, (London: SPCK 1952) p. 67. 
8 Nazianzen Or. 28: 3 
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God remains disconnected from the world but that God remains greater than 
his engagement with the world, which ensures that God's being cannot 
become 'joined' to the world as it does in a pantheistic model. 9 The Fathers 
affirmed that God's being was the source of all being but not in a monistic 
sense. 
We are enquiring into a nature whose being is absolute and not into being bound 
up with something else. But being is in its proper sense peculiar to God, and 
belongs to Him entirely, and is not limited or cut short by any before or after. 10 
This affirmation is the starting point of their theology. For Nazianzen, to 
define 'being' one must look to God, for it is God alone who truly is. It means 
God does not need to fit into humanity's categories but humanity must fit 
into God's. 11 It also means that 'being' in the strict sense is found in God and 
cannot be found apart from Him. 
1.2. Divine or Human limits on the Knowled2e of God 
The distinction between theologia and economia was used to maintain an 
apophatic element in the descriptions of God. The emphasis upon the 
mystery of God's being can be taken in two very different ways. The first 
approach (which the Fathers took) is to allow that God is not limited to 
human terms or human understanding because of who he is. The second 
approach is to believe that the limitation of the knowledge of God has to do 
with the human capacity for knowledge. The danger with the latter 
perception is that God can be perceived as an object which is not 
comprehended because it is not yet fully visible to the human eye. 12 
Combined with the misunderstanding of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, 
9 Origen's concept of the soul as eternal left him in a position which identified the human 
person as eternally related to God. This meant that God was irrevocably tied to the created 
realm through this eternal relation. 
10 Nazianzen 4th Theo Or: 18. 
II 'The error of arguing from natural phenomena to the incomprehensible might be pardonable 
if one observed the proper apophatic limitations. ' Nyssa Eunomius 1.213 quoted in Pelikan 
Christianity and Classical Culture. p. 46. 
12 Eunomius suggested that it was sin which prevented the human mind from fully 
comprehending God (See Pelikan Christianity and Classical Culture. p. 51). This approach 
leads to the view that ultimately the fullness of God can be comprehended if and when sin is 
dealt with. The Cappadocians would at times be seen to posit that the being of God could be 
known better by the mind than it could be described in language (While this might at first seem 
to suggest that God could be finally comprehended the qualifying adjective is 'better'). While 
they held that a deeper understanding of God was possible they maintained ultimately an 
apophatic element to all knowledge of God. This is particularly well portrayed in Nyssa's 
Life of Aloscs %vhere he applies the concept of infinite progression in the knowledge of God. 
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which we have just discussed, the search for God's being becomes the basis for 
all kinds of abstract and speculative arguments about what kind of being God 
is. The quest of the theologian, who has not moved beyond a philosophical 
search for the locus of being, becomes identifying the essence of God as 
though that is what God trulyiS. 1 3 In fact this is the same tendency 
evidenced in Sabellianism in which the being of God was seen to be that 
which lay behind the three persons or modes of God. This was certainly not 
the intention of the Cappadocians when they spoke of the distinction between 
theologia and oikonomia. We see their intention in the earlier quote from 
Nazianzen where he refers to God in God's self as Trinity, rather than, simply 
speaking of God's essence. 14 That we cannot speak of the being of God in 
itself is not because of a limitation of human understanding, although that is 
a significant limit, but because God is not dependent on the world in order to 
be God. 
The history of theological thought reveals that the question of the 'being' of 
God has often been concerned with identifying the irreducible essence which 
lies behind the revealed persons. In this century, with the recovery of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, 15 Karl Rahner is noted for his statement that the 
economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and the immanent Trinity is the 
economic Trinity. 16 His clear insight is that by allowing the distinction 
between God in God's self and God for us to become too strong, the Church 
had relegated the doctrine of God to the realm of abstract and intellectual 
speculation. In particular he condemned the western Church for having lost 
the understanding that God's being is Trinitarian. His bold declaration that 
13 The issue becomes further confused when 'image' language is used to posit a coherence 
between human intellect or 'nous' and the being of God. Participation in the being of God 
becomes identified with a conscious union of the mind, which is why psychological models of 
the Trinity are particularly dangerous. LaCugna notes that where the distinction of the 
Cappadocians paved the way for the break between theologia and oikonomia, it was 
Augustine's psychological model which began the process of abstract speculation about the 
being of God. Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Clinstiati Life. (New 
York: Harper Collins 1991) p. 44 
14Nazianzen Or. 28: 3 
15 Thomas Weinandy provides an extensive list of works published on Trinitarian theology 
during this century in The Father's Spirit of Soizship (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) p. l. 
British Council of Churches, Th e Forgotten Trinity: The Report of the BCC Shidy Coininission 
on Trinitarian Doctrine Today, ed. Alistair Heron, 1989, is also helpful in this regard. 
16 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, eng. trans. (London: Burnes and Oates, 1970) p. 22. Quoted by G. 
Havrilak in 'Karl Rahner and the Greek Trinity' SVTQ N, ol. 34: 1 1990, p. 69. 
13 
most theologians in the west were mere 'monotheistsl 7pointed to the fact 
that discussions on the doctrine of God were normally concerned with 
identifying the essence of God rather than dealing with the being of God as 
the three in one and the one in three. ] 8 Expressed another way we might say 
that the distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity is often 
translated as a distinction between the essence of God and the existence of 
God; the essence perceived as the substratum which makes God up, while the 
existence is identified with the three persons and God's action in the world. 
Rahner acknowledged the problem with a distinction between the essence of 
God and the existence of God yet, he failed to establish that the distinction 
between God in God's self and God for us was not about an essence/ existence 
distinction. 19 In both the East and the West, a desire to guard the limits to 
the knowledge of God can seem to suggest that God's essence lies behind 
God's economy. 
in the tradition of the Eastern Church there is no place for a theology, and even 
less for a mysticism, of the divine essence. The goal of Orthodox Spirituality, 
the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven, is not the vision of the essence, but, 
above all a participation in the divine life of the Holy Trinity. 20 
Although Lossky's intention is to guard us from speculation with regard to 
the being of God in God's self, his language subtly suggests that the essence 
lies behind the life of the Trinity. The problem is compounded when we 
allow the distinction, between the essence and existence of God, to 
subliminally suggest that God's true being is something different than or 
apart from what has been revealed to us. The intention of the Greek patristic 
distinction between theologia and economia was not to identify the essence 
which lay behind the persons but to acknowledge that God in God's self is the 
17 Rahner, Pie Trinity, p. 10. Quoted by G. Havrilak in'Karl. Rahner and the Greek Trinity'p. 
62. This is not to deny that the Christian faith is monotheistic but to emphasise that the one 
God we worship is Trinity. It is interesting to note that the use of the term 'monotheistic' is 
misleading in so far as we do worship one God, yet, we do not have a term to denote being that is 
not autonomous and self contained in itself. 
18 Rahner himself failed to avoid this identification. See A. Torrance Persons ill Collillitillioll. 
p. 273 
19 LaCugna, God For Us, Quoted by Torrance in Persons ill Cointymnion, p. 275, says 'Rahner was 
not entirely able to resist making use of the Cartesian conception of a person as a discrete self 
-consciousness but in such a way that it is the 'divine "essence", not the three-divine persons 
which is made the referent of that self consciousness. ' 
20 A IT p. 65. 
14 
ultimate category of being rather than a category derived from or dependent 
upon human conceptions of being. 21 
The distinction between theologia and economia is primarily an 
epistemological question. It maintains the limits of what we might say of or 
about God. Yet, this distinction is in turn based upon the doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo which maintains an ontological distinction between God and the 
world. As a result of the overlap of these distinctions we must also 
acknowledge that the theologialeconomia distinction also reflects that God's 
being is not encompassed in his engagement with the world. The confusion 
arises when the two distinctions are conflated to suggest that God's being is 
located in his transcendence of the world. This is what happens in the 
western search to identify the essence of God and equally in a eastern 
emphasis upon the unknowable essence of God. In other words these two 
distinctions are conflated whenever the suggestion is made that God's essence 
somehow lies beyond his intimate involvement with creation. Zizioulas, 
concerned to maintain God's intimate involvement in the world, fails to 
maintain the delicate balance in his thought when he affirms that the 
essence/ energy model 'allows for God's immanent being to be 
<<incomprehensible>> and truly beyond history and creation'. 22 In his later 
work he more carefully notes that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo shows 'that 
God existed before and regardless of the world, and thus that it is imperative 
to be able to refer to God without implicitly or explicitly referring at the same 
time to the world'. 23 The distinction between God and the world is not that 
God 'exists' somehow beyond the world but that in existing before the world 
he is not monistically joined to the world. In turn, the theologialeconomia 
distinction establishes the limits to human knowledge of God, it does not 
assert that God's true 'being' remains other than his involvement with the 
world. 
21 John Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical 
Study', The Forgotteit Truidy, ed. Alisdair Heron (BCC study comi-nission on the doctrine of God 
the Trinity today, 1991) p. 23, notes Rahner's failure to appreciate the need to maintain a 
distinction between the economic and immanent Trinity. 
22 John Zizioulas, 'The Teaching of the Second Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit' in Credo 
1.11 Slih-itutti Simchnit ed. J. S. Martin (Rome: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1983), p. 51. We xvill 
briefly discuss the essence/ energy distinction in chapter four of this thesis. 
23 ZIzioulas, Doctruie of God 1991 p. 23. 
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1.3. God's Intimate Involvement 
LaCugna, who begins with acknowledging Rahner's axiom of the unity of the 
economic and immanent Trinity, 24 continues by suggesting that the 
distinction between God in God's self and God for us was the cause not only 
of the abstract speculation on the essence of God but also of the understanding 
of a God who was not intimately involved with the world. 
Indeed the ultimate theological error, the ultimate non orthodoxy or heresy or 
untruth about God, would be to think of God as living in an altogether separate 
household, living entirely for Godself, by Godself, within Godself. Thisis what 
the Church tried to overcome in Arianism and Eunomianism, but to some degree 
this 'heresy' is incipient even in Trinitarian theologies that make divine self 
sufficiency absolute. 25 
LaCugna is concerned that the confusion over the distinction of God from the 
world has led to the notion of a transcendent God who is disengaged from the 
world. She would prefer to emphasise that while God remains beyond 
objective definition this does not mean that God is distinct from the world. 
She maintains that God is personal and therefore uncircumscribable rather 
than allowing that God in God's self is in anyway different from God for us. 
It is one thing to say that God is incomprehensible because we do not know the 
essence of God as it is in itself. It is another thing to say that God is 
incomprehensible because God is personal. The former locates God's 
incomprehensibility in the limitation of the human mind, the latter in God. 26 
The emphasis upon the 'personal' nature of God allows that knowledge of 
God retains a degree of apophaticism because of who God iS. 27 However, in 
order to establish her position LaCugna must first assert that the term person 
or personal is a concept which cannot be objectified. 28 While we would agree 
with an emphasis upon the term 'person' we would equally affirm that it is 
not adequate, in its own right, to maintain the limits on the knowledge of 
24 In reference to the patristics LaCugna, God For Us, p. 211, notes that the distinction was 
made between theologia (that pertaining to the nature of God in Himself and economia (that 
pertaining to the work of salvation). Quoting from Rahner's The Trinity she says'no adequate 
distinction can be made between the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the economy. ' 
25 LaCugna, God For Us, p. 383. 
26 LaCugna, God For Us, p. 302. Italics mine. 
27 LaCugna has perceptively reallsed that a distinction between God for us and God in God's 
self makes no sense if we do not address the question of the'being'of God. 
28 In chapter two, when we discuss the use of the term 'person'as it is applied to God ad intra, 
we will posit that it is the persons of the Trinity who define the term person. 
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God. 29 As we will discuss in chapter three, the term person is a necessary and 
useful analogy in a description of God and yet it has it hmits-30 
What LaCugna has not recognised is that the distinction between God for us 
and God in God's self, or as we prefer, God ad extra and God ad intra, 31 is a 
fundamental distinction to enable the use of any analogy in the first place. 32 
The Fathers were able to explore and use different analogies to describe God 
because they began with the presupposition that all analogies were bounded 
by this distinction between theologia and economia. Therefore to use the 
term 'person' to guard the limits on the knowledge of God is to fail to 
maintain proper analogous limits. Emphasising that God is 
uncircurnscribable because God is personal, without careful qualification, fails 
to allow that God remains greater than all analogies. 
While there is no question that the distinction between God for us and God 
in God's self, allowed or even enabled the development of an abstract or even 
speculative approach to God, we would continue to maintain that it is a 
necessary distinction if we are to allow God's relation to the world to be a free 
rather than a necessary and pantheistic relation. 33 Therefore, we would 
affirm the one half of Rahner's axiom, that the economic Trinity is true to the 
immanent Trinity, for this serves to emphasise the continuity between the 
29 LaCugna's use of 'person. ' is, to a large degree, taken from Zizioulas' thesis. Aswewill 
discuss later Zizioulas himself is at times in danger of assuming that the term person does not 
itself need to be limited by the distinction between. theologia and economia. 
30 In this context we must remember that many of the Fathers approved of identifying God's 
essence with'nous'for much the same reason as LaCugna now wants to use'person, because it is a 
term which defies circumscription. 
31 JO]ne aspect of the confusion here relates to the term'immanent', which is a theologically 
weak term implying a static conception of God "as he remains in himself". The phrase Deus ad 
intra is a much healthier one, in that it implies that God conceived independently of his 
relation towards that which is not God, still remains a relational being. ' A. Torrance Persons in 
ConinnintOn p. 279. 
32 When Zizioulas suggests that there were two leavenings he holds the 'personalness' of God 
hand in hand with the distinction between God and the world. BC, p. 39-40. 
33 Later Trinitarian theology enables us to see more clearly the importance of the doctrine of 
the immanent Trinity. Because God is, 'before' creation took place, already a being-in-relation, 
there is no need for him to create what is already other than himself .... In some recent theology 
it has been suggested that, if God does not need the creation in some way or another, he must be 
a distant and unfeeling monarch. Such an objection confuses two points; the first is the proper 
objection to the form that doctrines of aseity have sometimes taken, suggesting as they do the 
total lack of involvement, of an Epicurean kind, of a completely immutable and unfeeling deity, 
Yet, it does not follow that for God to enter into relation with the world he must need it in some 
way. Colin Gunton, 'Relation and Relativity' in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine 
Being and Act ed. Chistoph Schwoebel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 97. 
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God revealed and the God who reveals. However, we cannot equally affirm 
that the immanent Trinity is wholly contained in the economic Trinity, 34 for 
this would tie God irrevocably to the world. The distinction of 
theOlogia/economia is meant to ensure that God's being remains greater than 
that which has been revealed -- not distinct from,, nor removed from that 
which has been revealed. Furthermore we would question LaCugna on 
whether the real issue here is the distinction which the Fathers made or a 
failure to accept the parameters in which it was made. 
Let us review where we are. The distinction between God ad extra and God 
ad intra has developed in many instances into a basis to allow abstract 
speculation on the one essence of God. Nonetheless, we would argue that it 
remains an essential distinction if we are to begin our discussions of the 
Trinity in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. As we noted at the beginning 
of this section, the Fathers developed this distinction in order to maintain 
first that God is truly God as he has shown himself to us in Jesus and secondly 
that God remains greater than but not distinct from this revelation. In 
particular, we would maintain that the patristic distinction between theologia 
and economia was made to allow for and defend the deity of Christ and the 
mystery of the unity in diversity of the Trinity, in so far as they were concepts 
which were not subject to human logic. In this discussion we must 
remember that the Fathers began from the context of revelation, they did not 
begin by attempting to describe the one transcendent God. Their concern was 
primarily to explain how we might speak of the God who is revealed in Jesus 
Christ, rather than offering a philosophy of being. 35 
In making the clear distinction between the world and God and yet affirming 
that God is the source of all being the Fathers were not only challenging the 
notion that being is the substratum of all existence but were also challenging 
how 'being' could be defined or understood. The philosophical notion that 
being is the static substance which hes behind a particular existent could not 
fit with a distinction between God and the World. Rather, there needed to be 
34 Yves Congar reflects the same concern with Rahner's thesis in I Believe bi the Holy Spirit: 
The River of Life Flows hi East aild IA'est. Vol. 3 eng. trans. D. Smith (New York: Seabuiy, 1983), 
pp. 11-18. 
35'The basis of Eastern triadology is found in soteriology, in that its fundamental goal Is to 
maintain the christological and pneurnatalogical presuppositions that 'a) the incarnate Logos 
and Divine Spirit are met and experienced first as divine agents of salvation; and (b) only then 
are they discovered to be essentially one God. ' Havrilak, 'Karl Rahner and the Greek Trinity', 
p. 69. 
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a new model of being which allowed for the fact that God in God's self was 
independent of, yet capable of truly engaging with or entering into relation 
with creation. In other xvords the challenge the Fathers were presented with 
was how they might speak of God's relation to the world without threatening 
the freedom of God or the freedom of the world. Unfortunately in much of 
the tradition the distinction between theologia and economia has not been 
correlated with a revision of the notion of being with the result that God has 
been understood as ultimately removed from or disengaged from the world. 
This in turn allowed a speculative focus on the essence of God where the 
being of God was perceived in static and unchanging terms. 36 Therefore the 
problem in utilising a distinction between economia and theologia is not that 
it has produced an abstract doctrine of a God totally removed from the world 
but that the philosophical principles which were called into question by this 
distinction were still used to interpret the being of God. It was exactly 
this issue which forced the Fathers to define, from the revelation of God ad 
extra, how they understood that the being of God ad intra was the dynamic 
and relational unity of the three in one. 
2.1. Cappadocian Distinctions on the Being of God 
0, In325 ad. the Council of Nicea adopted the term hoinoousion (o'[wouatoy) to 
affirm the unity of the Father and the Son. This affirmation was in response 
to Arian arguments which insisted that the distinction between Jesus and 
God must be a distinction of nature or essence if it were to be a real 
distinction. By declaring an identity of substance between the Son and the 
Father the Council established that the 'persons' were equally God, in 
themselves and with each other. This statement of the unity of the Father 
and the Son is without question an important aspect of the doctrine of the 
Trinity and the proclamation of the Christian faith. It identifies Jesus Christ 
with the 'being' of God, and establishes that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
does not imply that Jesus is anything less than fully God with the Father. 
This definition narrowed the focus in the discussion over the nature of Jesus 
Christ although it did not end the debate. There were many who continued 
to question what it meant to say that the Son was of one substance with the 
36 'The significance of this interpretation lies in the assumption that the ontological 
'principle' of God is not found in the person but in the substance, that is, in the "being" itself of 
God. Indeed the idea took shape in Western theology that which constitutes the unity of God 
is the one divine substance, the one divinity; this is, as it were, the ontological 'pnnciple' of 
God'. BC p-40- 
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Father and there was the parallel question of the Spirit's relation with. the 
Father and the Son. 
The Cappadocians were, and continue to be criticised for their unease with 
simply asserting the homoousion in their concern to maintain the distinction 
of the persons. Weinandy suggests that the Cappadocians failed to 
understand that the term homoousion did allow for a description of unity 
with diversity. 37 He notes that to state that there is an identity of substance 
presupposes a distinction of persons. It is clear, however, that the 
Cappadocians recognised this implication, yet, felt it was not adequate, given 
the need to refute those who were interpreting the Nicene affirmation 
improperly. 'Marcellus ... had the hardihood to profess to find a pretext for his 
principles in that creed by affixing an improper sense upon the 
homoousion. '38 Given the parameters and assumptions of Greek 
philosophy up to that point, it is easy to see how perceiving the two persons 
as identified in substance could suggest that the ous1a was simply the platonic 
form which lay behind the manifestation of persons. 
The chief opponents to the Nicene agreement were the semi-Arians or 
'homoiousions', who strongly argued that the word homoousion suggested a 
form of Sabellianism because it failed to ensure that the distinction between 
the Father and Son was maintained. 39 The proposal to replace homoousion 
(O[tooVicnov; of one substance) with homoiousion (O[tOLO'U(JLOV; like in 
substance) was one attempt to allow for the particularity of personS. 40 The 
Cappadocians, although sympathetic to the concerns of the Semi-Arians, 41 
37 'The Cappadocians never captured the true metaphysical significance of Nicea's homoousion 
doctrine .... because they did not possess the metaphysical acumen of Athanasius, Platonic 
emanationism became firmly grafted into Orthodox Trinitarian thought, and it is present to 
this day. ' Weinandy, The Father's Spirit of Sonship, p. 13. Not only does the testimony of the 
Cappadocians refute Weinandy's suggestion but we must also note that Athanasius was willing 
to accept the Cappadocians' distinctions. 
38 Basil Ep. 125: 1 
39 Paul of Samosata, a leader of the semi-Arians, had accepted o1Ao0V(YL0rV yet used it in a sense 
which allowed for a Sabellian interpretation of the unity. 
40 The Synod of Selucia in 359 adopted the term homoiousion in place of homoousion. 
41 William Hill writes 'The deepest instincts of the Cappadocians are with the homolousion 
formula, with its corresponding emphasis upon plurality in the Godhead. ' The Three Personed 
God: The Ti-ini(if as the Mystery of Salvation, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1982), 
p. 47. Quoted in Weinandy, The Fathet-'s Sjurit of Sonship, p. 55. While there is no doubt that 
the Cappadocians were in favour of maintaining the distinction of persons it is also clear that 
they were very concerned not to lose the simple unity of the Godhead. To suggest that their 
'instincts' or loyalty lay %vith the term homoiousion rather than with the term homoousion is 
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did eventually align themselves with the council of Nicea. 42 Basil, 
commenting on the homo I' ous 'o n, notes the danger of 'likeness' being 
interpreted loosely unless it is qualified with the statement 'without any 
difference'(c'txctpcckkaKTO, )S); and for that reason he prefers homoousion. 43 
Basil affirmed the substantial unity in deity of each person (as defined by the 
Nicene council). 'For God in essence or substance is co-essential or 
consubstantial with God in essence or substance. '44 While the Cappadocians, 
with Athanasius, did accept the terminological necessity of homoousion, they 
were concerned to define the context within which it was used. 
The fact that 'homoousion' did not finally settle the issue is also evident in 
the fact that the debate over the being'of God moved on to include the 
question of the nature of the Spirit. The question of the nature of the Spirit 
had remained dormant while the Church had struggled with affirming the 
deity of Christ. The fourth century Church was divided over the nature of the 
Spirit due to the uncertain meaning of scriptural texts. The pneutnatoinachi 
(a'heretical' position which developed following the council of Nicea) 
forced the issue of the nature of the Spirit by denying the deity of the Spirit. 45 
The popular support of this reductionist conception of the Spirit is reflected 
in Basil's cautious use of language when speaking of the deity of the Spirit. 46 
In contrast to Basil, both Gregories affirm the declaration of the deity of the 
Spirit. Nazianzen in particular questions Basil's cautious approach noting 
the need for clarity on the nature of the Spirit. 47 Yet, in light of Basil's careful 
affirmation of the equality of the Spirit with the Father, in De Spiritu Sancto, 
one can only assume that his concern was to affirm the equality of the Spirit 
without alienating anyone who was close to his position. Basil was 
misleading. Certainly they struggled with the issues but they clearly stated that homoiousion 
is not adequate. to convey the unity of persons. 
42 Basil affirms the correct understanding of homoousion. Ep. 52: 1-3,159: 1,226: 3,125: 1-3,214: 3- 
4,361. Cited by Jevtich in 'Between the Nicaeans' and the 'Easterners"' SVTQ 1980, Vol. 24, 
p. 239. 
43 Basil, Ep. 9: 3. 
44 Basil, Ep. 8: 3. 
45 The pneumatomachi literally means 'fighter against the Spirit'. Dictionary of Chri-stiall 
Theology, ed. A. Richardson, (London: SCM 1969), s. v. I pneumatomachi', A. Richardson. An 
offshoot of Arianism, the pneumatomachi denied deity to the Spirit. 
46 Basil, De S17. St 25, points to the equality of the Spirit with the Son and the Father rather 
than bluntly speaking of him as God. De Sp. St The Lord has delivered to us as a necessary 
and saving doctrine that the Holy Spirit is to be ranked with the Father. ' Although elsewhere 
he does directly call the Spirit God. Basil, Ep. 8, Ep. 159. 
47 Nazianzen Ep. 58. 
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apparently aware of the danger of ostracising other Church leaders in his era, 
many of whom were uncertain of how to speak of the Spirit. 48 Yet, this was 
not solely a pastoral concern, clearly part of his difficulty was with using a 
unity which was founded on an identity of substance. Zizioulas suggests that 
where homoousion was necessary to affirm the unity of the Son with the 
Father it was not equally necessary in the case of the Spirit. His argument is 
that the Son in his union with the created realm needed to be affirmed as 
uncreated in substance, where the Spirit who remained distinct from creation 
did not need the same affirmation. 49 Thus Zizioulas' argument is that 
homoousios is not an affirmation of the unity of God but a simple assertion 
that Christ is uncreated in substance. 
2.2. Three Distinct Hvvostases or Persons 
The result of the vigorous debate following the Nicene Council was a gradual 
clarification of the term hypostasis ('O"xooýracyts). The Cappadocians, who were 
directly involved in this process, were anxious to guard the particularity and 
distinction of the three persons without losing the simple unity. Nyssa says 
Why then dost thou divide the three persons into different fragments of 
different natures, and make them three Gods, unlike to one another, whilst 
from all thou dost receive one and the same grace150 
In order to guard the unity yet particularity of the three persons, they 
distinguished between the terms hypostasis and ousia, noting that God was 
one in essence or ousia while being three hypostases or persons. The western 
Church -generally referred to the three as persons following Tertullian's 
descrip tion of persona. The Cappadocians used both hypos ta sis and prosopon 
suggesting that the nature of the three was somewhat more than the 
common understanding contained in the word person. 'For merely to 
enumerate the differences of persons is insufficient; we must confess each 
person to have a natural existence in real hypostasis. '51 At this time the 
word persona, in the Roman world, conveyed the idea of one's position in 
the structure of society; in the Greek world, it suggested the sense of a mask or 
48 Zizioulas, The Teaching of the Second Ecumenical Council', 1983 p. 33. 
49 'If one professes that the Spirit is not a creature then one does not have to profess the 
<<homoousios>> of the Spirit'. ZtZioulas, 'The Teaching of the Second Ecumenical Council', 
1983 p. 34 
50 Nyssa, On the Baptism of Christ 
51 Basil, Ep 110: 5. 
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a role assumed in a play. 52 Neither of these definitions xkýas satisfactory to the 
Cappado, cians as they suggested a notion of person which Nvas only temporary 
or a mask over the true substance which lay behind the visible manifestation. 
The problem was that there was no conceptualisation or philosophical system 
which could allow for true existence or being in the form of the concrete 
particulars. The concrete particular would inevitably lose its connection Nvith 
real and eternal significance. Person, or personality, in the common parlance 
would be something exterior to the individual; for example, one could 
assume several roles or 'personas. In this case to say the Father, Son and 
Spirit were persons could suggest Sabellianism where the Son and Spirit were 
only temporal manifestations of the true essence. What the Cappadocians 
desired was a definition which lay somewhere between the two words, person 
and hypostasis. They desired a definition to combine the idea of substance (or 
real content) which hypostasis suggested, with the idea of identity which 
person denoted. 
At the same time the popular understanding of hypostasis itself was not 
adequate to explain the particularity of the three, because it was understood as 
equivalent to the word ousia, both of which suggested substance. In fact the 
Council of Nicea, in defence of the unity of the Father and the Son, had used 
hypostasis and ousia interchangeably. It is easy to understand why the 
council would be willing to equate hypostasis and ousia; their objective was 
to affirm the full deity of Christ in the face of the Arian challenge which 
opposed the claim that Christ was equal to the Father. The benefit of equating 
hypostasis with ousia is that it affirms the equality of the three. Furthermore 
it lays the ground work for speaking of the ontological reality of both ousia 
and hypostasis. At the same time while the Nicene understanding of 
hypostasis conveyed the important idea that the three persons were fully God, 
equating hypostasis and ousia with each other allowed the three to lose their 
particular significance. 
52 Prestige suggests that prosopon never carried the notion of mask in theology; 'It never means 
a mask in theology, though modern writers constantly repeat that the Sabell'ans used it in 
that sense. In reality, the Sabellians appear to have held only one prosopon in the godhead, 
and the word uniformly means individuaUG. L. Prestige, God p. xxviii. Nonetheless, this does 
not refute the tendency of the Sabellians to suggest that the three persons were temporal modes 
of the one God, and in this sense they may legitimately be viewed as elucidating the concept 
that the three persons were simply roles assumed by God; in which case the Idea of a mask does 
provide a simple expression of their position. 
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Given the strong statement in the -"ý\Hcene council of the identity of substance 
between the Father and the Son, the Cappadocians were able to move on to 
elaborate how the distinct three were united without difference and without 
division. Thus they were careful to emphasise the unity in distinction by 
using the word homoousios hand in hand with the word hypostasi's. 'Weare 
therefore bound to confess the Son to be one substance with the Father, as it is 
written; but the Father to exist in His own proper hypostasis, the Son in His 
and the Holy Ghost in His, as they themselves have clearly delivered this 
doctrine'. jevitch says of Basil that he 'always combined the two terms 
"hypostasis" and "homoousios", in order to express more correctly the 
ineffable mystery of the Trinitarian being, life and communion, ko1nonia of 
God'. 53 
2.3. The Substance of God 
The Cappadocians were not happy with some of the substantive implications 
of a statement of ousia which subsumed the hypostases. For Basil, the 
necessary qualification was that three hypostases should suggest three true 
and 'substantial' entities and not simply roles within, or masks over, one 
absolute substance. For in'the case of God the Father and God the Son there 
is no question of substance anterior to or even underlying both'. 54 Following 
the council of Nicea, Athanasius recognised the need to affirm that the 
hypostasis could be used to speak of the threeness of God. 55 Yet, he allowed 
that the term could apply to either the threeness or the oneness of God. The 
Cappadocians, sought to clearly distinguish between hypostasis and ousia to 
point out that hypostasis did not mean substance in the way that ousia meant 
substance. 56 'Those who say that 'ousia' and 'hypostasis' are the same are 
compelled to confess only different 'persons' (xp6monct), and by avoiding the 
use of the word 'three hypostases' they do not succeed in escaping the 
Sabellian evil. 157 They spoke of three hypostases and one ousia, a formula 
53 jevtich, 'Between the "Nicaeans"'and the "Easterners"', p. 245. 
54 Basil, Ep. 52: 1. 
55 In the council of Alexandria in 362 Athanasius had moved beyond the Nicene refusal to 
accept three hypostases and was happy to use hypostasis in both senses of either one 
hypostasts or three hypostases. For the Cappadocians it could not be a case of either/ or, three 
hypostasis became for them a key term to guard the absolute distinction of the three. 
56 See discussion in Basil, Ep. 125: 1. 
57 Basil, Ep. 236: 6, quoted by Jevtich Beffi)een Me 'Nicaeans 'and the 'Easteniers' SVTQ 1980 
ý, ol. 24 p-243. 
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which had been avoided by the council of Nicea58 while trying to defend 
against the Arian use of hypostasis. 59 The result was that two terms which 
had been considered equivalents are held to refer to different aspects of God. 
In the similarity and yet distinction of these terms the Cappadocians 
established the paradox in understanding the being of God. For Basil, 
C" ýEWS)60which was real and hypostasis meant a mode of existence 
(TponoS Wmp 
- 
distinct in itself, without allowing for an autonomy of essence. Ousia meant 
the substance which was the inseparable unity of the three hypostases. 
The difficulty inherent in the Cappadocian. project of locating ontological 
significance to the hypostasis is that it seems to deny ontological significance 
to the ousia of God. 61 Thus many people have accused them of positing an 
abstract ousia in favour of substantial hypostases. 62 We would not agree that 
in this formula, of one ousia and three hypostases, either term should be 
understood or held as less significant. 63 Rather, the Cappadocians clearly 
wanted to hold both terms as equally significant in understanding God. 
Without question there are times when it seems as though they use ousia in 
the sense of an abstract universal, yet, they also speak of the ousia in very 
concrete terms as well. 64 Their insistence on the formula of one ousia and 
three hypostases is clear affirmation that they did not want to deny the 
01 V -P d, 58 Where some people would argue that the phrase 'E_ý 'E-rýpccs unocructcrEwsq oucricts 
ýctcwovTas euvau might be seen. as a direct statement against the use of the three hypostasis, 
Stead cogently agues that it was in fact simply a defence that the Son has no origin apart from 
the Father. J. C. Stead, Divine Stibstance (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1977), p. 241. 
59 The term 'three hypostases' was first used by Origen, See jevtich 'Between the Nicaeans 
and the Easterners', p 248. 
60 Basil De Sp. St. 46; Ep. 38: 3 and Nyssa Con Eun 1. 
61 Nyssa commonly uses 'community of nature' to refer to the unity of the three -however, he 
typically uses the analogy of human unity to explain this 'community'. (114,132,146). 
62 LaCugna quotes Hanson (The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God p. 735) who suggests 
that the Cappadocians used ousia in an abstract way. However, LaCugna, God For Us, p. 80, 
defends the Cappadocians noting that they were simply attempting to maintain the 
unknowability of the ousia. 
63 John Panagopolus suggests that, 'In order to avoid the further accusation of tritheism, the 
identification of prosopon with hypostasis actually served, contrary to Zizioulas' 
understanding, to empty hypostasis of ontological content'. 'Ontology or Theology of the 
person? ' Synaxis, 1985. Cited by Aristotle Papanikolaou, unpublished paper presented at 
American Academy of Religion, (San Francisco), Nov. 1997. 
64 Kelly affirms "The fundamental point xvhich should be remembered is that for these x-,, riters 
the ousia of Godhead was not an abstract essence but a concrete reality'. J. N. D. Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrines (London: A&C Black, 1958), p. 268. 
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'oneness' of God. 65 Part of the difficulty surely comes from the philosophical 
categories which they had to work with. Both Plato and Aristotle end up with 
particulars which are secondary to true 'being'. Philosophically it was 
impossible for being', as the substratum of a closed monadic world, to alloNN' 
for ontological significance to the particulars. In Aristotle's scheme, which 
was an attempt to reverse the abstract idealism of Plato's forms, the primary 
substance or being existed in hypostatic form. While many theologians saNN, 
this as the perfect way to describe the being of the Trinity it failed to satisfy the 
Cappadocians. 66 The problem with Aristotle's scheme is that even though 
the secondary substance does not exist apart from hypostases it can exist apart 
from a particular hypostasis. In other words, if we apply Aristotle's scheme to 
the Trinity we could say that without the Spirit, the Son and the Father 
would still be fully God because the essence or secondary substance of God 
would still dwell in them. 
The clear declaration of the Cappadocians was that God was three in one and 
one in three. God is not three and one, but three in one and one in three. 
The threeness and oneness are not in conflict, nor can God ever be described 
solely as either one or three. In describing the Christian God the 
Cappadocians spoke of the one simple ousia (o'U'(5M) and the three distinct 
persons or hypostases 
(O'no"uraoEs). 
But the communion and the distinction apprehended in them are, in a certain 
sense, ineffable and inconceivable, the continuity of nature being never rent 
asunder by the distinction of the hypostases, nor the notes of proper distinction 
confounded in the community of essence. 67 
While they spoke at various times of either the essential "oneness" of God or 
the distinct persons of the Godhead the central claim was that it was not a case 
65 'We on the contrary confess identity of nature and accepting the consubstantiahty, and 
rejecting the composition of the Father, God in substance, Who begat the Soft, God in substance. ' 
Basil, Ep. 8: 3. Almost inevitably philosophical principles demand that either the hypostases 
or the ousia must be the ontological basis for the being of God. So that the Cappadocians 
refused to allow that the ousia alone is the ontological basis of the Godhead seems at first 
glance to deny its ontological significance. 
66 Many scholars in the West argue that the Cappadocians are simply using Aristotle's model 
of primary and secondary substance in their distinction of hypostasis and ousia. Zizioulas 
argues that this is a misunderstanding of the Cappadocians. BCp. 38& 85. LaCugna quotes J. 
Lebon (from'Le Sort du Consubstantial Niceen'RHE 48 (1953), pp. 635-655), arguing the same 
position as Zizioulas although she allows that it is a highly contentious issue. LaCugna, God 
For Us, p. 67. J. Wilkes, 'The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizioulas'in Vox Evatigelica 2-5,1995, 
p. 67, also argues that it is not possible to align the Cappaclocians doctrine with Aristotle's 
scheme. 
67Basil Ep 38: 4. 
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of "either/ or", instead, they insisted that one must acknowledge the two 
principles at the same time. Speaking of the unity we need to constantly 
realise we may forget the distinctions and speaking of the three we must 
constantly realise we may forget their absolute unity. 
The Fathers insisted that each of the three are fully God in themselves and 
together but they are only fully God in themselves because they are related in 
an indissoluble way. 68 While their assertion guards against dividing God 
into portions or suggesting a functional interdependent combination of three 
persons it also prevents viewing the essence69as being something apart from 
the three as though it lay behind the three. As contradictory as it may appear, 
in an immediate logical sense, for three hypostases to be one God without 
confusion and without addition, the Cappadocians insisted on this 
description of God. To prevent one plus one plus one adding up to three they 
refused to allow for any submission of the Trinity to combination or addition. 
They clearly state that although God is three persons there is no way in which 
God can be numbered. 70 In fact to use the concept of number in referring to 
God denies the 'nature' of God. Basil insists upon the unity of God: 
we confess one God not in number but in nature. For everything which is called 
one in number is not one absolutely, nor yet simple in nature; but God is 
universally confessed to be simple and not composite. 71 
To speak of God who is three in one and one in three does not lead to a 
mathematical equation of how the three might add up to one or how the one 
might divide equally into three. It is not a question of addition but the 
holding together of two apparently paradoxical statements. 
68 T. F. Torrance speaks of Athanasius' interpretation of homoousios which'meant not merely 
that the ousia of the Son was of the ousia of God, but that there was an indivisible and 
continuous relation of being of the Father in the Son, so that the being of the Godhead is whole 
or complete not in the Father alone but in the Son and the Holy Spirit as much as in the 
Godhead' T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation p. 226. Quoted in Weinandy, The Father's 
Spirit of Sonship, 13, 
69 Essence in this sense does not refer to the abstract elements which make up the ousia. Instead 
it refers to objective unity of the three persons. Prestige notes the danger of using essence in the 
sense of an abstract universal. Prestige, God, p. 270. In spite of this danger it is a word which 
the Cappadocians use to speak of the ousia while striving to avoid implying that the ousia is 
abstract. 
70They begin with the Aristotelian premise that that which is not material cannot be 
numbered, this in part would be to avoid the materialism of a stoic approach which would 
divide up the ousia of God, yet they move beyond it as well by insisting that while the 
persons are distinct the nature of God is both substantial and simple. 
7] Basil Ep. 8; 2. See also Nazianzen Or. 31; 17-19. 
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The Cappadocians played an important role in funnelling the concerns of the 
Arians and semi-Arians towards a clarification which did not diminish the 
work of the Nicene council. The strong statement of the unity of the Father 
and the Son which had been spearheaded by Athanasius gave them the 
freedom to work with the concern of maintaining the particularity of the 
persons. Both the Arians and the semi-Arians (including the Cappadocians) 
followed in the footsteps of Origen with his concern to maintain the 
distinctions of the persons. In the formula of one ousia in three hypostases, 
the Fathers found a way which allowed for a clearer expression of the nature 
of God without providing a basis for positing different gods. While many 
people have accused the Cappadocians of tritheism both in their time and 
even today, 72 we would insist that it is a danger implicit in the complexity of 
comprehending the doctrine of the Trinity rather than being a fault or 
characteristic of their particular position. It must be said that the danger 
inherent in losing the understanding of the particular persons is equal to the 
danger of tritheism. The Cappadocians did not want to suggest polytheism in 
any way (they clearly affirmed biblical monotheism). 73 It is only by 
struggling with both the unity and diversity of God that anyone can hope to 
appreciate more deeply the true nature of God. 
We have expressed something of the paradox which the Cappadocian 
formula of the one ousia and three hypostases attempted to affirm. Clearly 
one of their concerns was to maintain an apophatic element to any 
descriptions of God. Nonetheless in their defence of this formula, they 
continued to clarify how the formula should be understood. With their 
willingness to utilise the analogy of human persons and human 
communities to express something of the paradox of the Trinity they are 
often identified as the patristic source of the 'social' doctrine of the Trinity. 
Throughout this thesis we will be considering Zizioulas' argument for the 
use of the language of persons and relations, language which he correlates to 
the Cappadocians' formula of one ousia and three hypostases. In order to 
understand his application of the Cappadocian ideas to his theology we must 
clarify several points along the way. These points include the Cappadocians' 
use of analogies, and their understanding of the distinction of the persons. 
72Alister McGrath labels the Cappadocians as tritheistic in Chrishaii Tlieology: ail 
hitroductioii, (Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 1994) p. 257. 
73 Nazianzen, Or 21: 35, speaks of the danger of polytheism in his tribute to Athanasiu. s. 
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Having explored these points we will then return to examine how Zizioulas 
highlights the notion of the communion or koinonia of the three persons. 
An 
The Cappadocians used a whole variety of analogies to express the being of 
God as three in one. Yet, as we noted at the beginning of this paper all these 
analogies were used within the assumption that God's being could never be 
wholly defined by an analogy because God remains greater than and free in 
relation to the created world. Nazianzen notes the problem with analogies: 
I have been unable to discover anything on earth with which to compare the 
nature of the Godhead. For even if I did happen upon some tiny likeness it 
escaped me for the most part, and left me down below with my example. I 
picture to myself an eye, a fountain, a river, as others have done before, to see if 
the first might be analogous to the Father, the second to the Son, and the third 
to the Holy Ghost ... Again I thought of the sun and a ray and light. But here 
again there was a fear lest people should get the idea of composition in the 
Uncompounded Nature. 74 
In spite of this concern there are clearly times when the use of analogies by 
the Cappadocians, particularly Nyssa, is inappropriate. To express something 
of the interrelations of the three, Gregory Nyssen, at one point, uses the 
analogy of the composition of elements which make up an individual 
person. 75 He suggests that the three persons are in fact united to each other in 
the same way as an individual human operates as a union of body, soul and 
spirit. 76 Ultimately the problem with this analogy is that it tends to suggest a 
functional unity. While the body is one aspect of the human person one 
cannot say in this sense that Jesus is only part of God. When this analogy is 
confused with the distinction between God's being ad extra and God's being 
ad intra which we discussed at the beginning of this chapter,, the stage is set 
for the problematic essence/ existence distinction. 
One of the major reasons why the Cappadocians are often accused of being 
tritheistic is because they sought to emphasise the distinction of the 'three' in 
one by using the analogy of human persons united as a species. Gregory of 
74Nazianzen, Fiffli Theo. Or. 31-32. Nyssa also guarded against perceiving analogies as 
comprehensive or even adequate to describe the being of God. Quoted mPelikan, Clzristiallity. 
p. 45. 
75 Nyssa, Tlie Great Cateclusm chapter 1-2 
76 Stead, Diviiie Stibsti7llce. p. 170, identifies one point at which Nyssa uses a metaphor of the 
coexistence of several sciences in the same rnind in Contra Ar. et Sab 12. However he notes that 
Nyssa is conscious that it is only a metaphor. 
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Nyssa demonstrates a clear preference for using the analogy of the general to 
the particular. 77 Basil, however, is careful to differentiate himself from Stoic 
notions of unity by substratum 
i 
and Aristotelian notions of unity by genus. '8 
There is some truth to the idea that there is a sense of tritheism in their 
descriptions; however, they took pains to avoid suggesting that there were 
three gods, devoting great effort to establish the unmitigated unity of God. 
The fact that they upheld God's being as the only true being ensured that any 
analogies based on human persons could not be interpreted as 
anthropomorphic projections on the being of God. 
3.2. Operations 
One of the central questions raised by the Cappadocians' doctrine of the 
Trinity is their refusal to distinguish the three persons on the basis of 
their operations or on the basis of any qualitites or characteristics. The 
Cappadocians speak of the operations of the three persons as one operation. 
Grant then, that we perceive the operation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to 
be one and the same, in no respect showing difference or variation; from this 
identity of operation we necessarily infer the unity of nature. 79 
Gregory of Nyssa, in particular, argues for a unity of ousia which is clearly 
evident from their unity of operations. 80 They do not speak of the three 
being distinguished by responsibilities for different areas nor do they speak of 
them working together in the sense of the strengths of one person 
complementing the weaknesses of the other. 81 To identify areas of 
responsibility as the absolute domain of one of the three, would suggest a 
division of persons which was absolute. This was part of the suggestion of 
the Arians who in attempting to define the three persons assigned them areas 
of operation which became absolute definitions and distinctions of their 
natures. The area of operation, for the Arians, became the description of the 
person. Thus the Cappadocians were careful to qualify that the operations 
77 Although this point depends upon whether Ep. 38, which uses the analogy of unity by 
species, is attributed to Gregory of Nyssa or Basil. 
78 Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trmity, hicartiattoti, p. 342-346, 
Cited in Wilkes The TY-Mitar i(m, p. 86. 
79 Basil, Ep. 189: 6. 
80 Athanasius had also argued from a unity of operations to a unity of nature. 
81 This does not mean that they did not speak of the three acting in particular ways, simpiv 
that they could not be differentiated on the basis of their actions. 
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involved all three persons equally or at the least could not be used to establish 
distinctions between the persons. 
The concern to maintain the unity of the persons in their operations was 
strengthened with a refusal to acknowledge distinction on the basis of 
qualities. 
We in accordance with the true doctrine speak of the Son as neither like nor 
unlike the Father. Each of these terms is equally impossible , for like and 
unlike are predicated in relation to quality, and the divine is free from 
quality. 82 
Thus they refer to the three as being one in essence, simple and 
uncompounded. Where the 0[tOLO-UGLOS party had sought to clarify the unity 
by stating that the Father and Son were alike in nature rather than identical 
in nature (homoousios) the Cappadocians maintained Athanasius' idea of 
the inherent unity of persons in their ousia. 
The full force of this statement may be felt when we realise that in human 
terms our primary means of differentiating one person from another is by 
comparison of certain qualities or characteristics. We will have cause to 
examine this later in the thesis when we explore the understanding of 
personal particularity. Distinguishing on the basis of qualities is the primary 
way in which we can claim to distinguish one person from another. This is 
exactly what the Cappadocians will not allow in their description of the three 
persons of the Trinity who may only be qualified on the basis of their 
relations to each other or on the order of origin. 
3.3. Distinction Through Relations 
The Cappadocian Fathers are thus careful to insist that the only absolute 
qualification which can be made of the three persons is their relations one to 
another. 83 The three persons reveal who they are in relation to each other. 
Therefore the names Father and Son speak of relationships which identify 
the two as distinct persons yet establish their identity as comparative only to 
each other. The Fathers moved from this affirmation to include the Spirit 
82 Basil, p. 116-117. 
83 Nyssa notes that the terms of origin must not be used to deny the essential relatedness of the 
Father and the Son. Adzy. Etui. Bk 2: 9. 
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who is the third person of the Trinity identified as distinct only in relation to 
the Father and the Son. 84 Nyssa criticises Eunomius, for 
everyone, when the words father and son are spoken, at once recognises the 
proper and natural relationship to one another which they imply. This 
relationship is conveyed at once by the appellations themselves. To prevent it 
being understood of the Father, and the only begotten Son, he robs us of this 
idea of relationship. 85 
These interrelationships are not to be viewed as characteristics of the persons 
nor their operations, but are constitutive of the hypostases. The three persons 
do not exist apart from or before their relations, nor do their relations exist 
apart from the persons, the relations are essential aspects of their nature. All 
other names, besides Father, Son and Spirit, which may be given to the three 
persons, while descriptive of their nature and qualities, are at best analogous. 
This means that the identity of the three is relative only to each other, there is 
no higher form or principle which exists next to or beyond God. 
This points us to a second qualification which is that the differentiation of the 
three from each other, while being a clear distinction, is not a distinction on 
our terms but a distinction on God's terms. God ad intra is not dependent 
upon humanity for distinguishing one person from another for each is 
distinct in relation to each other. This in turn leads us to two assumptions: 
the first is that their distinctness is enduring and not simply connected to 
revelation of God ad extra; and secondly that the distinctness of their persons 
can never be understood in abstraction. The Godhead is complete in its own 
triunity, there is no need for any other entity to give identity or being to the 
three who know each other in their relations to each other. This also means 
that we can never declare them to be distinct on the basis of our 
understanding as we examine them in a purely objective manner, but can 
only understand them as being distinct as we ourselves approach them from 
how they have shown themselves to be. It is only as we know the Son as the 
Son of the Father that we can speak of the Father who is revealed by and 
distinguished from the Son only in so far as he is the Father of the Son. 
84 Affirming an identity for the Spirit, as constituted only in relation to the other two persons 
is not immediately evident. The Fathers made this affirmation based upon the precedence of 
the Father/Son relationship. 
85Nyssa, Ath,. Eun., Bk- 1: 14. Nazianzen, Or 31: 9. 
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Dynamic and/or Substantial Unity 
When Zizioulas claims that the Cappadocians were proposing a radical 
revision of ontology one of the central tenets of his claim is that in their 
writings they were outlining a concept of Being as Communion. The title of 
Zizioulas' book underlines his belief that in the Cappadocians' work is to be 
found a radical revision of traditional notions of ontology. Central to this 
claim is the suggestion that the they were proposing a shift from 'substantial' 
notions of being to a dynamic relational notion of being as communion. 
Zizioulas claim that he is simply recovering patristic categories is challenged 
by McFarlane, who among other writers,, criticises him for denying that the 
Cappadocians equated ousia with substance. 86 Wilkes is even more direct in 
his criticism of Zizioulas. 'His entire attitude to the ousia is so negative that 
it is difficult to see that he can actually support the one ousia, three prosopa 
statement that he quotes. 187 There certainly is a tendency in Zizioulas to take 
an anti-essentialist stance to the degree that he at times seems to deny any 
concept of substance. 88 Yet, in light of the philosophical tradition's 
identification of being with 'underlying' substance, Zizioulas' apparently 
existential emphasis upon the person rather than substantive essence is 
understandable. However, it must be emphasised that Zizioulas' concern, 
which is clearly in keeping with the concerns of the Cappadocians, is not to 
deny the ontological significance of the ousia of God but to avoid perceiving 
the ousia as the static irreducible essence which lies behind the revealed 
Godhead; 
If God's being is by nature relational, and if it can be signified by the word 
'substance', can we not then conclude almost inevitably that, given the ultimate 
character of God's being for all eternity, substance, in as much as it signifies the 
ultimate character of being, can be conceived only as communion? " 
86 'In BC Zizioulas argues for a particular interpretation of Cappadocian ontology. He argues 
that Basil, in re-defining 'person' introduces a new philosophical concept: a fact the history of 
philosophy has not noted ... However, is his a fair presentation of what the 
Cappadocians 
themselves argued? It would appear not, for they held in tension both the substantial and the 
personal. ' Graham McFarlane, Christ and tile Spirit: Tile Doctrine of Christ according to 
EdTvard Irving, (Exeter; Paternoster Press, 1996), p. 45. 
87Wilkes criticises Zizioulas for misrepresenting the Cappadocians understanding of Ousia. 
Wilkes, The Trinitarian, p. 80-82. 
88 Zizioulas has certainly not gone as far as Volf who suggests'it is advisable to dispense 
entirely with the one numerically identical divine nature and instead to conceive the unity of 
God perichoretically. Miroslav Volf, After Oitr Likeness: Tile Cluirch as tile 1111age of tile 
Trinity. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 203. 
89 BC p. 84. 
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His reticence is not with the idea that there is a substantial 'whatness' to the 
being of God, but that this '-vvhatness' might be seen as the static protological 
essence of God. Let us briefly return to the Cappadocians writings to see if 
there are grounds for Zizioulas' claim that ousia equals communion. 
The identification of the Father Son relationship, which Athanasius 
emphasised as central to the being of God, would alone be grounds for 
arguing that the notion of substantialist ontologies needed to be redressed. 90 
However, the Cappadocians were much more explicit as they spoke about the 
dynamic unity of the three persons. God is not sometimes one and 
sometimes three persons but is always a "conjunction" of persons or a 
if community of nature" (KoLwovia). 91 For Basil with his strong belief in the 
importance of community92 there were obvious parallels with his 
understanding of the earthly communities and the triunity of God. It was a 
natural projection of his understanding of the relational unity of God and an 
obvious step with which to speak of God's nature. When the unity of God is 
spoken of as communion, conjunction or community the apparent danger is 
that it may be easy to see the unity as something anterior rather than integral 
to the persons. Which is certainly part of the reason why the Cappadocians 
themselves are accused of failing to emphasise the 'substantial' unity of God. 
The analogy of community would appear to make Basil's position 
particularly susceptible to a weak or generic sense of unity. Yet, his clear 
desire is to point to something which is greater than this analogy 'in the case 
of the divine and uncompounded nature the union consists in the 
communion of the Godhead. '93 The significant emphasis in this sentence is 
that the unity of God is both an uncompounded nature and communion and 
this is quite different from any reference to a human analogy of community 
due to a shared nature, or a community of persons who identify themselves 
with each other. While all human beings are derived from, or begin with, 
the one human nature, the tendency is toward division and disintegration. 
The contrast between human beings is more apparent than any perceived 
90 We will be taking up that issue in the next chapter. 
91 Basi IEp. 38,189: 7-8,210: 4-5. 
92 Basil is acknowledged as one of the Fathers of the monastic movement in the East. In the 
East under Basil, the emphasis was very much upon entering into community life rather than 
the individual retreat associated with western monasticism. See Metropolitan Georges 
(Khrodor), 'Basil the Great: Bishop and Pastor' SVTQ 29: 1,1985, pp. 5-27. 
93 Basil, De S17. St. 45. 
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unity. The unity of God is not an operation or function of the three persons 
but an objective reality with ontological status. Basil says "A certain 
communion indissoluble and continuous it . 
94 The eternal aspect of the 
triune nature of God is clearly something which differentiates his 
communion from ours. 95 It is important to emphasise that Basil was trying 
to point to the mystery of God's unity rather than suggesting that human 
communities might provide the paradigm of what God's nature must be,, a 
position he was able to assume because of the Fathers' affirmation of the 
distinction between the created and the uncreated. 
Clearly, Zizioulas is not wrong to have suggested that the Cappadocians used 
the term koinonia in speaking of the unity of God. However, there is a 
difference in how the Cappadocians locate this communion. Basil used the 
term community of nature not community of persons or community of 
hypostases. 96 
But the communion and the distinction apprehended in them are, in a certain 
sense, ineffable and inconceivable, the continuity of nature being never rent 
asunder by the distinction of the hypostases, nor the notes of proper distinction 
confounded. in the community of essence. 9 7 
The communion of God is not something which is anterior to the persons, 
but coincident with the persons: 'Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but in them is 
seen a certain communion indissoluble and continuous'. 98 Using the term 
community of nature leads to the understanding that the unity is not 
something outside of the three persons nor is it something which follows on 
from the three persons, instead the union is part and parcel of who the three 
persons are. When the Cappadocians used the notion of communion they 
were not displacing the term ousia in favour of a notion of communion of 
94 Basil, Ep. 38: 4. 
95 Although the Cappadocians did not use the term perichoresis or even adequately develop 
the term coinherence there is no doubt that they laid the ground work for it in their 
clarification of the basis of the unity of the three persons. Although Na zianzen used the term 
perichoresis to refer to the unity of the two nature in Christ, it wasn't until the time of Pseudo- 
Cyril that it was used to refer to the unity of the persons in the Trinity. See Verna Harrison., 
'Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers', SVTQ 35-1 (1991), pp. 53-65. 
96 While the term community or koinonia of nature is clearly a major aspect of Basil's argument 
in clarifying the doctrine of the Trinity, it is not utilised to the same extent with both 
Gregories. Nyssa in particular doesn't seem to use it in the same way as Basil has so clearly 
attempted to do. Nazianzen while using the principle of the concept develops it in different 
ways. 
97 Basil, Ep. 38: 4 (There are many who believe this letter should be attributed to Gregory of 
Nyssa and not Basil). 
98 Basil, Ep. 38. 
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persons, for to simply propose that the unity of God was a product of the 
communion of persons would be tritheistic. The Cappadocians clearly sought 
to maintain the paradox of the God who is at once three and one. 
Clearly the concern not to collapse the formula of the one ousia and three 
hypostases into a simple equation, forces us to ask if Zizioulas is not in danger 
of doing exactly that when he equates the ousia with the koinonia of the three 
persons. 99 For if the oneness of God is simply equated with the communion 
of the three persons then we are in danger of turning the paradoxical formula 
into an logical equation. 100 Yet, to suggest that the koinonia is in anyway 
distinct from the hypostases, remains in danger of establishing the ousia as 
something other than the persons. Although the Cappadocians speak of a 
communion of essence rather than a communion of persons they are equally 
concerned to affirm that the unity is integral to the persons. Nazianzen 
reflects this notion of communion in a very clear statement locating unity 
within the particular persons rather than seeing it as something prodticedby, 
or existing apart from them. 
But each of these Persons possesses Unity, not less with that which is limited 
to it than with itself, by reason of the identity of essence and power. ' 01 
Noting that the unity of the three persons is an identity of essence and power 
is a considerable qualification suggesting that the three begin and end in 
unity; not only are they united in their essence or nature but they are also 
united in their operation. In fact, it seems as though the key issue in this 
situation is to affirm the real ontological content to both the terms ousia and 
hypostasis without allowing that they are 'distinct' categories. This is clearly 
what Zizioulas intends as he continues to maintain the dialectic of the one 
ousia , three hypostases. 
99 Wilkes, The Trinitarian, p. 70-71, criticises Zizioulas for failing to address the issue of how 
the ousia is related to the hypostases. We would suggest that what needs to be emphasised is 
not how the ousia and the hypostases can be understood to 'relate' to each other, but, that the 
oneness and threeness of God must be held at the same time. If we return to our discussion of 
Nazianzen's formula, the three hi one and the otie in three, we will remember that one of the 
purposes of the formula was to deny the possibility of applying mathematics to understand 
how God is both one and three. We would argue that to attempt to establish the way in which 
the ousia of God is 'related' to the hypostases of God can easily slide into an attempt to add 
together or equate the two poles of a paradox. 
10OWhich is why there remains the need to use the term homoousios as a positive affirmation 
and not simply as a negative affirmation as Zizioulas argues in The Teaching of the Second 
Eciiiiiemcal Cotvicd, 1983, p-34- 
101 Nazianzen, Or 31: 16.. 
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The nature of God is communion. This does not mean that the persons have an 
ontological priority over the one substance of God, but that the one substance of 
God coincides with the communion of the three persons. 102 
In speaking of the unity of God we must be careful that, when we use the 
term communion, we are not slipping into an analogy which would imply 
that the unity of the Godhead follows on from the persons for that would 
imply tritheism. We must somehow allow that the unity of the Godhead is a 
unity which coincides with the distinction of the persons. We should not 
forget that 'the unity of the revealed God is differentiated from everything 
else that may be called Unity'. 103 The legitimacy of speaking of the relational 
unity of the three persons will be something we examine more closely in the 
next few chapters and particularly in chapter two where we look at the notion 
of the Father as cause. 
Conclusion 
It is clear from this chapter that the Cappadocian perspective, which led to the 
development of the doctrine of three hypostases in one ousia, does reveal a 
unique appreciation of God's being. This perspective has value, especially in 
the West where the perception of God's being has tended towards a static and 
monistic unity. The great difficulty with focusing primarily upon the unity of 
God is that it is almost natural to suggest that the unity is in some way 
independent of or primary to the particular persons. Thus one either posits 
the unity as the true and 'simple' God lying beyond the three manifestations, 
or suggests that the unity is a compound of elements which make up a greater 
whole. Obviously there are inherent dangers in any approach for there are no 
analogies in creation which can fully express the complexity of God's nature. 
Nonetheless, we must speak of a dynamic and relational understanding of 
God if only to make sense of how God, the uncreated, is able to relate to the 
created world without that relation collapsing into monism. The advantage 
in recovering an appreciation of the three persons in a communion of 
essence is that it more adequately ensures that God ad extra is held to be 
commensurate with God ad intra by allocating real identity and being to the 
particularities of revelation. This forces one to approach God as Father, Son 
and Spirit instead of attempting to speak of God in a generic sense; in short, it 
102 BC p. 134 
Io Ka 103 Colin Gunton, Being and Beconung: The Doctr *ne f God in Charles Hartshorne atid rl 
Barth. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 45. 
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forces one to remain true to the basis of revelation rather than dealing with 
God in abstract metaphysical terms. 
There is always the danger of the analogies of persons and communion 
leading to an anthropomorphic tritheism. In the third and fourth centuries 
in the encounter with Greek philosophy it may have been more natural to 
look for the eternal form behind the particular existent. Today in a society 
which is strongly influenced by existential thinking and precepts, the analogy 
of persons in communion will be understood quite differently. In both cases 
the limits and possibilities of any analogy must be guided by the distinction 
that the God who has truly shown himself to us always remains greater than 
that which we have seen and understood. While these analogies allow an 
entry into language about God which is appropriate to God, it should not 
allow its listener to reduce God to a human construct; rather it should force 
them to realign their perception of reality in the light of a God whose unity in 
Trinity is always beyond comprehensive objective depictions. 
We would argue that when Zizioulas highlights the Cappadocian notion of 
community or communion of nature he is remaining with the direction of 
their intentions. He is not seeking to develop a new avenue of speculation 
into the being of God, but is seeking to define the parameters of the discussion 
only as far as necessary to remain true to the tradition. In keeping with any 
such attempt we need to examine the contours of his proposal in order to 
ensure that we remain true to the dynamic of revelation. Turning now to 
Zizioulas' understanding of the person we will again examine how he has 
established the primacy of the of the person through the notion of the Father 
as cause. 
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Chapter Two: The Person of Father 
Introduction 
Who or what is the Father: the locus of the Godhead, God wholly in himself, the 
First Person of the Trinity or all of these things? The early debates over Jesus of 
Nazareth were centred on the assumption that 'Father' was a name for God. 
Exactly what it means to say that the Father is God was, and is today, grounds 
for debate. Many terms were used to denote the place of the Father within the 
Trinity, or his relations with the Son and the Spirit. Some of these terms have 
been the source of concern especially in the West. Our interest with these terms 
is to explore the implications they have for our understanding of the concept of 
persons, both divine and human. Yet, in this paper we will only begin to touch 
on some of the issues involved in defining a notion of the 'person' and the 
corresponding term frelation'. In exploring the modern debate over the terms 
I person' and 'relation', we will primarily deal with the Orthodox emphasis upon 
the Father as cause or the principle of the Son and. the Spirit. 
John Zizioulas and Vladimir Lossky both hold that the identification of the 
Father as cause is an essential step both in the doctrine of the Trinity and as a 
basis for the concept of persons both divine and human. 1 This is in spite of the 
fact that they acknowledge the notion of causality appears as essentially 
problematic. 2 In making these claims for the term 'person'. both Zizioulas and 
Lossky acknowledge that the Fathers did not challenge the notions of human 
personhood, for the debate over the notion of the person is a more modern 
concern. Yet,, they argue that the identification of the hypostasis of the Father is 
the starting point for defining the notion of the person. Their concern is to 
develop and express a concept of the person which reflects the Cappadocian 
understanding of the particular and that understanding of the particular is 
perhaps most clearly elaborated in the discussions of the person of the Father. 
The boldness of their claims has raised much debate in both Last and West 
1The Greek Fathers always maintained that the principle of unity in the Trinity is the person of 
the Father. As principle of the other two hypostasis, the Father is at the same time the source of 
the relations whence the hypostases receive their distinct characteristics. A IT p. 58. Cf. BC. p. 41 
2 Causality, with all of its defects as a term, expresses Nvhat it stands for quite well: the hypostatic 
distinction of the Three which arises from the Person of the Father- a distinction between absolute 
diversities , brought about 
by the fact that the Father is not uniquely the essence. I&L p. 91. 
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particularly in their dependence upon the notion of causalitY. One of the chief 
opponents of Zizioulas on the issue of causality is T. F. Torrance and xve will be 
drawing on his ideas throughout this chapter as we attempt to clarify the 
fundamental concerns. 
I. I. Father as Tri 
In order to explore this issue we must begin by establishing the patristic 
emphasis upon the Father as principle and cause (arche and aitia). It cannot be 
denied that many if not most of the Fathers of the Church clearly held to a notion 
of the Father as the arche of the Godhead. The patristic writers were not 
attempting to establish a new category or to project a priori assumptions onto the 
being of God. Rather they were beginning from the biblical texts which clearly 
identified, at least from an economic level, the primacy of the Father over the Son 
and the Spirit. 3 The Cappadocian emphasis upon the term aitia does distinguish 
them from some of the other Fathers. However, they were clearly in keeping 
with the tradition in their emphasis upon the primacy of the Father. 
T. F. Torrance, in the debate over the language of causality, suggests that even 
Athanasius did not place the same emphasis upon the person of the Father as the 
Cappadocians. We would agree that Athanasius did not develop the same 
emphasis upon the ordering of the persons as the Cappadocians did. 4 Torrance 
however, misleads us when he suggests that Athanasius located the unity of 
persons in the One being of the Godhead in contrast to a particular person. For 
Athanasius' language begins with the particular persons of the Son and the 
Father. His use of the doctrine of the homoousion is grounded in the assumption 
that the Father is God. He suggests that the Son is God because he is equal to 
and in relation with the Father; 5 thus inferring that the Father is in some sense 
primary to the Son in the Godhead. 6 Furthermore, Athanasius does use the 
3 'God sittipliciter is God the Father, the fount and goal of our being. ' Gunton Vie ProinlSe, p. 168. 
4 While accepting the formulation of 'one Being, three Persons' [Athanasius] had such a strong 
view of the complete identity, equality and unity of the three Persons within the Godhead, that 
he declined to advance a view of the monarchy in which the oneness of God was defined by 
reference to the Person of the Father, rather than to the oneness of the Being of the Godhead. 
T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 17. 
5 Athanasius, De Incarnatio 17. 
6 Athanasius, Or. Cont-Ar. 4: 1. 
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language of the Father as aitia, as Meijering clearly establishes. 7AIthough, 
Athanasius does not use it to the same extent or in the same Nvay that the 
Cappadocians, use it, it is wrong to assert that he avoids it altogether. Both the 
Cappadocians and Athanasius picked up the language of cause from Origen and, 
as such, they attempted to do justice to Origen's use of it. Although Athanasius 
prefers the language of arche he is clearly implying that the Father is the 'origin' 
of the Son. 8 For example he states that; 'our Lord Jesus Christ the Saviour of all, 
through whom the Father orders, and holds together all things, and exercises 
providence over the Universe. '9 The difficulty which remains, for many 
theologians, is that with the primary use of the term aitia, or cause, by the 
Cappadocians, there is the suggestion of undue emphasis being placed upon the 
Father. 10 
1.2. Father of the Son 
T. F. Torrance, in affirming Athanasius' approach and the doctrine of the 
homoousion, places a clear emphasis upon Athanasius' avowal of the full 
equality of the Son and the Father and his affirmation that the Father never 
exists by himself but always and only in relation to the Son. II Athanasius 
emphasised the Father as 'father' to exclude any identification of the Father as 
self-existent. For 'father he cannot be called, nor can he be, unless a son exisC1 2 
T. F. Torrance suggests that the Cappadocians failed to emulate Athanasius at this 
point. Instead by identifying the Father as cause they located the Godhead 
7 E. P. Meijering, 'Will and Trinity in Gregory of Nazianzen' in God Being History: Shidies in 
Patristic Pldlosopliy, (Amsterdam: North Holland Pub. Co., 1975) p. 109. 
8 'For the Word, being Son of the One God, is referred to Him of whom also He is; so that Father 
and Son are two, yet the monad of the Godhead is indivisible and inseparable. And thus too we 
preserve One Beginning of Godhead and not two Beginnings, whence there is strictly a 
Monarchy. And of this very Beginning the Word is by Nature Son, not as if another beginning, 
subsisting by Himself, nor having come into being externally to that Beginning, lest from that 
diversity a Dyarchy and Polarchy should ensue; but of the One Beginning He is own Son, own 
wisdom, own Word, existing from It. ' Athanasius, Con Ar. 4: 1. Cf. E. P. Meije ring 'Athanas ius on 
the Father as the Origin of the Son' in God Being Histoi-ji, pp. 89-102 
9 Athanasius, Conh-a Gentes 47 
IOThe Latin tradition was satisfied with a concept of 'principle* or%ource*which the 
Cappadocian Fathers replaced by 'cause" as the reserve of the Father alone. ' Andre De Halleux, 
'Personnahsnie ou Essentialisme Trinitaire chez les Peres CappadociensT Revue 77teologique de 
Louvain, 17,1986, p. 265. 
IIT. F. Torrance, Triiiitariaii Pm-spectives (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. S. 
12 Athanasius, Discourse I Agaiiist the Arialls, 8: 29. 
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primarily in the person of the Father at the expense of the persons of the Son and 
the Spirit. While we acknowledge this tendency, in the Cappadocians' attempt to 
establish the particularity of the persons, we must note that they affirmed the 
Athanasian insistence that the term 'father' implied the existence of a son. 13 This 
ensured that the Father could never be identified as self existent or as existent 
apart from the Son and by implication, apart from the Spirit. 14 
For what mutual relation is so closely and concordantly engrafted and fitted 
together as that meaning of relation to the Father expressed by the word 'son'? 
And a proof of this is that even if both of these names be not spoken, that which 
is omitted is connoted by the one that is uttered, so closely is the one implied in 
the other, and concordant with it: and both of them are so discerned in the one 
that one cannot be conceived without the other. 15 
To identify the Father as cause is not therefore at the expense of the identity of 
the Son but in conjunction with the Son. Not only were the Cappadocians and 
Athanasius attempting to affirm some of the same things but that they were also 
working from the same basic position. These Fathers together sought to defend a 
position which established the unity of the Godhead without denying the 
particularity of the persons. 
1.3. Subordination or Equality? 
The real concern of many in the West with the Cappadocian approach to the 
doctrine of the Trinity is that the Father is God in a way which the Son and Spirit 
are not. 16 The heart of the issue was, and is, about the legitimacy of any 
suggestion that one of the three persons is 'superior' to the others. 17 The 
13 Nyssa argues for no cause beyond the Father for to do so would disallow the Father as his 
proper name. Nyssa, Coii. Eiiii. Bk. 1. 
14 Bobrinsky notes that the Cappadocians, included the Spirit in this idea of 'the "person" who is 
at once identified as a concrete and irreducible existent while being inseparably united to the 
Father and Son. Nyssa conceived'the Spirit to be an essential power 'self-centred in its own 
person, yet incapable of being separated from God' 'The Indwelling of the Spirit in Christ: 
'Pneumatic Christology' in the Cappadocian Fathers', SVTQ 28-1,1984, p. 63. 
15 Nyssa, Con. Eun. 4; 8. Cf. Con. Eun. 2: 2,9. 
16 To Athanasius, the Godhead is complete not in the Father alone, still less in the Three Persons 
as parts of the one OUGM, but in each Person as much as in all. The Cappadocian Fathers go back 
to the Origenist view that the Godhead is complete primarily in the Father alone, but mediately in 
. -I >- the Son and Spirit, by virtue of their origination from the Father as xqyiI or(XL-rL(X TqS OEoTq-rO S. 
Newman 'introduction' to Vol. IX in NPNF, p. xxxii. 
17 Gunton says of the idea of the Father as cause: 'While such a claim preserves the due priority 
of the Father in the Godhead, I do not believe that it allows for an adequate theology of the 
mutual constitution of Father, Son and Spirit. Gunton, The M-onzise p. 165. 
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suggestion of subordination remains unacceptable to many in the West. 
McFarlane draws on Schleiermacher to illustrate the xvidespread ongoing refusal 
to accept any notion of subordination in the Trinity. 
Schleiermacher makes a very perceptive and critical comment regarding such an 
interpretation which actually addresses the theological method assumed by 
Zizioulas... 'they identify the Father with the unity of the divine essence, but not 
the Son or the Spirit. This can be traced right back to the idea of Origen, that the 
Father is God absolutely, while the Son and the Spirit are God only by 
participation in the divine essence- an idea which is positively rejected by what 
the Orthodox Church teaches, but secretly underlies their whole procedure. '18 
The problem is how to identify that the Father is in some way the 'principle' of 
the Godhead without allowing for the demeaning of the Son and the Spirit. 
Identifying the Father as principle must be held hand in hand with a clear 
identification of the absolute equality of the three hypostases. Zizioulas suggests 
that Basil's doxological treatment of the three persons, 'Father and Son and Holy 
Spirit', gives clear evidence that he perceived the three persons as fully and 
equally God. 19 A clear example of how they tried to hold the two together is 
seen in Nazianzen's sermon, On the Arrival of the Egyptians. 
But if anyone be estranged from God, and therefore divideth the One supreme 
Substance into an inequality of natures, it were marvellous if such a one were not 
cut in sunder by the sword, and his portion appointed with the unbelievers... if 
all that the Father has belongs likewise to the Son, except Causality. 20 
Since the Cappadocians were intent upon maintaining the unique identity and 
equality of each person, any model which suggests that the Son or the Spirit is 
less than the Father would be unacceptable. Furthermore to interpret their 
understanding of causality as a basis for demeaning the Son and the Spirit is to 
take it out of its context. 
Nonetheless, in the attempt to hold together the notion of the Father as the 
principle of the other two persons there is almost inevitably a tendency to see a 
demeaning of the Son and the Spirit. When Lossky quotes John of Damascus to 
support the idea of the Father as cause we can see that the hidden agenda, 
suggested by McFarlane, has been and continues to be very boldly stated by 
some Eastern thinkers. 
18 Graham McFarlane, Cith'st and the Spirit p. 64, quoting Schleiermacher. 
19 Zizioulas suggested this in private conversation January 20,1997. 
20 Nazlanzen, Or. 34: 9-10, Or. 2: 38. 
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The Father derives from Himsetf His being, nor does He derive a single quality 
from another. Rather he is himself the beginning and cause of the existence of all 
things both as to their nature and mode of being. All then that the Son and the 
Spirit have is from the Father, even their very being; and unless the Father is, 
neither the Son nor the Spirit is. 21 
This highlights the major concern of many theologians in the West with the 
apparent Orthodox tendency to identify the Father alone as the'essence'of God. 
1.4. Neo-platonic Emanationism 
T. F. Torrance suggests that the way the Cappadocians choose to affirm deity to 
the Son and the Spirit failed to allow for the fact that each of the persons is 
wholly God. In the progression from the Father to the other Persons they might 
be in danger of casting 
the internal relations of Father, Son and Spirit into consecutive structures of a 
causal series or a 'claim' of dependence through the Son, instead of conceiving 
them more, like Athanasius, in terms of their coinherent and undivided 
wholeness in which each person is whole of the whole. 22 
T. F. Torrance is raising the concern that the Cappadocians, are using a Neo- 
platonic approach to perceive how the one essence of God is distributed from the 
first person of the Trinity through to the othertwo. 23 Torrance believes that in 
their singular emphasis upon the Father there is a danger of suggesting that the 
Son and the Spirit derive their deity from the Father. 
There are many others who accuse the Cappadocians of uncritically applying 
principles of platonism to the doctrine of the Trinity. Weinandy, while 
appreciating some aspects of the Cappadocians' position, suggests that they 
confused rather than clarifyied the terminological advance of Athanasius. 
21 MT pp. 59-60. 
22 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), p. 238. 
23 '[Clausality to the Cappadocians was a unique sense of cause as comprising and continuous 
with its effects'. T. F. Torrance, Vie Trinibirian Faith , p. 237. Torrance quotes Basil Con Eun 1: 19,25 
E17.38: 4,7 and. Nyssa Con Eun. 1: 36,39,42 in support of his statement. 
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For I the Cappadocians I the Father alone still embodied the Godhead and the Son 
was begotteil oid of him and the Holy Spirit 1-n-oceeded oid of him. While the 
Cappadocians were great terminological and conceptual innovators in regard to 
the Trinity and wished to ensure the monarchy of the Father and the true 
individuality of the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet because they did not possess the 
metaphysical acumen of Athanasius, Platonic emanationism became firmly 
grafted into Orthodox Trinitarian thought, and is present to this day. 24 
While we will challenge Weinandy's understanding of the Cappadocians later in 
this chapter, we must admit that some Orthodox thinkers do appear to have 
adopted platonic concepts and even Neo-platonic emanationism in their 
depiction of Trinitarian doctrine. 25 The danger is in suggesting that the Father is 
God because he holds or is the essence of God which appears to be exactly what 
Lossky is saying. 
If the Father is the personal cause of the hypostases, he is also, for that reason, the 
principle of their common possession of one and the same nature; and in that 
sense, He is the 'source' of the common divinity of the three. 26 
For Lossky establishing that the 'one' of the Godhead is the person of the Father 
is a key defence of the filioque clause and a clear attempt to move away from 
locating being in an primordial essence. However, in his concern to establish 
that the particular person of the Father is fully God in himself, he is in danger of 
simply reversing the position of some thinkers in the West. Where some in the 
West appear to locate the Father in the essence, Lossky appears to be locating the 
essence solely in the Father. While Lossky continues in the same argument to 
establish that the Father is eternally related to the Son (in the very fact that he is 
Father), the damage has already been done, the Father has been isolated as in 
some way existing or'being-in-himself'. 27 
24 Weinandy, 77ze Father's Spirit of Sonship, p. 13. We have already discussed Weinandy's 
comments on the Cappadocians use of the term homoousion in chapter one of this thesis. p. 
25 We must not overlook the fact that the Cappadocians explicitly discounted the idea that they 
were using platonic principles uncritically. Nazianzen Or 29: 2 Basil Ep. 52: 3. The Cappadocian 
development of the understanding of the ousia (which was discussed in chapter one of this 
thesis) as the dynamic communion of the three persons which was not contained by one of the 
three but constituted in the mutual relating of the three would avoid the problem of a platonic 
essence. 
26 I&L p. 91. 
27 Lossky continues from the quotation above to cite Damascene in saying the Father is always 
the Father of the Son. John of Damascus in the same passage does identify the unitý, Nvith the 
essence of God (or the ousia) as well as with the Father. A IT p. 61. 
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1.5. Nazianzen's Modirication of Causality 
T. F. Torrance, who seeks to mediate between the East and the West, suggests that 
the Cappadocians even differed among themselves on the issue of causality. He 
postulates that Nazianzen, in his later writings, eventually moved beyond Basil's 
I mistake' of locating the cause in the Father and in fact 'strongly objected to it', 28 
by emphasising a unity based in God as Trinity and backing down from 
speaking of the Father as cause. 29 We must be clear at this point that this is not 
simply a issue of terminology; T. F. Torrance is not solely concerned to establish 
whether or not the Cappadocians used the term 'cause'. He also seeks to show 
Nazianzen's reticence to use language which located the Father as the One God 
to the detriment of the other two persons. What concerns T. F. Torrance is any 
hint that the Father might be identified as superior to the other persons. 
Nazianzen's language would seem to tread the middle ground very carefully as 
he allows the monarchy to be identified with the one God without suggesting 
that the monarchy is identified with either the essence of God or solely with the 
person of the Father. 30 
One God because of the Monarchia. No sooner do I conceive of the one than I am 
illumined by the splendour of the three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I 
am carried back to the One. When I think of anyone of the three I think of Him 
as the Whole. 31 
Nazianzen was not proposing something different from Basil who also suggests 
that the Monarchia can be identified with the one God. 32 However, it does 
appear that Nazianzen attempted to more carefully balance the concern for 
particularity of the persons while emphasising the oneness of God. Lossky in 
fact suggests that Nazianzen was actually holding the concept of the one God 
and the Father so closely together that he is in danger of confounding them. 33 In 
28 T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 19. 
29 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, p. 239 & Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 138. 
. 01 30'But Mov(xpXL(x is that which we hold in honour. It is, however, a monarchy that is not limited 
to one person, for it is possible for Unity if at variance with itself to come into a condition of 
plurality; but one which is made of an equality of Nature and a union of mind, and an identity of 
motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity- a thing which is impossible to created nature- 
so that though numerically distinct there is no severance of Essence. ' Nazianzen, Third Theo. Or. 
2. 
31 Nazianzen, Or 40: 41. 
32 'Worshipping as we do God of God, we both confess the distinction of persons and at the same 
time abide by the Monarchy. ' Basil, De. Sp. St. p. 45. 
33 MT. p. 59- 
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spite of the care with which Nazianzen spoke of the monarchy of the one God or 
how he used the notion of cause, we cannot hold with T. F. Torrance in his claim 
that Nazianzen, even later in his career, denied the notion of causality. 
Nazianzen clearly continues to identify the Father as the cause of the other tývo 
persons of the Godhead. 34 It would seem that while Nazianzen and the other 
Cappadocians recognised the danger of locating the cause solely in the Father 
they refused to put it aside as a principle of the Trinity. 
We have already noted that where Athanasius was primarily concerned with the 
danger of Arianism, the Cappadocians, and especially Basil, entered the disputes 
when the concern was with the continuing question of Sabellianism. Where Basil 
sought to affirm the integrity of the particular persons and to avoid the danger of 
identifying a unity of being as primary to the persons, Nazianzen (after Basil's 
death) was primarily involved in the complex Eunomian debates in 
Constantinople. Therefore when we look at Nazianzen's references to the Father 
as cause we need to keep in mind that the debate in which he was directly 
involved was more sharply focused than it had been for Basil. 
1.6. Against the Eunomians 
Underlying the discussion of the arche or affia for the Fathers was the 
interpretation of the generation of the Son from the Father. The clarification of 
the issues arose in the context of debates over orthodoxy. The Eunomians had 
interpreted the biblical statement of 'begotten' (yEvvqTos) asyEVTITOS, meamng 
originated. They used this as a basis for arguing that the Father, as the 
generative source, was by nature different than the Son and the Spirit and as 
such was the only true God. The Eunomian position which developed out of a 
particular interpretation of Origen's doctrine of causality was itself clearly and 
carefully refuted by the Cappadocians. The Fathers affirmed the biblical 
statement of generation yet refused to allow the generation to be a reason to 
suggest any distinction of essence between the persons. The Fathers were also 
careful to allow no room for the Arian argument that 'there was a time when the 
Son was not'. They did this by allowing that the generation of the Son is a- 
34 Torrance's claims fall down when one observes that Nazianzen continues to affirm the notion 
of Father as cause at least until 381 a. d. Nazianzen, Or 42: 15 written in 381a. d. See also Or. 31: 10 
written in 380 a. d. Meijering affirms that'time and again Gregory stresses that the Father is the 
cause of the Son. He denies that this means that the Father is, in time, prior to the Son'. 
Meijering, 'Will and Trinity in Gregory of Nazianzus', p. 108 
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temporal; there never was a time when the Father was without the Word, or 
when He was not with the Father'. 35 The generation of the Son does not 
describe how the Son came to be, but how the Son is related to the Father. 36 For 
the Son, although generated by the Father, is Himself unoriginate; 'but the 
proper name of the unoriginate is the Father, and that of the unoriginately 
Begotten is Son, and that of the unbegottenly Proceeding or going forth is the 
Holy Ghost. '37 They qualified the generation of the Son as an eternal generation, 
thus noting that the Father was eternally Father and the Son eternally Son. 38 
It is interesting that, in the debate between the Cappadocians, and the 
Eunomians, both parties affirmed the language of cause with reference to the 
Father. 39 The Eunomians, used causality to suggest that the Son was not of the 
I essence' of the Father who was God. The Cappadocians rather than putting 
aside the term 'cause', emphasised that it was the person of the Father, rather than 
the essence of God or even the essence of the Father, which caused the Son. The 
Cappadocians did not want to deny that the Father was in some way the 
I principle' of the Son. Yet, equally they could not simply affirm that the Son was 
of the essence of God; for to refute the Eunomians' argument with the simple 
identification of the Son with the essence of God would tend towards an 
essentialism of substance. To suggest that the essence of God could be identified 
solely with the Father would be to deny the assertion that it was the person of the 
Father and not his 'ousia' which caused the Son and the Spirit. Zizioulas argues 
that for the Cappadocians, 'the introduction of <cause> in addition to <source> 
was meant to indicate that divine existence does not <spring>, so to say, 
<naturally> as from an impersonal substance, but is brought into existence, it is 
35 Nazianzen, Or 29: 17. 
36 But the things of God are beyond all this, for with, Him perhaps the will to beget is generation, 
and there is no intermediate action. Nazianzen Or 29: 5 See also Ep 38: 4. 
37 Nazianzen, Or 30; 19, CF Nyssa, Con Eun. Bk. 1: 42. 
38 Nazianzen, Or 29: 2,3. 
39 The idea that all things must have their'being' in some absolute source or sources was a 
principle of early Greek philosophy. Thus causality or the attempt to find the simple irreducible 
source of being was part of the philosophers' quest. In the Phaedo, Plato says'generation is, as it 
were, an ever existing and immortal element in the mortal nature' Reginald E. Allen, Greek 
Philosoj7hy: 77wles to Aristotle, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 150 Philosophical 
interpretations of causality were obviously not compatible with the notion of causality as it was 
used by the Cappadocians. 
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<caused> by someone'. 40 Nazianzen reminds us of their objective: 'lest Nve 
should give Essence to the Father but deny personality to the others and make 
them only powers of God, existing in Him, and not personal'41 The emphasis 
that the Son was 'personally' and not 'essentially' caused was the basis of 
Nazianzen's argument that the being of God, as either Father or Son could not be 
located in a static essential substance. Let us look more closely at some of the 
specifics of the argument to illustrate this issue. 
Within the debate one of the key questions which was raised was how the will of 
A God was involved in the generation of the Son. If it was ainvoluntary generation 
it would suggest that the generation of the Son was a necessary generation, 
which in turn would imply that there was some higher principle which 
determined the 'being' of God. This involuntary generation would therefore be a 
form of platonic emanationism which Nazianzen clearly refutes. 42 Alternatively, 
the Eunomians argued that, a voluntary generation would imply that the 'will' of 
God was in some way distinct from God's being. In other words the very 
arbitrariness of the 'will' of God would imply that the Son was not of the very 
essence of God. Nazianzen argued, using the analogy of a human father; because 
it was the person of the Father who caused the Son the will of the Father cannot 
be abstracted from the person of the Father. 43 In affirming the strong 
identification of the will of the Father with his person, Nazianzen also affirmed 
that the 'will' of the Father was not arbitrary or a 'choice' of the Father but, the 
eternal will of the Father. 44 By emphasising the Son as generated or caused by 
the person of the Father, Nazianzen was able to assert that the Son was freely, yet 
not arbitrarily caused by the Father. 
The emphasis upon a personal rather than essential notion of cause should not be 
taken to suggest that the Cappadocians had moved towards a denial of the 
40 Ziz loulas, Ae Teachlizg, p. 37. 
41 Nazianzen, Fifth Theo, Or 32. (-uCCkkcc 6F'- [n) u6ocnijaw[tEv, &kkcýc buvoc[tEts E)Eou jtoLq(j(%tEv 
2>C .1 EVURCxgxoucf(xs, (Yvx vq)U(-3TW(T(xs. ) 
42 Nazianzen, Third Theo. Or. 2. 
43 Nazianzen Third Theo. Or. 6 
44'The how of God's generation remains unknown to men, and that God's will differs from 
human w] I I, because in God (unlike man) will and action do not foflow each other, but coincide. ' 





? essential' unity of God. They clearly maintained that the essential oneness of 
God was not to be collapsed into the unity of the persons. 
In saying that the one is caused and the other uncaused, we do not divide the 
nature by the principle of causality, but only explain that the Son does not e\lst 
without generation nor the Father by generation... When, then, we acknowledge 
such a distinction in the Holy Trinity that we believe that one is cause and the 
other depends on it, we can no longer be charged with dissolving the distinction 
of the Persons in the common nature. The principle of causality distinguishes 
then, the Persons of the Holy Trinity. It affirms that the one is uncaused, while 
the other depends on the cause. But the divine nature is in every way 
understood to be without distinction or difference. For this reason we rightly say 
that there is one Godhead and one God, and express all the other attributes that 
befit the divine in the singular. 45 
Where the identification of the Father as the cause of the other persons would 
serve to distinguish the particular persons, the distinction between ousia and 
hypostasis would seem to guard against locating the essence of the Godhead 
primarily in the person of the Father. Where the Eunomians would allow that 
the essence of God was a cause if not the cause of all that exists, the Cappadocians 
emphasised that within the Trinity the person of the Father was the cause of the 
other two persons. 46 Not only were they positing a personal rather than 
essential notion of causality but, by holding the personal cause together with the 
I essential' oneness of God, the Cappadocians challenged the notion of static 
essential ontologies. The Eunomians had argued against there being any 
distinction in God for 'movement' would imply either necessity or arbitrariness. 
In holding together the 'simple' unity of God with the eternal distinction of the 
persons the Cappadocians were inevitably positing movement within the 
Godhead and by implication a dynamic notion of being. 47 
1.7. Cause: Unity of the Persons or the Oneness of God? 
It is often assumed that the Cappadocians attempted to identify the Father as the 
cause of unity within the Godhead because he had or is the source of the'essence' 
of deity. If the notion of causality was intended primarily to guard the unity of 
45 'An Answer to Ablabius'that we should not think of saying there are three Gods'. Christoloýzy Of 
the Lato- Fathers, Library of the Christian Classics, vol. III p. 266-270. Nyssa quoted by F. Watson, 
Research Insitute in Systematic Theology, Kings College, London, Nov. 26,1996. 
46 Pelikan quotes Nyssa who acknowledges and uses the commonplace notion that God is the 
first cause. Pelikan, Christianihj and Classical Culture p. 67-8. 
47 ZtZioulas suggests that the notion of cause, as the Cappadocians utilised it, implied a 
dynamism in the being of God. Seminar presented at King's College Theological Research 
Summer Seminar, Sept. 1997. 
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God it would suggest that the unity of God was secondary to the persons, which 
in turn would imply either Neo-platonic emanationism or a notion of a 
compound God who is made up of the unity of three distinct persons. It is 
misleading to suggest that the central emphasis upon the Father as cause was 
only an attempt to locate the source of unity with the Father; as though having 
begun with the premise of the distinction of the persons the Cappadocians had to 
reinforce that they were one. 48 Certainly Nazianzen, in defending the doctrine 
in Constantinople., does suggest that the three persons are united because the 
Father is their cause, but this is not to suggest that the Father is the source of the 
oneness of the God. We would suggest that the primary purpose of emphasising 
the Father as cause was not to maintain the unity of the persons but to emphasise 
their distinction. 
But God, Who is over all, alone has, as one special mark of His own hypostasis, 
His being Father, and his deriving His hypostasis from no cause; and through 
this mark He is peculiarly known. Wherefore in the communion of the substance 
we maintain that there is no mutual approach or intercommunion of those notes 
of indication perceived in the Trinity, whereby is set forth the proper peculiarity 
of the Persons delivered in the faith, each of these being distinctively 
apprehended by His own notes. 49 
To assert that the notion of Father as cause was a method by which the 
Cappadocians maintained the unity of God is to deny their adherence to the 
formula of one ousia and three hypostases. For the identification of the 'oneness' 
of God with the ousia could never be identified 'exclusively', with one 
autonoinous person5O The Father as cause is the basis by which we understand 
the unity and distinction of the persons. Therefore, when we speak of the unity 
and distinction of the persons we speak of the Father as cause; when we speak of 
the oneness of God we speak of the one ousia. 
4.8 While T. F. Torrance, in The Trinitarian Faith, pp. 237-38, suggests that the need for a basis of 
unity is the reason for the Cappadocians use of the Father as cause it would seem that this idea 
was secondary to their primary perspective of maintaining the particularity of persons as the 
irreducible unit of being. 
49 Basil, Ep. 38: 4. This epistle is variously attributed to Basil or to Gregory of Nyssa. 
50 'They rightly said "of one substance", in order to set forth the equal dignity of the nature. 
Things, that have a relation of brotherhood, are not, as some persons have supposed, of one 
substance; but when both the cause and that which derives its natural existence from the cause 
are of the same nature, then they are called "of one substance". ' Basil Ep. 52: 2. 
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2.1. One in Three or Three in One 
At the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity lies the paradox of the one in three and 
the three in one. It will always remain difficult to avoid collapsing this 'formula' 
into a simple equation. Father De Regnon is quoted by both Eastern and I Vestern 
thinkers for his statement of this paradox. 'Latin philosophy first considers the 
nature in itself and proceeds to the agent; Greek philosophy first considers the 
agent and afterwards passes through it to find the nature. '51 The logic of this 
statement belies the struggle to maintain the paradox which has plagued 
theologians of both East and West. Zizioulas and T. F. Torrance agree that De 
Regnon's commonly accepted thesis can be misleading. They both refer to the 
Greek Fathers who stressed the oneness and the threeness of God as the two 
aspects of God which must be held together at the same time; God who cannot be 
numbered is neither one nor three, but one and three. In other words, Nve do not 
begin by describing the unity of God. and then move on to describe how that 
unity in some way includes a distinction of the three persons; nor do we begin by 
speaking of the three persons and continue to describe their unity as one aspect 
of their personhood. 
Zizioulas seeks to maintain the paradox by allowing that while we may speak of 
the oneness of God either in terms of substance or in terms of the person of the 
Father we are actually speaking of God in two different ways. When speaking of 
the 'what' of the being of God we speak of the ousia; when speaking of the 'how' 
of the being of God we speak of the three persons. 52 These two ways of speaking 
of the 'beingý of God are not inutually exclusive options between which we must 
choose; they must both be held together at the same time. As Zizioulas himself 
clearly states, 'the identification of God with the Father risks losing its biblical 
content unless our doctrine of God includes not just the three persons, but also 
51 Theodore DeRegon, Etudes de tizeologie positive stir la Sainte Trinite. p. 433. Quoted by Lossky in 
ý, N IT. p. 57-58, and by John Meyendorff, Byzantine 
77zeology: Historical Trends, and Doctrinal Tlietnes 
(New York: SVS Press, 1974), p. 181. 
52 In private conversation January 20,1997 Zizioulas suggested that there are three aspects to 
'being': one is the affirmation that something exists; two is the 'what' question, e. g. It is the 
substance which exists; and three is the 'how' question, it is the persons who exist. Cf. Zizioulas, 
'The Doctrine of God: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution'in Trinitarian 77ieology 
Today ed. Christoph Schwoebel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) p. 55. Zizioulas identifies the'how' 
with the hypostases and the'what' xvith the ousia. Cf. LeGuillou, ReflextOns, p. 460, notes that 
Aquinas suggested that we may speak of the what and the who of God. 
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the unique ousia. '53These two ways of speaking of God's being cannot be 
identified with God's being ad intra and God's being ad extra. 54 To identify God 
ad intra with the'what'of God leads too easily to the identification of the static 
essence of the 'transcendent' God as the source of the persons. By using these 
two ways of speaking, which are not mutually exclusive or comprehensive in 
their own right, we are enabled to more carefully balance our discussions of the 
mystery of the triune God. 55 
T. F. Torrance, like Zizioulas, desires to walk a nuddle path, avoiding the failures 
of both East and West to hold together a unity of persons in the One God. 
Although T. F. Torrance prefers to speak of the one Being of God(Which is 
dynamic and relational), where Zizioulas prefers to speak of the person (who by 
definition is constituted in relation), both theologians are seeking to confront the 
static monadic ground of many western approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Nonetheless they each continue to remain true to DeRegnon's thesis in some 
ways by prioritising one of the two approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
2.2. T. F. Torrance on One Being, Three Persons 
T. F. Torrance, acknowledging the problem with western treatments of the 
essence as a static something, notes the danger for the East in undermining the 
ousia of God to the point that it is perceived as generic: 
the one Being of God refers not to some impersonal essence, which has often 
been the problem of the Latin West, nor to some abstract generic notion of being, 
which has been a tendency in the Greek East, but to the living dynam. ic'l am' of 
the One God, the eternal living Being which God has of Himself. 56 
The emphasis upon the eternal living being of God does suggest a notion of 
God's being which is not a static substance; however T. F. Torrance's argument at 
times betrays a willingness to emphasise the being at the cost of the persons. 
53 BC p. 89. 
54 We must be absolutely clear at this point that the language of the'how'God exists is not to be 
confused with the issue of how God ad intra exists as three persons. For we must always remain 
apophatic with regard to the question 'how' God is God. Zizioulas himself affirms the apophatic 
limits to the question the how of God. Zizioulas, Vie Teaching, p. 45. 
55'The dynamic in God is such that the question as to which is more fundamental between union 
or communion is inappropriate and fundamentally anthropomorphic or, indeed, cosmo-morphic 
deriving that is, from a failure to think out of the unique form which the divine communion takes 
ad-extra. ' A. Torrance, Persons, p. 257. 
56 T. F. Torrance, Tritiltarum Perspectives, p. 19. 
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On one level there is nothing apparently wrong with identifying the Being of 
God as the source or locus of the Godhead. The problem, which T. F. Torrance 
and Zizioulas have already acknowledged, is if we perceive the being of God as 
something which hes behind the three persons. For if the being of God is in 
anyway prior or anterior to the persons then we end up positing a form of 
Sabellianism. It seems that T. F. Torrance, in his desire to avoid identifying the 
Father with the 'oneness' of God, pushes his point a little too far, so that he seems 
almost to say that the being of God is that which hes behind the three persons. 57 
Quite clearly, Athanasius' approach to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity took its 
start and controlling norm from the revealing and saving acts of God in the 
'incarnate parousia' of his only begotten Son in Jesus Christ, and moved through 
the Nicene concept 'of one being with the Father' (homoousios to Patri) to its 
ultimate ground in the eternal relations and distinctions within the one Being of 
the Godhead. 58 
There can be no question that T. F. Torrance would want to avoid suggesting that 
there is anything lying behind the three persons of the Trinity yet his very 
expression of a progression from Christ to the homoousion to the ultitnate ground 
of the one being of God seems to lead in that direction. 
Another point at which T. F. Torrance's prioritising of the being of God seems to 
lead him away from the Eastern position is seen when he speaks of the two 
aspects of the being of God. 'Calvin distinguishes between subsistentia= 
hypostasis and essentia, for subsistentia= hypostasis refers to being -in-relation 
(existere ad alios), but essentia refers to being-in-itself (existere in se, a se ipSO). '59 
We, in contrast to Torrance, would prefer at this point to avoid Calvin's 
suggestion that the ousia or the'one'can be identified as being-in-itself. To 
identify the essence of God as being-in-itself is legitimate in so far as it 
emphasises both the integrity and simplicity of God. The difficulty is that it 
lends itself all too easily to the idea that the 'essence' of God (identified with the 
oneness of God as opposed to the threeness of God, and futhermore, almost 
identified with God ad intra) is the pure or simple substratum which lies behind 
57 He affirms Calvin in identifying the persons as subsistent in the one being of God. Subsistent 
is not being for although it is joined by an indivisible nexus it is not simply to be equated with it. 
T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian PerspectiVes, p. 69. 
58 T. F. Torrance, Trinitarlim Perspectives, p. 9. 
59 T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 28. 
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the three persons. 60 Nonetheless, we would prefer Calvin's formula to T. F. 
Torrance's own formula of 'one Being, three persons, for when xve align 
Torrance's formula with the patristic formula of one ousia and three hypostases 
the clear implication is that the ousia is equated with the being of God. It is this 
implication which would clearly conflict with the thrust of this chapter that the 
persons are not adjuncts to the 'one being' of God. At least Calvin is clearly 
identifying that we must acknowledge that both the hypostases and ousia are 
I ways' of speaking of the being of God. Yet, we would suggest that if in contrast 
to the language of being-in-itself, we identify the oneness of God xvith the ousia 
and refer to it as being-as-communion (or even being as love), Nve may establish I that it is never a static substance but the dynamic perichoretic being of God. 
In the concern to avoid any implications that the persons are self existent 
T. F. Torrance seems to interpret Nazianzen. and Athanasius through the western 
perspective of the 'relations' subsisting in the one being of God. 61 There is one 
point where Nazianzen identifies the person of the Father with the relation. 
between the Father and the Son. 621-lowever, the identification of the relations as 
internal. to the one being of God is in fact subtly different to Nazianzen's 
association of the relations with the persons rather than with the one substance 
or essence of God. 63 The relations must be ontological but the persons must not 
60 Gunton, The ProtniSe, p. 170, criticises Calvin on this same point: 'It does seem that Calvin here 
commits the characteristic sin of Western trinitarianism, of seeing the persons not as constituting 
the being of God by their mutual relations but as in some way inhering in the being that is in 
some sense prior to them. ' 
61 'The account that Gregory the Theologian offers us of the Holy Trinity represents a dynamic 
development of the Athanasian doctrine of the real relations dwelling consubstantially within the 
unitary Being or ousia of God. ' T. F. Torrance, Truzitartatz Perspectives, p. 33. Zizioulas also says'of 
crucial significance is Gregory's interpretative reference to the three divine persons as relations or 
schesis eternally and hypostatically subsisting in God which are strictly beyond all time, beyond 
all beginning and beyond all cause. ' BC, p. 27. 
62 Nazianzen, Third Theo. Or. 16. 
63 'But the difference of manifestations, if I may so express myself, or rather of their mutual 
relations one to another, has caused the difference in their names. ' Nazianzen Fifth Theo. Or. 9. 
Nazianzen does not suggest the persons inhere in the one being of God; 'When we look at the 
Godhead, or the First Cause, or the Monarchia, that which we conceive is one; but when we look 
at the Persons in whom the Godhead dwells, and at those who timelessly and with equal glory 
have their being from the first cause- there are three whom we worship. ' Nazianzen, Fifth Theo 
Or. 14. Cf. Or 31: 16. 
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be collapsed into the relations. 64 T. F. Torrance Is concern to offer an alternative to 
identifying the Father with the Godhead in the end seems to lend some truth to 
Zizioulas' position, that an emphasis upon the 'one being' can deny the persons 
2.3. Zizioulas on the Person 
Zizioulas maintains the distinction of the three by identifying 'person' as the 
primitive ontological category. 65 He insists that there is a simple choice; if we do 
not maintain the person of the Father as the cause of, or as primary to the 
Godhead we will inevitably perceive the three persons as emerging from a pre - 
existent substance. 66 In interpreting Athanasius (in a very different way from 
T. F. Torrance) Zizioulas goes so far as to suggest that Athanasius rejected notions 
of substance ontologies. 
[N]owhere in Platonic or, for that matter, ancient Greek thought in general, can 
we find the view that perfectness or fullness of a substance is depleted (or 
eliminated), if a certain relationship is absent from it. Athanasius himself (De 
Syn. 51) is conscious of this difference between his ontology and that of the 
Greeks as he rejects any notion of divine substance per se, i. e.. without its being 
qualified with the term Father. 67 
Zizioulas insists that the emphasis upon the persons and especiany the person of 
the Father, overturns substantialist ontologies: 68 
it is crucial whether we identify the One God with the Father or with the one 
substance. For if He is Father only secondarily and not in his ultimate personal 
identity, Fatherhood is not the name of God but a name about God. 69 
He argues that it is this identification, of particularity with a existent xvho is an 
integrated whole yet is constituted in its relation to another, which underlies a 
64 T. F. Torrance does make this qualification 'the persons are more than distinctive relations, for 
they really subsist in the one Being of God which they have in common. ' T. F. Torrance, Tritutartaii 
Perspectives, p. 70. 
65 Colin Gunton also argues for the significance of the term'person' as an ontologically primitive 
word. However, he does not claim, as Zizioulas appears to, that it is the ontological primordial 
word. The Proinise p. 10. 
66 John Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person' in Persoits Divhze and Hinnan. eds. Christoph Schwoebel 
and Colin Gunton. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991) p. 39-40. Cf. ZlZioulas in private conversation 
January 20,1997 affirmed that for him there are only these two alternatives. 
67 BC p. 85. 
68'That is to say the substance never exists in a naked state, without "a mode of existence". And 
the one divine substance is consequently the being of God only because it has these three modes 
of existence. Which it owes not to the substance but to the person, the Father. ' BC, p. 41. 
69 Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God', p. 60. 
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metaphysic that is foreign to the philosophical thought of that age. Zizioulas 
continues by arguing that the Council of Constantinople sought to affirm that the 
Son was from the person and not the substance of the Father. He notes that the 
council took the step of altering the Creed of Nicea at the point xvhere it referred 
to the Son as being 
from the substance of the Father (ek tes otisias tou patros) and making it simply 
read 'from the Father' (ek tou patros). This change at a time when fights took place 
over words could not be accidental. It is a clear expression of the Cappadocian 
interest in stressing that it is the person of the Father and not divine substance 
that is the source and cause of the Trinity. 70 
In simple terms one might say that this is the difference between identifying the 
unity of the Trinity with someone rather than with something. 71 Yet, in this 
quotation, we witness a tendency in Zizioulas to collapse the oneness and 
threeness of God into the 'one' person of the Father. While there are clear 
arguments to support the identification of God with the term Father, we would 
argue that this identification must be held carefully with the assertion that the 
oneness of God must never be solely identified with the oneness of a person. 
Alan Torrance remains critical of Zizioulas, suggesting there is a tendency 
towards contradiction. 
It is Zizioulas' contention that despite the fact that 'it would be unthinkable to 
speak of the'one God" before speaking of the God who is "communion" it is not 
only thinkable but necessary to speak ontologically of the one person before 
speaking of the God who is communion. 72 
In spite of Zizioulas' desire to hold the hypostases and the ousia in equal tension 
he clearly devotes his attention to emphasising the person. In his concern to 
avoid any hint of substantialist ontology, he appears to be setting aside the 
careful affirmation that the unity of God must be referred to as the ousia at the 
same time as it is identified with the unity of the persons in the Father. 
70 Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God', p. 51-52. We must note that others in the tradition such as 
Maximus and John of Damascus continued to use both phrases at the same time. 
71. Torrance is clearly reacting against this position when he notes that'Calvin considered it 
impossible to think of the Holy Spirit as proceeding from the Person or Hypostasis of the Father, 
rather than from the Being of God the Father. ' T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 36. 
72 A. Torrance, Persons, p. 292. 
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2.4. UsinLy the Term 'Person' 
The argument regarding the understanding and use of the term 'person'both 
theologically and anthropologically underlies the whole of this thesis. It is, 
however, useful at this point to raise some of the basic arguments regarding the 
use of the term in theological debate. The primary argument against using the 
term 'person' in theological discourse is that it commonly carries with it the 
connotations of autonomous or independent centres of consciousness. 73 
Nonetheless, we would agree with Zizioulas, and T. F. Torrance, that there are 
grounds for claiming the term person as a theological term. 74 In the context of 
Trinitarian theology we would argue that it is better to work to carefully redefine 
terms which are already established than to seek to posit alternatives. 75 It is 
likely that any alternatives will themselves cause confusion and need constant 
redefinition, given that any term used analogically of God will inevitably fail to 
fully convey the mystery of God. We would also argue that to use terms which 
are disassociated from the incarnation of Christ as a person who is human and 
divine, will inevitably lead to too strong a distinction between the revelation of 
God ad extra and God ad intra. If however, we are to claim the term as essentially 
theological, then we need to be very careful to elaborate what we mean by the 
term and how we intend to use it. Any use of the term person must take into 
account the wide variety of meanings which it carries with it. 76 Some people 
argue that the very flexibility of the term is grounds for continuing to use it in its 
theological application. 77 
73 It is these connotations which caused Barth and Rahner, among others, to avoid the term 
person in reference to the divine persons. 
74'lt must not be overlooked as Rahner seems to have done, that the concept of person, not 
known in ancient times either in Hebrew or Greek tradition, actually originated in the early 
Christian centuries as a product of the Nicene doctrines of Christ and the Holy Trinity, and thus 
as an essentially onto-relational concept. ' T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian, p. 99. 
75 Kiesling quotes W. J. Hill in support of a general consensus that it is better to seek to redefine 
the terminology of the tradition than to attempt to replace it. The problem is that 'once the notion 
of person is abandoned, rather than developed in the light of modern thought, it is difficult to 
avoid the semblance of modatistic monotheism. ' Christopher Kiesling, 'On Relating to the 
Persons of the Trinity' in Theological Shidies 47 (1986), p. 601. 
76 L. B. Porter, 'On Keeping the Persons in the Trinity', Vieological Stitdies 41,1980 p. 531, to express 
the complexity of the term'person', cites nine different definitions from the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
77 Alan Torrance, Persons p. 266. 
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II It might well be argued that in colloquial and literary discourse it is not so 
much a conceptually elusive or overly subtle word as it is a creatively allusive 
word exhibiting a flexibility that is one of its chief virtues and that these very 
characteristics are what first recommended its use in theological discourse. 78 
As we will explore in chapters four and five of this thesis, Zizioulas' and Lossky's 
understandings of the term 'person' are different, even though they are both 
seeking to establish their understanding of the term in Cappadocian theological 
definitions The term person, when used in theological discourse must always be 
carefully 'set' within the whole scope of Trii-dtarian thought. 79 
2.5. Person-in -Relation 
It is the very relational basis of the term 'person' which allows Zizioulas to 
identify it as the starting point of the doctrine of the Trinity. 80 'In God it is 
possible for the particular to be ontologically ultimate because relationship is 
permanent and unbreakable. '81 The person can never be considered as a thing in 
itself, but is always constituted in relation to another. 'The person cannot exist 
without communion; but every form of communion which denies or suppresses 
the person, is inadmissible. '82 In making this identification he at once refutes the 
notion that we can ever speak of being-in-itself yet identifies the Father as this 
particular who is primary to being. Zizoulas, appears to be doing two things at 
the same time: he is defining the term 'person' from Trinitarian theology while 
also affirming Trinitarian theology through the definition of the term 'person. 83 
The identification of the Father with the concept of causality is clearly 
problematic for the affirmation of the notion of the person. One difficulty is that 
the language of 'cause' is itself grounded in essentialist principles. To utilise the 
notion of causality to affirm the ontological primacy of the term person creates 
the danger of collapsing the paradoxical formula which is the very basis of 
78 L. B. Porter, 'On Keeping the Persons in the Trinity', p-533- 
79 Which is why, for example, we argued in chapter one that LaCugna's use of the term 'person', 
to guard the 'unknowability' of God, was not adequate. Rather it must be held in the context of a 
clear distinction between God ad ititra and God ad extra. 
80'Father' by definition is a relational term (no father is conceivable without a son). BC, p. 85. Cf. 
p. 86. 
81 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person', p. 41- 
82 BC p. ] 8. 
83 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Persotz', p. 40. 
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defining the term person in the first place. Causality points to a notion of 
movement in the context of the formula of the one in the three; it helps to affirm 
that God is not a static essence but a dynamic and relational being-84We 
maintain a dynamic rather than a static notion of God's being because of the 
paradox of holding together the two ways of speaking of the being of God, the 
one ousia and three hypostases. In so far as the use of the concept of causalib, ý 
might be used to overturn the whole approach to substantialist ontologies it is a 
good rhetorical tool. However, the term cause should not be used to establish 
the notion of the person as ontologically primordial to the being of God, but to 
affirm that within the formula of the one ousia and three hypostases neither the 
persons nor the simple unity can take precedence over the other. It does not and 
should not suggest that we can locate the unity of God solely in the person of the 
Father. We would agree that we cannot perceive substance as ontologically 
primary; yet, to posit the particular as ontologically primary in contradistinction 
to the substance of God would seem in danger of replacing the one substance 
with the substance of a particular. 
The term person cannot in itself serve as the basis for a notion of unity in 
diversity. It is only as it is held within the context of the doctrine of the Trinity 
that we can claim a definition of the term which overturns popular autonomous 
concepts of the person. As such our path is first to seek to define the term person 
through founding it in the understanding of the paradox of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, and directly through the incarnation of the Son. From there we may 
continue to affirm that the term person may be used to locate real ontological 
content to the particulars, in so far as our understanding of the being of God 
establishes that content. 
3.1. The Ordering f the Persons 
If we are to utilise a concept of the person in both our doctrine of the Trinity and 
theological anthropology we will need to be clear in how we are defining the 
term. Given Zizioulas thesis, and the claim of this chapter, that person means 
84 The traditional notion of cause suggests a unidirectional relationship in which that which is 
caused is not reciprocally related, nor ontologically related, to the cause. Nazianzen clearly 
redefined cause to include reciprocity, however, the term itself should not be isolated from the 
formula within which it was used. In other words the term cause, when identified with the 
Father, is used to affirm that the oneness of God does not take precedence over the three persons 
who are constituted in relation to each other. 
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person-in-relation, we must take some time to clarify the understanding of the 
notion of relation in terms of the question of ordering or -rccýLs in the doctrine of 
the Trinity. The question of the ordering of the divine persons is a direct 
implication of the notion of causality. The scope of this chapter only allows us to 
begin to explore what is involved in the understanding of the concept of 
relations. 
Earlier in this chapter, we explored the question of whether or not the 
Cappadocians and the Orthodox Church after them, have simply used Neo- 
platonic principles in their description of the ordering of the persons. If we 
emphasise the ordering as the basis of the persons' deity then we are in danger of 
positing a platonic principle of derived deity. The relations of the persons would 
be based upon a 'materialist' sharing of the same substance whether it is 
replicated as an ideal form or partitioned as in an Aristotelian model. In either 
case the relations would define the persons or become the content of the persons. 
Rather than constituting each other in their relations the three would be seen to 
be constituted by an ordering which takes precedence over the persons. Neither 
can we allow that the relations are simply the action or choice of the personS. 85 
This would be the danger if our understanding of the communion of the divine 
persons was correlated too closely with a human analogy of community and the 
relations were perceived as anterior to the persons. This is not adequate either, 
in so far as it fails to establish that the unity of the three persons as an absolute 
unity. What we need to maintain is the relations of the persons are not external 
to the persons nor are they prior to the persons. Instead the relations as 
ontological aspects of these particular persons are essential in their constitution 
and yet do not exist apart from or above the persons. 
The question of the equality of the three persons who are each whole of the 
whole while being inseparably united as the One God is right at the heart of all 
Trinitarian depictions and it also has important implications for how we perceive 
what it means to be a person. T. F. Torrance in taking issue with a hierarchical 
ordering of persons of the Trinity, is raising a real concern. While he allows that 
the ordering of the persons within the Trinity is a real ordering he suggests it is 
85 Basil discounts 'relations of brotherhood' as analogical of the relations of the persons of the 
Trinity because they are too abstract, in failing to note the unity of substance. Basil, Ep. 52: 3. 
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not an ontological ordering that would deny the equality of the persons-86He 
says of Calvin, '[T]hus like Cyril of Alexandria he interprets the words of Jesus, 
... the Father is greater than I", not ontologically but soteriologically and 
economically. ' 87 Lossky seems to side with T. F. Torrance here in suggesting that 
the ordering of the persons cannot be true of God ad in tra: 
This is why in the realm of divine manifestation, it is possible to establish an 
order of persons (U41, S) which, strictly speaking, should not be attributed to 
Trinitarian existence in itself, despite the 'monarchy' and 'causality' of the Father: 
these confer upon Him no hypostatic primacy over the other two hypostases. 88 
This agnostic approach to the implications of the ordering of the persons for God 
ad intra is credible in so far as the incarnation of the Son must make some 
difference in the way in which the persons are related to each other. 89 Yet if we 
are to maintain that the economic Trinity is not a projection but true of and in fact 
continuous with God ad intra, we must allow that the ordering is not simply 
economic. If the ordering of the persons is not true to the being of God then how 
can we maintain that the one being of God is not prior to its expression in the 
three persons? 
Alan Torrance allows that the relations of origin are to do with the ontological 
grounding of the persons yet seeks to distinguish them from the relations of 
communion. 90 This is an important point to make as it establishes that the 
relations of the persons are not confined to a particular ordering as though this 
-rccýt s was determinative of the way the persons are and relate. In speaking of 
God ad in tra, he would say that we may speak of the Father, Son and Spirit 
without attempting to draw too many inferences from those names. While he 
86'While Calvin like Gregory Nazianzen, seeks to give full weight to the biblical order in the 
relations between the three divine Persons, he makes sure that this is not allowed to carry over 
into his thought any element of subordinationism. ' T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 32. 
87 T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 32. 
88 I&L p. 92-93 
89 In regard to the issue of the ordering of the persons Torrance would prefer to move away from 
the language of cause: 'ought we to allow our understanding of God's self revelation to be limited 
by ethnic linguistic conventions. ' T. F. Torrance, Trinitarmn Perspectives, p. 19. Alan Torrance, 
Research Institute in Systematic Theology, Kings College, London, Nov. 19,1996, speaking of the 
use of the term'father'of the first person of the Godhead suggested that we need to be careful in 
pleading semantic agnosticism as we might lose our critical controls. Surely at the point of 
dealing with the relational constitution of the three persons we must be especially careful to 
avoid using social norms to establish the principles of divine relationality. 
90 Alan Torrance, Persons, p. 254. 
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would emphasise that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are true of God ad 
intra and are not simply manifestations of God in the economy he would also 
hold that there is no inherent ordering of the persons to be discerned from the 
description of the Father and the Son. He is concerned that we should not 
assume any subordination from ascribing the terms Father and Son to the 
persons of the Trinity. 91 
We would argue that the danger in stressing the disjunction is that the terms may 
be so completely deprived of their meaning that they no longer serve as 
analogies in any sense of the word. Furthermore, the biblical and credal 
statements regarding the generation of the Son, and the identification of God 
with the Father, would seem to imply that there remains some sense in which the 
ordering of the persons is not an ordering which is solely economic and 
soteriological. While we must not circumscribe the relations of the persons 
within a structure of ordering we, equally, would not disassociate the ordering of 
the persons from the relations of communion. 
What we would be concerned about is the subliminal valuing of a concept of 
'free'relating, unconstricted. by any ordering, above the specific taxis of 
revelation. The danger is that we might uphold an ideal of free relations where 
the emphasis is placed upon each person 'choosing' who they relate to and with. 
The freedom of the relations of the persons of the Trinity is not that they choose to 
relate to each other as though the persons first exist and then relate. Rather the 
freedom in relation is the continual reciprocal affirmation of the Son in response 
to the Father and the Father in response to the Son. 92 
One difficulty with any attempt to reduce or understate the ordering of the 
divine persons is that it seems to be based in an a priori concern to establish the 
91 The Cappadocians note that even the terms Father and Son cannot be directly applied to 
humanity. Speaking of God's relations Nazianzen says: 'these names do not belong to us in the 
absolute sense, because we are both, and not one more than the other; and we are of both, and not 
of one only; and so we are divided, and by degrees become men, not perhaps even men, and such 
as we did not desire, leaving and being left, so that only the relation remain, without the 
underlying facts. ' Nazianzen, Or. 29: 4. 
92 Meijering quotes Dodd on this point: ... It is on the assumption of the possibility of one-sided 
causal relations that the whole Neo-Platonic system hinges", Gregory on purpose uses the same 
word when he speaks of the relation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father, see 
e. g. oratio 11116, obviously in order to stress the ontological equality of Father and Son. ' 
Meijering, 'Will and Trinity in Gregory of Nazianzus', p. 111. 
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homogeneity of the persons. This demand for a level playing field without a 
hierarchy has a basis in the battles against Arianism; yet, in the modern context it 
also reflects a concern for the equality of persons which too often leads to the 
demand that the persons are homogenous. However, as we have already 
discussed and established, for the Cappadocians the ordering of the persons in 
God ad intra is not to suggest that the persons are unequal. Instead the ordering 
of the persons represented by the terms ungenerated,, generated, and proceeding 
describes how the distinct persons are truly a dynamic unity. While we would 
affirm the concerns raised with regard to the damage caused by subordinationist 
views and hierarchical structures we would continue to insist that there is an 
ordering of the persons of the Trinity that finds its origin in the Father and that 
ordering must be true of God ad intra. God is Father, Son and Spirit eternally. 
Rather than emphasising an equality of persons which would deny the ordering, 
we would suggest that the ordering must not in anyway demean the truth that 
each of the persons is whole of the whole. This in turn cannot help but have 
important implications for a notion of the person. 
It is important, as Alan Torrance has noted, to recognise the limitation to any 
scheme of ordering. 93 Some scholars, following Augustine and Aquinas, argue 
that even the Cappadocians, by emphasising the equality of persons, demean the 
importance of their ordering. 94 LeGuillou argues that there must be an 
ontological ordering to do justice to the persons of the Trinity. 95 But he continues 
by discounting the ordering based simply on the terms of the East (cause - 
generated-proceeding) on the grounds that it is too apophatic and therefore 
ultimately inadequate. He perceives that the psychological model is more 
adequate as it gives specific content to the ordering of the persons. It is 
interesting to note that if we follow through the logic of the psychological 
analogy we recognise that the distinction of the three persons within the one God 
must always be relative to God relating to that which is other. In other words 
93 Torrance, Persons, p. 254. 
94'[Tiheir overriding concern is with defending the consubstantia-lity of the three hypostases. In 
doing this they allowed the order between the persons to be obscured. This is not surprising 
when one considers that the prevailing thought pattern in the background of their own thought is 
Neo-platonic participationism, in which order means a hierarchy of superior to inferior. Against 
any importation of this into Trinitarian thinking they stand firm. ' William HJU, 77w 77iree Personed 
God: The Trint4l as the A lysteiýl of Sizhiatffln, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1982), p. 279. 
95 Le Guillou, 'Reflexions' p. 455-460. 
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speaking of the inner dynamics of an individual person only has context within 
how that person relates to other persons or things. As a result, the force of the 
analogy may explain how God relates to the world in his economy but it cannot, 
by the very grounds of the analogy, be held to be true to God's being in se. In 
which case LeGuillou is left positing an analogy which either erases the 
distinction between God ad intra and God ad extra (rendering God in pantheist 
terms) or he must allow that his analogy describes only the economy of 
God(something which he has already refused to do). 96 
3.3. Reciprocal Relations 
In speaking of the relations of the persons of the Trinity we must do two things: 
We must maintain that there is an ordering of persons which originates in the 
Father and is constitutive of the persons; yet we must also maintain that the 
relations are never one sided but are eternally reciprocated by the Son and the 
Spirit. 'And the union is the Father from whom and to whom the order of 
Persons r-uns its course, not so as to be confounded but so as to be possessed, 
without distinction of time, will or power. '97 In other words the description of 
cause, generation and procession may be taken to describe an ordering of the 
persons of the Trinity; an ordering which is not simply a static hierarchy of 
temporal origination but a dynamic returning movement of communion which 
never ceases. 
To emphasise the responsive reciprocal movement of communion as a dynamic 
flow we need to establish in what way the Son and the Spirit also relate to each 
other and with the Father. The Father as arche constitutes the Son and the Spirit. 
The Son and the Spirit in their living out the purposes of the Father and offering 
back to him the fruits of their labour also serve to constitute the person of the 
Father. Colin Gunton provides some thoughts in this direction: 
96 The complexity of these issues is evident in the fact that T. F. Torrance, Triiiihiriati Perspectives, 
p. 38, appears to be in danger of doing this even though he affirms in the same chapter the need 
to hold together the economy with God ad intra. 
97 Nazianzen, Or 42: 15. 
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the Father is what he is not only because he begets the Son, but also because the 
Son responds in the way made known in his obedience as incarnate, and so can 
be understood to be the one who shares in the constitution of the being of God by 
means of his eternal response of obedience and love. Similarly, the movement of 
the Spirit can also be seen to be constitutive of the being of God the Father, in 
that it is the Spirit who ensures that the love of Father and Son is not simply 
mutual love, but moves outward, so that creation and redemption are indeed free 
acts of God, but acts grounded in his being as love. 98 
Developing the balance to the relations of origin with the description of the 
response of the Son and the Spirit to the Father need not deny the Father as 
source and would seem to be in keeping with the context of revelation. 99 
Conclusion 
The discussion of the divine persons, as we have pursued it, has implications for 
how we understand the term'person'and the term'relation'. Emphasising the 
Father as cause can lead to perceiving the three as ordered or hierarchical in 
relation to each other. However, it also affirms that the essence of being does not 
he behind these particular persons. 100 Establishing the Father as the arche or aitia 
of the other persons is not to suggest that this describes what it means to be a 
person but what it means to speak of this particular person. To say that the 
Father is the first person of the Trinity is not to imply that he alone defines the 
term person, nor that he alone establishes the ontological primacy of the person. 
The Father is never a person as a thing in itself, but only in relation to the Son and 
the Spirit who are fully and truly persons as well. 
A danger with prioritising the need for equivalence amongst the persons of the 
Trinity is that the emphasis upon the equality of persons allows for a free 
standing conception of the 'person' to take logical and even metaphysical 
precedence over these particular persons. Rather than assuming a priori that the 
persons must be equivalent to each other if they are to be fully personal, should 
we not allow the persons of the Trinity themselves to deftne what it means to be a 
98 Gunton, The Promise, p. 1 65. 
y Today, ed. 99 Christoph Schwoebel, 'Christology and Trinitarian Thought' in Trinitarian Theolog't 
Christoph Schwoebel, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 140,. suggests, 'giving up the restrictive 
view of the Trinitarian relations exclusively as originating relations and seeing them as mutual 
and reciprocal relations, though not of course as symmetrical relations. The mutuality of the 
Trinitarian Persons, includes both their personal constitution to one another and their personal 
distinction from one another. 
100 Nyssa, Enn. Bk 1: 37. 
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person? In fact, the demand for equivalence can be demeaning, rather than 
freeing, for particular persons, in that it locates the valuation of the persons in a 
principle of homogeneity. It is important to maintain that there is no free- 
standing concept of the person(no ideal form or description). There is first of all 
the person of the Son who in the incarnation makes possible the application of 
the notion of the person to the hypostases of the Godhead. It is only through the 
person of Jesus of Nazareth and the subsequent affirmation of Trinitarian 
theology that we might equally apply the term person to the Father and the 
Spirit. 101 
The unity of the Godhead must be understood in two ways if we are to maintain 
the orthodoxy of the formula of the one in three and the three in one. On the one 
hand we must maintain that the unity of the persons is not a unity which can be 
abstracted from or understood as prior to the persons of the Trinity; it is nothing 
more than the communion or community of those persons who together are the 
one God. On the other hand we must maintain that the unity or oneness of God 
is not anterior to the persons, no analogy of community or even communion can 
ever do justice to the simple unity of the one God. 
In this chapter we have sought to locate the terms 'person' and 'relation' as 
theological terms which are defined in respect to the divine persons and the 
unity of the one God. In the rest of this thesis we will be discussing how we 
might correlate the understanding of the persons and relations of the Trinity to 
human persons and relations. We would affirm that there must always be a 
disjunction maintained between human persons and divine persons. 102 A 
disjunction which the flexibility of the terms 'person' and 'relation' would seem to 
allow. It is the incarnation which brings us to the point of seeking to hold 
together the Son as the image of the Father with the claim that we too are made 
in the image of God. 
101 This emphasis is identified by other modern Orthodox writers as a clear indication that the 
irreducible unit of 'being'is not the essence of the Godhead nor even a concrete hypostasis of the 
Godhead but a particular hypostasis which is the Father. Jevtich, 'Between the "Nicaeans" and 
the "Easterners", p. 247, echoes this thought; 'For the mystery of the Christian God consists in the 
mystery of God the Father, and only subsequently the one essence of the divinity, which in fact is 
the essence of God the Father. 
102 Zizioulas argues that 'person' must remain an eschatological category. BC p. 62. 
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Section B. Person, Relation and Identity in Modern Theological 
Anthropology. 
Chapter Three: Relation and Identity in the Context of Existentialist 
and Personalist thought. 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters we discussed the concepts of ontology, person and 
relation in the context of Trinitarian theology. As we now move to discuss the 
same concepts in terms of human persons we need to begin by situating our 
argument in the context of the modem discussion of the terms person and 
relation. Our quick overview will be all too brief. However, we intend to 
highlight a few key issues in the history of the debate with reference to some 
thinkers who have direct bearing on our objective of contextualising John 
Zizioulas' understanding of person and relation. Our desire in this chapter will 
be to argue that in using the term 'relations' we need to recover some of its fuller 
meaning if we are to do justice to the questions of ontology or identity. 
I. I. Models of Relation 
The word relations which is central to all discussions of identity or ontology, has 
a remarkably wide variety of meanings. ' The modern emphasis upon 
meaningful relationships reflects a concern to speak of a certain type of relations. 
There is often the hidden assumption that 'personal' relations, defined in contrast 
to impersonal or'unreal' relations, are a vital aspect of individual self expression 
and therefore are part of the integrity of a healthy individual. The assumption 
that 'personal' relationships are the ground and content of 'real' relations is 
actually a significant narrowing of the historical understanding of relations. This 
exclusive focus on 'personal' relations intends to uphold free and meaningful 
relations and yet, because it begins with a premise of the autonomous self and 
perceives other notions of relations as inadequate, there is a danger that it will 
fail to deal with the variety and form in which relations must and do take place. 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary lists six main meanings for the word 'relation' although it does not 
encompass the notion of ontological relations which xve will discuss later in this chapter. A. 
Torrance, Persons in Coininunion, p. 259, spells out some of the diverse notions that may be 
conveyed. 'The term 'relation'can refer to logical relations, the ordering of things, the ontological 
co-ordinates of a thing or a facet of something conceived with respect to something else. It may 
refer to genealogical connections, mutual conditions, causal "aitial'' or ontological grounds. ' 
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1.2. Essentialism 
Descartes is often pejoratively identified as the original proponent or source of 
the modem problem of individualist conceptions. Without question his 
emphasis upon the rational capacity as the seat of human identity and ontology 
opened the door to the development of the notion of the disengaged and 
disembodied self. 2 Nonetheless, we would argue that the modem 
understanding of relationships, in the context of a radically autonomous view of 
the self, is informed by developments which followed long after Descartes. 
Descartes was, to all intents and purposes, working with a far more fundamental 
and ontological notion of relation. Central to his thesis was the notion that 
humanity was made in the image of God and therefore that there must be a basis 
by which we might identify an analogia entis between God and humanity. His 
notion of the mind as the seat of 'being'in the human individual was founded 
upon the biblical idea of humanity as 'made in the image of God'. 3 The thrust of 
his thesis was to determine what it was that made humanity unique; what made 
humanity'in the image of God'. He was not looking for individual 
characteristics for uniqueness as we would today. Thus, far from positing a 
notion of radical autonomy Descartes was in fact attempting to identify what 
essential structural element within the human matrix 'related' them to God. 
The fundamental problem with Descartes' approach is identified by Cohn 
Gunton. Gunton notes that the development of the idea of the rational capacity 
as the seat of the image of God and as the locus of 'being' within each individual 
is derived from a confusion of two questions which he calls the comparative and 
the ontological questions. 4 Gunton argues that to combine the question of 
ontology with the comparative question, what it means to say that this entity is 
such and not another, is in fact to confuse the issue at hand. By conflating these 
two questions western thought laid the ground work for isolating the individual 
2 Descartes' formula is characterised by Gilbert Ryle as the 'ghost in the machine' suggesting a 
rational being disengaged from the material world. In spite of Descartes attempts to posit a very 
close link between the rational capacity and the physical body the latter remamed a tool used by 
the mind. Gilbert Ryle speaks of the elusiveTin Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 
p. 186. 
3See Edward Craig's The Mind of God and the Works of Men, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
which traces the influence of the biblical notion of image in the development of Western thought. 
4 The two question are sometimes conflated, if not confused, by supposing that an argument for 
the distinctive ontology of the human might be derived from a comparison and contrast: by 
means of a quest for ways in which the human is different from other entities. Colin Gunton 
'Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology' in Persons DIVilie and Hunian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 
p. 47. 
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as a thing in itself and confused both the notions of ontology and particularitý'- 
The result of this confusion and the attempt to identify the element or locus of 
being' in humanity has led to the mind/ body dualism which is foundational to 
modern individualism. In locating 'being' in the mind or rational capacity and 
identifying that locus as the seat of the image of God, Descartes also paved the 
way for understanding the essential element of being as a static something given 
to or found in the individual. 
Although Descartes' project proved to be a significant step forward in the notion 
of individual autonomy, it is in fact Kant's rejection of abstract metaphysics 
which served to establish the break between God and humanity. This not only 
overturned the notion of a substantial 'relation' between God and humanity but 
eventually opened the door for the denial of the essential unity of all human 
beings. Although humanity was like God or related to God in their rational 
capacity it was a short step towards perceiving this rational capacity as 
something the individual 'owned' rather than a platonic sharing in'being'Nvhich 
originated in and maintained its source in God. 
Descartes' understanding of the rational capacity as the locus of our imaging God 
can hardly be understood as a relation in the modem sense of the word. Nor for 
that matter does it fit within Aristotle's notion of relations either. 5 In both cases 
relation is seen to be secondary to being or substance. Nonetheless, we would 
argue that Descartes' thesis was rooted in an understanding that the ontological 
basis of humanity was in some way founded upon humanity's 'relation' to God. 
To be 'related' to another meant that one must share some element or some basic 
similarity with another. In this sense the relation of humanity to God was 
identified with the rational content of the individual, a rational content which 
provided common ground or a meeting point with God because God was also 
rational. Thus relation, if in fact we may call this relation, was identified not with 
the active engagement with another but with the constitutive makeup of the 
individual which corresponded to the other. 
5'ln Aristotle, and certainly in logic until the time of Kant, relation is subordinate to substance. 
Relations are what take place or subsist between substances that are prior to them: something 
first exists, and then enters or finds itself in relation to other things, which may change its 
accidents, but not what it really is. ' Colin Gunton The Proynise of Tritn'tarian Theology 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), p. 156. 
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1.3. HeLyelian Idealism 
Hegel's idealism was a response both to the dualism of Descartes and to the 
radical autonomy of Kant. Although Hegel was proposing something very 
different from traditional forms of idealism his vision of total unity remained 
idealist in its comprehensiveness. 6 Hegel is significant, for the purposes of our 
study, not only because of his development of a dynamic notion of relation 
between the one and the many, but because of his significant impact on Eastern 
Orthodox thought. 'Hegel confirmed the characteristic Russian tendency to fuse 
together the religious, philosophical, and the political, and the whole of the 
enterprise of the Russian religious philosophy reflects this fusion. '7 Eastern 
Orthodoxy was seen to offer a solution to the dilemma of the relation of the 
general to the particular in combining unity and freedom. 8 Like Descartes, 
Hegel and the Russian idealists such as Khomyakov and Soloviev were not 
trying to remove God from the picture. Instead, they were offering a far more 
dynamic notion, than essentialists, of how God might be said to be 'related' to the 
world. 9 The Hegelian idealists developed the notion of relation in the context of 
how the many are related to the One. Rather than accept this relation as some 
fixed platonic element that was located in the givenness of each human being, 
there was a move towards a far more dynamic conception of reality in which the 
idea that the one was in the process of becoming meant that the future 
determines the reality of the many rather than the past or the givenness of the 
material world. 
In identifying the spiritual realm with Geist, or some interpretation of the 
Christian God such as Sophia, the Russian idealists related the Spirit directly to 
the material world. This overturned the notion which had been established by 
Cartesian dualism that the engagement of God with the world was primarily 
6 In the remainder of this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, we will use the term 'idealists' to 
refer to hegellan idealism. 
7 Rowan Williams, 'Eastern Orthodox Theology'in The Modern Theologians: all hit-rodtiction to 
Christilin Theology in the'Twentieth Century, 2nd ed., ed. David Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
p. 500. 
8'The proposition that only Orthodoxy can successfully conjoin the principle of unity with that of 
liberty has been termed "la these fondamentale de Khormakov". ' Aidan Nichols, Theology ill tile 
Riisslint Diaspora, Clitirch, Fathers, Etichin-ist in NikolaiAfans'ezý 1893-1966 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 20. 
9'Given the guiding idea of total unity, Solcryvev was naturally stimulated to endeavour to 
overcome such apparent or alleged oppositions as those between science and religions, 
philosophy and religious faith. ' Frederick Copleston, Russian Religioils Philosophy (London: 
Search Press, 1988), p. 12. 
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protological. By insisting that God or'being'was dependent upon the world for 
its realisation the idealists were identifying the one as immediately related to the 
material world. In fact the relation between the one and the many was made so 
immanent that the 'One' was inescapably related to the many. However, this 
concern with immanence was not the simple pantheism of some Romantic 
approaches, a pantheism which arrived at an emphasis upon the organic 
whole. 10 Instead, for the hegelians, the One was identified as both directly 
related to the world while still maintaining its identity as something distinct 
within the world. Where the romantics posited a notion of organic relatedness in 
contrast to the mechanical relatedness of the essentialists, the hegelians held to a 
notion of spirit/ organic relatedness which incorporated the notion of active 
agency into the question of the unity of the one and the many. By balancing the 
concern for the integrity of the one with its active relation to the many the 
hegelians moved much closer to the modern notion of free relations. 
Hegel paved the way for a dramatic breakthrough in the understanding of 
ontology. By emphasising the self realisation of the subject in a teleological 
rather than a protological. context he located 'being' in the becoming of Geist in 
relation to the many. This allowed the idealists to speak of a unity which 
accounted for or depended upon the entities which made it up rather than the 
entities being determined by the unity or substance which made them up. Thus, 
they perceived active relations as one aspect of the matrix witl-dn which the one 
and the many existed; relations in the idealists' scheme became integral to the 
unity of the cosmos. 
The panentheist approach of the idealists has much to be said for it in terms of its 
understanding of the notion of relations. It begins with the notion that relations 
take place within the matrix of being while also constituting being. Where 
essentialists used the notion of identity as the basis for applying ontology to the 
many the hegelians used the notion of relations alongside of or with ontology to 
allow the many to constitute their unity in and with the absolute subject. The 
hegehan notion of God's engagement with the world incorporates two key 
aspects of relation, identity and opposition or otherness. Hegel noted that 
relation required opposition if it was to be maintained as relation and not 
10 McFadyen comments on the danger of a notion of relations which is simply based on physical 
or organic notions of the one: 'Were social relations to be based on the principles of biophysical 
relatedness, the results would be disastrous. There would be no means of securing the continued 
independence and opposition of the other. Alistair %IcFadyen, 77ie Call To Persoilltood: a Christum 
Theoiýl of the Individittil tit Sochil Rehitionships (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), p. 64. 
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collapsed into monism-11 This was in contrast to the essentialists whose concern 
to deal with the notion of identity in ontology subsumed the question of 
otherness or opposition in relations. We can see immediately that Hegel has 
taken a significant step forward in the understanding of relation. No longer is 
ontology located in a simple concept of shared substance or essence, instead he is 
attempting to allow for identity and otherness in relation as constitutive elements 
within the matrix of being. As an attempt to explain the question of the relation 
of the one to the many it was a significant step forward from the static and 
determinist ontologies of the Cartesian approach. 
Nonetheless there remained much about the idealist system which was 
unacceptable to many modem thinkers. The most difficult issue was that the one 
took determinative precedence over the many, so that even though there was 
seen to be a dynamic ordering to reality it still seemed as though the one 
determined or was determinative of the reality of the many. 12 If, 
eschatologically, truth is the full becoming of the One then the truth of the many 
loses enduring significance however important a role they may play in the 
realisation of the one. By locating the one as an integral aspect of the matrix of 
being the idealists overcame the tendency towards division and disintegration in 
the essentialist notion of the transcendent one. However, their emphasis upon 
the one 'becoming' in relation to the many meant that eventually this becoming is 
determinative of the many. The problem is a tendency to 
displace God from the transcendent to the immanent sphere, so that the locus of 
the divine is to be found not in a God who is other, but in various aspects of this - 
worldly reality. [Gunton] argues that the displacement is damaging and 
sometimes demonic in its outcome, because only where relatedness is held in 
tension with genuine otherness can things both human and divine, all. be given 
their due. 13 
Two corollaries of this problem are that it denies any notion of freedom to the 
many and that it appears to impose an ordering which is more 'real' than the 
parts which make up a whole. We might note that while the idealist approach 
appears to be rooted in a far more dynamic conception of the world it is unable 
to establish space for particularity. In one way or another the one is still 
perceived as the locus of being, with the many eventually subsumed into the one. 
II Charles Taylor, Hegel aizd Moderit Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), p. 14. 
12 This determinism was made more complete by the emphasis upon the rational nature of the 
one, with teleology pointing to a fully revealed and realised rational order. 
13 Gunton, The One the 77tree and the Many, p. 6. 
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1.4. The Shift to the Individual 
In response to the determinism of essentialism and idealism the existentialists 
attempted to begin with the individual and to identify unity or the general only 
in terms of the individual. The thrust of the effort in beginning from the opposite 
pole of the argument is to suggest that previous philosophical approaches to the 
question of the one and the many have in fact been mistaken right from their 
inception. The existentialists are part of a popular turn to the individual existent 
in a move away from the abstract metaphysics which had characterised 
philosophy until the modem age. Yet, they are not always as radically different 
from the tradition as they may first appear. MacQuarrie traces the development 
of existential ideas from the early philosophy (including Jewish thought). 14 
While Heidegger might pejoratively identify Hegel as the last and greatest 
exponent of metaphysical schemes 15there are some ways in which Hegel 
prepared the ground for the turn to the individual existent. 16Not only had 
Hegel sought to begin from the subject but his notion of freedom rooted in a 
teleological rather than protological approach is foundational to modem notions 
of freedom. Taylor suggests that in modem thought'Hegel's notion of Geist has 
been, as it were anthropologised- transferred from Geist to man-'17 
2.1. Nature to nature 
This radical shift is perhaps best understood through a reflection on the word 
I nature'. Throughout the history of thought the word nature has tended to be 
understood as applying to select groupings within the world or even the 
complex unity of the whole of the world. When the word nature was used to 
refer to a group or class the emphasis was in terms of the unity of that group, e. g. 
what it was about them which 'identified' them with each other. In the modern 
emphasis upon the particular the definition of nature takes a radical shift to 
begin with the individual. Nature no longer refers to the inter-relatedness of a 
subgroup within the greater whole, it now becomes the characteristics or 
qualities of the particular. To speak of an individual's nature is not to think in 
14 John MacQuarrie, An Existen6dist Theology: a Coinparison of Heidegger and Bidtinann (London: 
7 
SCM Press, 1955), p. 16-1 /. 
15 John MacQuarrie, Heldegger (London: Lutterworth Press 1968) p. 
16 Colin Gunton refers to Robert Jenson on this pointwhen he suggests that Hegel's only 
problem was that he confused Geist or God with himself. In which case Hegel might be seen as 
truly the progenitor of the existential tum to the self. In a discussion at the Research Institute for 
Systematic Theology, King's College London, October 1996. 
17 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Socieýl, p. 141. 
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terms of how they are related to the greater whole but to speak of xvhat it is about 
them that makes them who they are, that establishes their particular identity as 
unique in its own right. 
We seek self knowledge, but this can no longer mean just impersonal lore about 
human nature, as it could for Plato. Each of us has to discover his or her own 
form. We are not looking for the universal nature; we each look for our own 
being. Montaigne therefore inaugurates a new kind of reflection which is 
intensely individual, a self explanation, the airn of which is to reach self 
knowledge by coming to see through the screens of self delusion which passion 
or spiritual pride have erected. It is entirely a first person study, receiving little 
help from the deliverances of third person observation, and none from 
'science'. 18 
Where nature had been understood as a reference to the unity of being in terms 
of that which identified an individual entity with a larger group, it now referred 
to what was unique about an individual entity or that which identified them in 
opposition to or as distinct from the larger whole. 
Where essentialist thought would still allow that this inner nature was derived 
from the one or the general and represented the way the individual was 
identified with the greater whole, the existentialist suggested that this inner 
nature was to at least some degree determined by the choices of the particular. 
The existentialist would not deny that the sources from which the individual 
emerged did and do influence the constitution of their 'nature' or identity. 
However, they would insist that the most important and determinative element 
in the matrix would be the choices that the individual makes. 
2.2. Rejection of Static and Determinative Being or Unity 
A problem with the essentialist approach, which we have already mentioned, is 
that in emphasising 'being' in terms of the one it has also tended to see the one in 
static unchanging terms. To ensure that the one could truly be the absolute basis 
of the many, the one was identified as the unchanging, immovable basis of all 
reality. This static depiction of being' proved impossible to align with the 
dynamic existence of particular entities. 19 The result of the essentialist emphasis 
upon being' was a denial of the reality of the dynamic existence of the 
particulars. Being became the essential unitive element of all that exists. 
18 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 181. 
19 Nikolas Berdyaev in Slizvmj and Freedom eng. trans. (London: Centenary Press, 1943), p. 75-6, 
reflects the existential concern to free the person from static ontologies: 'This supremacy of 
freedom over being is also the supremacy of spirit over being. Being is static, spirit is dynamic; 
spirit is not being. 
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Existence as the dynamic matrix of life was enabled by'being'but could not 
affect or change being which remained the concrete stable element of all that is. 
The teleological emphasis, found in the idealist approach, overturned the static 
essentialist notions of reality in favour of a more dynamic and concrete notion of 
existence. However, the question which still drove the idealist approach was the 
concern to understand the basis of 'being' as the unity of all that is. The question 
of the one was transferred from a static whatness to a teleological becoming 
although the emphasis was still upon a total-unity. 
Perhaps the primary distinction of existential thought is the decision to begin 
from the individual rather than following the tradition of philosophy in its 
attempt to establish how the 'one' or an overarching unity Might allow for 
particularity. The existentialist turn to the individual existent located identity in 
the choices of the particular. In this sense they overturned the idealist concern to 
perceive an immediate and intimate relation of the one to the many. Where the 
dynamic matrix of being, for the idealist, would allow identity to the particulars 
in relation to the realisation of the ultimate purposes and fullness of the one, the 
existentialist disassociated the particulars from the matrix of being by locating 
their identity in their self-realisation. 
2.3. Self Determination in Freedom 
The existentialist concern was to give adequate accounting to the freedom of the 
particular to direct or decide its own destiny. 20 In the development of identity 
the individual establishes their particularity through effecting authentic choices 
rather than simply responding uncritically to natural impulses, or what has been 
given to them. 21 By reacting in opposition to the natural tendencies which are 
'given' to them the individual creates a self which is particularly their own. 
Sartre is especially well known for his radical view of freedom. 'Since we have 
defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without 
20 The libertarian notion of freedom posits freedom to the individual on both ontological and 
volitional levels. 
21 'This modern notion of subjectivity has spawned a number of conceptions of freedom which 
see it as something men win through to by setting aside obstacles or breaking loose from e\ternal 
impediments, ties or entanglements. To be free is to be untrammelled, to depend in one's action 
onk, on oneself. ' Charles Tavlor, H(ýgel and Modern Socie4l, (Cambridge; Cambridge Universit-v 
Press, 1979), p. 155- 
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help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passion, or by inventing 
some deterministic doctrine, is a self deceiver. '22 
The grounds for arguing for freedom is held by Sartre to be that the person defies 
any substantial definition. Sartre speaks of the paradox of presence in absence in 
which the physical absence of a individual may make their presence all the more 
real-23 The classic example he gives is waiting in a cafe for a meeting with a 
friend where the friend may be more present in their absence than the other 
people who are physically present in the cafe. The people who are physically 
present may in fact be objectified to the point that their existence is no more real 
than the chairs or tables which make up the cafe. This manifests the truth that a 
person cannot be defined simply in terms of their physical presence. The 
definition of personal existence must account for the reality that a person who is 
simply a physical presence is more an object than they are a person. This is not 
to be taken in a reductionist sense where we might assume that this apparent 
paradox means that the physical presence is not the true person but is in fact a 
mask to the person who is some essential entity which lies behind the physical 
substance, for it includes but is not limited to the physical presence. This means 
that to contain or attempt to limit a person through defining them actually 
depersonalises them. 24 The nature of encountering another person is that one 
attempts to define or describe them, however, this description can never 
incorporate the whole of a person because there is an openness or creativity 
about a person which always moves beyond any fixed depiction. The 
teleological bent of this analysis reflects the definition of freedom which was 
given to us by Hegel. The difference is that it is now directed towards the 
realisation of the individual entity rather than the becoming of Geist. 25 
Sartre's image of the cafe is a classic existential argument against attempts to 
define the individual on the basis of some essence or givenness which is exterior 
to their own choices or determination. A person is not defined by the stable 
22 J. P. Sartre, ExiStentialisin is and Hinnanisin, Trans P. Mairet (London: Metheun, 1948), p. 51. 
23 J. P. Sartre Being and Nothingness eng. trans (London: Metheun 1958), p. 9-10. 
24 Zizioulas suggests that this is because the capacity to transcend or'to be unwilling to accept 
his actual limits and to tend to move beyond them'is natural to the person. Capaci4l p. 401. 
25 Heidegger's notion of 'being unto death'Jocates the teleology of the individual in their 
dissolution. This is not however the nihilism which it might first seem but underlies Heidegger's 
determination to allow that the identity of an individual is the product of their free choice a 
choice which is realistically qualified by their death. He is concerned that human beings should 
live in the light of this reality rather than seeking to project an eternal element into their notion of 
being or their identity. 
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essence or element of being'but by the dynamic and existential matrix of their 
life. 
We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world -- 
and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not 
definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. 26 
For Sartre essence cannot precede existence but follows upon it. A person bý 
definition, does not first exist as a static quantity and then live or exist out of that 
essence. Nor is a person defined by anything given to them or inherent in their 
constitutive makeup. When a person has not acted there is no essence; the 
fulcrum of essence is choice enacted. In other words you cannot speak of the 
unrealised potential in a person as an indication of what that person is, if it is not 
lived out then it is not real. 'Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists 
only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his 
actions, nothing else but what his life is 1 27 The human person de fies 
description because they are never static but always growing, always changing. 
In Sartre's existential argument it is established that to attempt to delimit the 
individual is in fact to deny the very basis of their identity. The fact that we can 
never fully objectify another is used as a premise to establish that all particulars 
remain open or capable of transcending all objectification. 
2.4. Rejection of Metaphysics and the Transcendent 'One' 
With the modern tendency to begin with the particular there is the assumption 
that there is no need for a transcendent principle or 'other', for the relations of an 
individual to other individuals are adequate to establish true identity. 
Existentialist thought has tended to put aside the notion of relation to the one, at 
least as it has been understood in the philosophical tradition, because of the 
failure to allow uniqueness to the individual entity. In essentialist and idealist 
models the emphasis upon the 'one' has meant that identity of the particular is 
not free but determined. So, some modern thinkers have overcome the dualism 
between the one and the many by attempting to deny the existence of God or 
indeed any other transcendent. In fact, 'many progressive and influential minds 
have come to associate any belief in God at all with the suppression of the rights 
of the many'. 28 Given the earlier context of what we have said of Cartesian 
thought we might allow that the existential focus upon the individual is simply a 
26 Sartre Existentialism and Hunumism, p. 28. 
27 Sartre Existentuilism and Hinrumisin, p. 41. 
28 Gunton The Ooze the Three and the Many, p. 26. 
78 
development of the Cartesian approach. However, that would be to miss the 
significant shift in thought which is contained in this turn to the individual. 
Where Descartes' argument allowed for the notion of the autonomous self he 
himself always understood the self in terms of its relatedness to the one. Being 
was identified with the individual, yet it was understood in terms of its 
relatedness or 'imaging' of the one. While the modern notion of the particular 
begins in a reaction against notions of exterior sources of being or ordering, 
Descartes assumed the notion of the unity of being in formulating his notion of 
the individual. 
It has taken a radical shift in the perception of reality to allow for the denial of 
God or of any other universal. The Kantian relegation of God to the spiritual 
realm paved the way for a total dissociation of God from the material realm and 
an eventual denial of God altogether. 29 The rejection of God is correlated with 
the rejection of any transcendent 'principle' which might be determinative of the 
individual. 
The fact that the perspective defined by a hypergood involves our changing, a 
change which is qualified as'growth', or 'sanctification', or'higher 
consciou. sness', and even involves our repudiating earlier goods, is what makes it 
so problematic. 30 
Given the emphasis upon self determination it is hardly surprising that the 
I other', and especially any notion of the transcendent one is limited to that which 
affirms the particular in who they are or who they have chosen themselves to be, 
rather than suggesting that there is a need to move towards another or the 
demands and desires of another. 'Having demolished the older visions of cosmic 
order and exposed them as at best illusion, and perhaps even sham, it left all 
differentiations of the old society, all its special borders and disciplines, without 
justification. '31 The unity which is now to be sought is individual wholeness 
rather than a structure which hes outside of or precedes the particular. 32 
Libertarian thought has supported a move to complete freedom for the 
individual self with a corresponding denial of any responsibility for the other; 
29 The material/ spiritual dichotomy, within the Christian tradition, has often veered towards a 
spiritual/ material dualism which is in fact what lies behind Kant's distinction between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal realms. 
30Tayfor, Sources of the Self, p. 70. 
3lTaylor, Hegel and Modern Socieqj, 141-2. 
32'Personality is inward completeness and unity, mastery over self, victory over slavery. 
Dissolution of personality is a failing apart into separate self-affirming intellectual, emotional, 
sensory elements. The central core of man is broken up. ' Berdyaev, SlaVery and Freedoin, p. 134. 
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the individual is no longer defined by that which hes outside of them but is free 
to choose their own values. 
2.5. Solipsism and Introspection 
One popular term used to describe the openness of the human individual is the 
word transcendence. The idea of an ecstatic transcendence or going out from 
oneself or beyond the parameters from which a person 'begins' is central to 
existentialist notions of self definition. The difficulty with this existential notion 
is a tendency to see self transcendence as a moving completely outside of the 
givenness or parameters which have defined or constituted the individual. This 
radical going out or ecstasis could be seen to deny that, at the very least, the 'raw 
ingredients' continue to define something of what a person becomes. Even more 
significant is the tendency to perceive the dynamic matrix of the world as an 
inhibition to true freedom. 
Even the existentialists must allow room for some type of relationships. 33 Yet, 
with the emphasis placed squarely upon the individual they insist on the polarity 
of interpersonal relating where the relations with others to an extent, deny the 
person's identity in free choice. Sartre ruminates on the paradox of the social 
nature of persons. 
I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation 
of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any 
knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery 
of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which 
confronts mine, and which can-not think or will without doing so either for or 
against me. 34 
With Sartre's emphasis upon the individual the value for any engagement with 
another is limited to the immediate benefit which it imparts to the self. 35 This 
approach leads to a radically autonomous view of the person and eventually a 
form of solipsism where no one and nothing can be seen to be primarily 
constitutive of an individual's choice for self definition. In one way this 
approach is very difficult to refute for it needs no affirmation by anyone or 
anything else. Nietzche is, perhaps, the greatest exponent of the isolated self. 
33 Heidegger provides the example of at least one existentialist thinker who did attempt to 
address the relational matri\ of the person. 
,4 Sartre Existent u*11tsin and 
Hunwinsin, p. 45. See also Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 35, 'One is a set f 3 
only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those v,, ho surround 
it'. 
35 This utilitarianism finds it roots in Hegel where the one is necessarily dependent on the many 
for its self realisation. The difference is that the one is nov., the self rather than Geist. 
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The new thing in Nietzche was the man of 'azure isolation', si\ thousand feet 
above time and man; the man to whom a fellow-creature drinking at the same 
well is quite dreadful and insufferable; the man who is utterly inaccessible to 
others, having no friends and despising women; the man who is at home only 
with eagles and strong winds; the man whose only possible environment is 
desert and wintry landscape; the man beyond good and evil who can exist ordy 
as a consuming fire. 36 
For Nietzche the social fabric within which one lives is identified as part of the 
determinism which needs to be transcended if one is to be an authentic person. 
The socially constructed constitution is seen as something which must be 
overcome or at least shaped and moulded in appropriate xN-ays. Social relations 
and particularly institutions are often identified as an inescapable evil rather than 
a good in the flux of existence. M. Naville, in speaking of Sartre, says 'that is why 
the objective universe is, for existential man, nothing but an occasion of 
vexation, a thing elusive, fundamentally indifferent, a continual mere 
probability. '37 
It is not surprising therefore that the turn to the self begins with and perpetuates 
a strongly introspective stance. Transcendence from the world in which an 
individual finds themselves becomes an escape from the material realm. It leaves 
the individual with only the 'inner' realm of the self in which to locate their 
identity. The introspection of the solipsist self collapses the objective world into 
a subjective relativism. The emphasis upon choice and the radical freedom and 
self definition of choice can result in a denial of values, a denial of anything 
outside of the self. 38 Thus we see that what is important for Sartre is not what is 
chosen, because that is always relative; rather, it is simply the fact that one has 
chosen and in that choice has defined themselves. 
For Sartre, almost all the certainties of substantive rationalism have had to be 
surrendered. Rather the world is technically understood to be absurd. Now, 
literally, there is nothing on which the authentic self may rely and. still be truly 
for -itself. The self has only its freedom given to it .... The result is a thorough 
going relativism. As Sartre says in the concluding ethical pages of Beingand 
Nothingness, ... all 
human values are equivalent ... all are on principle 
doomed to 
failure. 39 
36 Karl Barth, CD 3: 2, p. 240. 
37 M. Naville, 'Discussion' in J. P. Sartre, Existentiiihsin is a Hinnanism, p. 65. 
38 We see this in Nietzche's interpretation of great thinkers through the eyes of his own 
perspective; ' He wrote concerning "Schopenhauer as Educator" but the instructive Schopenhauer 
was admittedly he himself. And he magnified Wagner so long as he could find and represent 
him himself and his own paganism. ' Barth, CD 3: 2, p. 232. 
39 Eugene Borowitz 'The Autonmous Self and Commanding Community', Aeological Studies, 45, 
1984, p. 41. 
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The aspiration to radical autonomy in the end fails to satisfy for it denies the 
very basis by which meaning and value are derived. 
The isolation once attained proves empty -Nietzche often thought that he lived in 
indescribable wealth in this isolation, and these were moments when he could 
beseechingly and yet also angrily point to the fact that he had infinite things to 
give, that infinite things were to be received from him. But then he had to 
contradict himself, for how could he give wealth and life and joy in this isolation? 40 
In spite of the fact that this perspective lacks coherence it continues to inform the 
modern understanding of how identity is to be located4l 
2.6. Situated Freedom 
The idea of freedom which the existentialists have developed in the context of the 
individual began with the hegelian notion of the freedom of the absolute subject. 
However Hegel's understanding of freedom was directly opposed to the absolute 
freedom of the individual suggested by some existentialists. In fact Taylor notes 
that 'Hegel laid bare the emptiness of the free self and the pure rational will, in 
his critique of Kant's morality and the politics' of absolute freedom. 142 To 
support a radical notion of freedom is to deny the very matrix which constitutes 
the self. Taylor continues, 
the modern notion of freedom is thus under threat from two sides. On the one 
hand, there is despair about the realisation of freedom, even doubt whether the 
aspiration to freedom makes any sense, in the face of the irrational and elemental 
in man. On the other, the ultimate emptiness of self-dependent freedom seems to 
lead, to nihilism. Thus much philosophical thought in the last century has 
engaged with this problem; how to go beyond a notion of the self as subject of a 
self-dependent wil-I and bring to light its insertion in our nature, our own and 
that which surrounds us; or in other terms how to situate freedom. 43 
There are many elements combined in what Taylor has called situated freedom. 
We are born into a certain family a certain culture and this defines who we are 
and what we are. We do not chose this identity, it is given to us. Throughout 
life we continue to be defined by the necessity of the world and all that 
surrounds us, by the very physical and biological construction of our bodies. The 
problem is that there are clear limits on the person's ability to exercise freedom; 
40 Barth, CD 3: 2, p. 233. 
41 Alan Torrance refers to the modem emphasis upon 'introspection as a possible and very 
popular means of access to the nature of the T. This is shown by sociologsts to be profoundly 
destructive and by philosophical argument to be highly problematic' Lecture in Theological 
Anthropology, Kings College London, Autumn 1994. 
42 Taylor Hegel and Modern Society, p. 158. 
gel and Modern Society, p. 159. 43 Tay I or He, 
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any decision which is made inevitably affects someone or something else. 44 
Ultimately this is the reality of our physical world and freedom is ac best relative 
to these givens. Even if we do not view the world as a closed system, but see it as 
continually expanding and growing, we must admit that the interrelationships of 
living beings within it cannot be denied without adverse effects on other living 
beings. It is evident that "every claim to absolute freedom is countered by the 
argument that its realisation would lead to chaos". 45 
2.7. The Transcendent One 
The existentialist turn to the particular when followed through to its logical 
conclusion, replaces the transcendent one with the self. Thus, it has not solved 
the paradox of the one and the many but simply reversed the equation so that the 
I one' proves to be the immanent self rather than the transcendent God. Philip 
Mairet, commenting on Sartre's ideal of absolute freedom, says but he has not 
yet worked out for himself the political implications of a philosophy of absolute 
freedom. If he did this ... the philosophic necessities inherent in his fundamental 
premise would carry him towards a theistic position. '46 As Heidegger 
recognised, any model which purports to acknowledge particularity to the many 
and not simply the self, must return to the paradox of holding together the one 
and the many at the same time. 47 If we are to allow value to other particulars we 
cannot deny transcendent values altogether. In recent years several sociologists 
in the United States have attributed the disintegration of society and societal 
values to a loss of transcendents. Whether this transcendent be God or simply 
some universals which are generally accepted these authors are in agreement 
44 Alan Torrance in an autumn lecture 1994 suggested'The self is irreducibly relafional in 
character. As agent it is irreducibly engaged. It cannot be construed in unipolar terms-either as a 
self-contained thinking being or as a self-contained self-analysing being. This can be seen at the 
philosophical and sociological level. ' Lecture in Theological Anthropology, Kings College 
London, Autumn 1994. 
45 BC, p. 43. 
46Philip Mairet, 'Introduction' to ExisteittialisitiatidHiiinaiiisin Jean-PaulSartre, p. 19 
47 Heidegger who in his later work was far more balanced than Sartre, did not deny the problem 
of the one and the many. What he attempted to do was to posit a dynamic relational flux as the 
basis of all existence. Therefore, in his model, the traditional debate between the one and the 
many was replaced overturned. His thesis has been instrumental in redefining ontology in ten-ns 
of the individual. Setting aside the traditional notions of being in terms of the one he sought to 
establish being as a question of individual existence. Thus Heidegger criticised philosophy for its 
concern xvith the question of 'being' rather than Avith a concern for'Being'. 
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that without some transcendent other there can be no 'space' for individual 
persons. 48 
Colin Gunton notes that when humanity does not accept the transcendents which 
are given to them there is the inevitable creation of other transcendents v, -hich are 
perhaps even more restrictive because they are not clearly acknowledged or 
defined. 
When God is displaced as the focus of the unity of things, the function he 
performs does not disappear, but is exercised by some other source of unity- 
some other universal. The universal is false because it does not encompass the 
realities of human relations and of our placing in the world and so operates 
deceptively or oppressively. 49 
Of course one might contest which'god'we are speaking of, but the point is that 
humanity naturally locates or creates some transcendent other (that is if it is not 
'given' a transcendent one) in order to establish some kind of meaningful order to 
human existence. Taylor, in agreement with Gunton, insists that all philosophies 
which claim to have done away with the need for a transcendent one have in fact 
instituted a new albeit subtle universal. 
Of course, the argument is complicated by the fact that all of these attacks, [on a 
transcendent one] with the exception of Foucault's, are overtly (and in fact I 
believe Foucault's are as well, though unadmittedly) committed to their own 
rival hy YI ergoods, generally connected to the principle of universal and equal 
respect. 0 
Both Gunton and Taylor suggest that the emphasis upon the priority of the 
individual at the expense of the one has led to the establishment of a principle of 
homogeneity where the demand for equality of all individuals in relation to each 
other has led to a denial of particularity in favour of a bland uniformity. 51 This 
perspective would seem to reflect Hegel's concern that a notion of radical 
freedom inevitably leads to a principle of homogeneity. The very principle 
48 Bellah et al in the Habits of the Heart and Christopher Lasch in The CuIttire of Narcissi'sin, insist 
that this turn to the particular at the cost of losing the transcendent has lead to the disintegration 
of society and the denial of the particular. 
49Gunton The One the Three and the Many, p. 31. 
50 Taylor, Sotirces of the Self, p. 71. 
51 The assertion of the rights of the many has paradoxically, dialectically perhaps, achieved the 
opposite, the submission of the many by new and in some cases demonic versions of the one. 
The logic of this is that when the one is displaced by the many, the displacement happens in two 
ways: either the many become an aggregate of ones, each attempting to dominate the world, the 
outcome being those regimes no%-,, labelled fascist, in which the strongest survives and dominates; 
or the many become homogenised, contrary to their true being, into the mass (Kierkegaard's 
'Public'). Gunton, The One the Three and the Alany, p. 33. 
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which the focus upon the particular was to uphold has been lost through the 
denial of the importance of the universals. 
The question is not whether we should allow for some transcendent one or some 
form of universals but how do we avoid simply projecting a transcendent other 
to fill the need for some order or structure to humanity. The danger of a 
projected transcendent has been clearly exposed by the thought of Feuerbach who 
illuminated how religion was and is often guilty of shaping a god to suit its own 
purposes. Gunton's premise is that apart from a proper balance between the one 
and the many we are left with either a Parmenidian monism (too strong an 
emphasis upon the one) or a Heraclitian flux (too strong an emphasis upon the 
many). 52 In the balance between the one and the many the two must be held 
together to do justice to the real matrix of being. To deny either the one or the 
many, or to subsume either as a subordinate or projection of the other, is to 
collapse the paradox of the unity of particulars. 
3.1. Nikolas Berdyaev 
Nikolas Berdyaev, a Russian Christian philosopher in the early part of this 
century, offered a philosophy which attempted to hold together a concern for the 
one God with the existential emphasis upon the particular human person. 
Although he did not want to deny the notion of 'being' as the protological basis 
of the particular he did want to affirm that the person was free to transcend that 
givenness. 
Man has been accepted. as the slave of being, which determines him entirely. He 
is not free in relation to being. His very freedom is born of being. Ontology can 
be an enslavement of man. The fundamental problem is the problem of the 
relation between being and freedom ... One must choose between two 
philosophies, the philosophy which recognises the supremacy of being over 
freedom and the philosophy which recognises the supremacy of freedom over 
being ... the philosophy of the primacy of 
being is a philosophy of impersonalism; 
a system of ontology which acknowledges the absolute supremacy of being is a 
system of determinism. 53 
Berdyaev is making a dear distinction between philosophy which begins with 
the question of ontology and philosophy which begins with the question of 
freedom. As such, he is distinguishing himself from the Russian idealist 
tradition which sought to explain the unity of the whole by beginning with the 
one and moving to the many. He is dearly siding with the existentialists who 
52 Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 27. 
-ý. l Berdyaev, Slaveyy and Freedom, p. 75-76. 
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wanted to move beyond the boundaries imposed by the principles of an abstract 
metaphysical approach to reality to establish the freedom of the particular. 54 
Berdyaev is opposed to a social ordering which is a structural or hierarchical and 
exterior framework which determines the particular entity. The tendency 
towards imposing a social ordering is identified by Berdyaev as the objectivisation 
of the world in which a projected structure is seen to be more real or ontological 
than the particulars who make it up. 
To be a part of any kind of whole, even if it be in revolt against that whole means 
to be exteriorised already. Only in a world of objectivisation, that is to say a 
world of alienation, impersonality and determinism, does that relation of part to 
the whole exist which is disclosed in individuals. 55 
This opposition would appear to be a direct response to the Russian idealist 
proposal of a hierarchical ordering of the material world which was grounded in 
the relation to the one God. Yet it would seem that his reaction is more directly 
opposed to the Marxist tendency to emphasise the supremacy of society over 
against the individual. When he says that individualism is simply the reversal of 
colleCtiviSM56 he means that in both instances there is a tendency to define 
oneself and others in an abstract 'objective' structure. He rightly notes that either 
position is relative to the whole and therefore not truly free. Berdyaev 
suggested that 'oppressive' forms of social ordering were abstract and unreal, 
they were nothing more than the product or projection of the choices of 
'individual' people. The tendency to define oneself either in relation to or in 
opposition to the surrounding world is to objectivise the world and indeed 
oneself. Berdyaev uses the word 'individual' to denote a entity which locates its 
being or identity primarily in relation to the whole. 
Berdyaev found himself in a paradoxical situation. With the existentialists, he 
rejected the use of abstract metaphysics to support a social structure or ordering. 
He recognised that a strong identification of a transcendent God with structures 
or ordering would fail to allow freedom to the particular. Yet, he did not want to 
reject the Christian God, but to identify God with the particular and not the 
social structure. Thus, he attempted to do away with the transcendent 
metaphysical notions of God or 'being' without doing away with the notion of 
God altogether. God is no longer identified with an abstract metaphysical notion 
54'Freedom, unconditional and uncompromising freedom has been the fountainhead and prime 
mover of all my thinking. ' Nichols quotes Berdyaev In Theology in the Russian Diaspora, p. 143. 
55 Berdyaev, Shweryand Freedom, p. 135. 
56 lbid p. 135. 
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of universal order but with the immanent interior and personal encounter. 
Berdyaev suggests that the individual is faced with a basic existential choice 
between living in objective structures or transcending objectivism through an 
encounter with God and others. 
Man is a being who surmounts and transcends himself. The realisation of 
personality in man is this continuous transcending of self. Man desires to go out 
from the closed circle of subjectivity and this movement always takes place in 
two dif ferent and even opposite directions. Emergence from subjectivity 
proceeds by way of objectivisation. This is the way which leads out into society 
with its forms of universal obligation, it is the way of science with its laws of 
universal obligation. On this path there takes place the alienation of human 
nature, its ejection into the object world: personality does not find itself. The 
other path is emergence from subjectivity through the process of transcendence. 
This is a passing over into the trans-subjective and not to the objective. This path 
lies in the deeps of existence, on. this path there takes place the existential 
meeting with God, with other people, with the interior existence of the world. It 
is the path not of objective communication but of existential communion. 57 
The freedom for existential encounter with God and with others becomes the 
basis for truly personal existence. The freedom of the particular is not to be 
denied by an emphasis upon'being', whether this'being'is seem as either the 
protological. static essence of Descartes or the teleological unity of the one in 
Hegel and the Russian idealists. 
Berdyaev is not alone in his reaction against hierarchies or social ordering. It is 
commonplace to perceive any notion of ordering as anti-personalist and 
destructive to the integrity of the particular entity. The modem turn to the 
particular has reflected a concern with any notion of ordering as a basis for 
individual identity. However, while Berdyaev's approach clearly identifies the 
problem with some aspects of social relations his notion of authentic relations is 
seemingly left without significant or definable content. The denial of any notion 
of ordering grounded in a concern for the particular in the end denies the 
constitutive role that the social envirom-nent plays in the life of the individual. 
Berdyaev's strong reaction against any notion of ordering which stands outside 
of or even alongside of the individual makes it difficult to see how he can truly 
do justice to the real structure of our world. In order to affirm freedom to the 
particulars Berdyaev has denied the concrete reality of the matrix of this world. 
He has collapsed the problem of the one and the many into an emphasis in which 
particularity is not threatened by an objective unity. Instead the unity or the 
whole is nothing more than the interior or spiritual unity of communion which 
57 lbid p-29. 
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arises from the unity of the many with the one God. Yet, in abstracting the 
relation of the particular to the one God, and to other particulars/ as an unity of 
interiority, Berdyaev has denied the necessary symbiosis between the universal 
order and the unity of the many. 58 Berdyaev has not offered a conception of 
relations which accounts for the material and objective nature of human 
relatedness, he has instead posited an interior 'personal' relation as the basis of 
identity. 59 Not only does this Gnostic approach fail to account for the goodness 
of God's good creation it also fails to account for the primary engagement with 
the matrix within which we find ourselves. 
It must always be remembered that if we are related to other persons, it is 
through the medium of our bodies. Without that emphasis, there is bound to be 
an individualistic conception of the person, because our embodiedness becomes 
a barrier between one person and another. 60 
Where the idealists held together the notion of identity and otherness with 
relation Berdyaev's approach tends to posit a relationality which lacks any 
grounding in the material world. Even though he is concerned to maintain the 
idea that the existential encounter with God and others is true relation, his 
mystical notion of relations lacks the content and credibility of the Russian 
idealists' concern to see a unity that accounted for the material world. Berdyaev's 
definition of the freedom of authentic relations in contrast to the ordering of 
inauthentic relations requires a dualism which demeans human situatedness. 61 
3.2. Situated in a Matrix of Relations 
In modern philosophy and psychology there is a recovery of the notion of unity 
which reflects this traditional focus on the inter-relatedness of people with each 
other and with the modem understanding of ecology which acknowledges the 
interdependence of all living beings with the world. Modem philosophers of 
language would argue that the turn inward to the subjective realm is not only a 
denial of the objective material realm but a denial of the constitutive element of 
language in the person. 
58'Until modern times and indeed during some of its phases, social order was nearly always 
understood to be rooted in some way in an insight into what we can call metaphysical order, the 
order of being as a whole. It is this that Descartes and his successors have destroyed, and with it 
the symbiosis of social and universal order. ' Gunton The One the Three and the Many, p. 15. 
59 Berdyaev, Slavety and Freedom, p-35. 
60 Gunton, The Promise, p. 140. 
610f course one might respond that to define authentic relations is to objectivise them. But in fact 
that response would indicate that one is remaining within the paradox of the objective/ subjective 
divide at the same moment that one is denying the validity of the divide. For to speak of 
relations in objective terms does not in fact reduce those relations to c1rcumscribable realities. 
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But it is the case of the self that the language which can never be made fully 
explicit is part of, internal to, or constitutive of the 'object' studied. To study 
persons is to studZ beings who ordy exist in, or are partly constituted by, a 
certain language. 2 
Heidegger, who recognised something of the importance of language in the 
dynamic matrix of existence, presents a radically different response to the 
excesses of essentialism than do most existentialists. It is the dynamic relational 
matrix of existence, including language which makes up Being which is the locus 
of all existence. Heidegger noted that radical subjectivity implied and indeed 
required radical objectivity in order to make any sense at all. Perceiving 
language as the real matrix within which particulars exist provides an alternative 
view of human relatedness which breaks through the inherent dualism of the 
traditional objective/ subjective divide. It does not deny the objective and 
subjective elements of human relatedness, yet it places them as elements within 
the matrix of the one and the many rather than utilising a model of autonomy as 
the basis of being. 
3.3. Two Forms of Relations 
Berdayaev's approach distinguishes between two types of relations or 
relatedness; the first is the social relations of ordering which are based upon an 
objectivising of the material realm. The second is the trans-subjective relations 
which move beyond the normal objective/ subjective divide of social objectivism. 
In this distinction the priority for Berdyaev is put upon the trans-subjective 
relations in which the individual does not find themselves as part of a greater 
whole nor define themselves in opposition to the whole. Instead the 'existential' 
meeting with God and other people is the grounds of true personal existence. 
The dividing line is placed between relations which are prior to the individual 
e. g. those which locate the individual as part of the ordering or structuring of 
society and those relations which are free, determined only by the choice of the 
individual. Relations are no longer perceived as an essentialist correspondence 
to the one nor as the idealist placing within the matrix of the whole; relations, 
like identity, become a function of the individual's choice. 63 Where the hegelians 
incorporated both otherness and relation in the question of ontology the 
existentialists located identity in the individual's choice for otherness; true 
62 Tavlor, Sources of the Self, p. 35. 
63 Of course whether one defines oneself in opposition to or in correspondence with another the 
role of relation is still central to one's self definition. We will discuss the problem with the notion 
of absolute freedom of choice in the paragraphs which follow. 
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relations are those which are freely chosen. While within the existentialist notion 
of relations there is emphasis placed upon the importance and even necessity of 
the other there is a clear emphasis upon relations as the prerogative of the 
individual. The libertarian notion of freedom, which Nvas expressed by many 
existentialists, is widely accepted and the notion of relationships as the 'free' 
prerogative of the individual remains a popular and fiercely guarded principle in 
western society. In many modem attitudes to relations any ordered or 
hierarchical structures which appear to be exterior determinatives or sources to 
the individual's identity are labelled as objectionable and perceived to be 
problematic to true or authentic existence. This solipsist notion of relations 
continues to profoundly affect modem values even though it cannot make sense 
of the fact that relations only take place within a matrix which inevitably remains 
in some way outside the individual. 
Surely part of the difficulty is that the problem in relating to others is not simply 
the tendency to objectivise them but is the very fact that they confront us as 
another. The premise that the dichotomy between the objective and subjective 
can be transcended, does not infer that we must abandon all objective language. 
To perceive the problem as inherently bound up with the material world of 
objects is to deny the essential need for otherness in relation. This is not to deny 
that the human tendency to objectivise is not a problem and in this respect 
Berdyaev's ideas are helpful. But, to identify the tendency to objectivise as a 
problem is different from identifying the objectivity of another as a problem. 
What would seem to lie at the root of the problem is the perception that we as 
human beings first 'are' and then 'relate'. 
4.1. Martin Buber 
As we continue to explore the issue of persons and relations we need to turn 
briefly to the thought of Martin Buber, who is recognised as one of the earliest 
and clearest progenitors of a notion of constitutive relations. 64 Buber seeks to 
do away with abstract metaphysics by emphasising the dynamic and immanent 
engagement of the one God with human persons. He acknowledges a desire to 
understand God's relation to the world as parallel to and correlated with inter- 
human relations; 'my most essential concern [was] the close connection of the 
relation to God with the relation to one's fellow-man'. 65 Buber posits the need of 
64 Heidegger's dynamic flux was also an attempt to suggest that being was Intrinsically dynamic 
rather than static. 
65 Martin Buber, I and Viou 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner and co. 1958), p. 123-24. 
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a 'personal' other, God, as the locus or source of I/ Thou relations. God cannot be 
seen as either an abstract notion of being nor as an Idea but must be seen as a 
person. 66 His point in this context is that God cannot simply be an object or 
substance which might be grasped but must be one who encounters us and meets 
us in a mutuality of relation. God who is the absolute person is a relational 
being. Where personalists recognised the need for the person to be-in-relation' 
Buber has gone one step further to posit that relations are intrinsic to being; 67 
the absolute person is a person whose being is relational. 68 Identifying the 
absolute person as a relational being he seeks to hold together the notion of 
particularity and relation as two aspects to being. 
Like Berdyaev, Buber is concerned to address inadequate forms of human 
relations and to emphasise that social relations or the structured relations of 
society are, in themselves, not an adequate basis for personhood. 69 Buber does 
not, however, follow Berdyaev by suggesting that there are two distinct forms of 
relation which exist apart from each other as though social relations happen on 
the level of nature and communion happens in an interior encounter. Although 
he does differentiate between I/ Thou and I/ It relations it is not meant to suggest 
two distinct realms of relating. Rather, the challenge for every human being is to 
begin with the matrix in which they exist (and not to deny it as Berdyaev would 
suggest) and 'transmute society into community'. 70 By holding together person 
and relation as two aspects of God and therefore two aspects of being, Buber is 
able to uphold a notion of particularity which is not based upon a denial of the 
constitutive relations of our social structure. 71 Therefore, unlike Berdyaev, and 
66'The description of God as a Person is indispensable for everyone who like myself means by 
'God' not a principle (although mystics like Eckhart sometimes identify him with 'Being') and like 
myself means by'God' not an idea (although philosophers like Plato at times could hold that he 
was this): but who rather means by 'God', as I do, him who- whatever else he may be- enters into 
a direct relation with us men. in creative, revealing and redeeming acts, and thus makes it 
possible for us to enter into a direct relation with him. ' Buber, land Thou, p. 135. 
67 Borowitz Autonomous Self and the Commanding Community, p. 37. 
68 Buber's notion of the absolute person who is yet a relational being is an attempt to hold 
together the notion of person and relation as intrinsically important to being. 
69 This might resonate with a distinction Alan Torrance makes when he speaks of the difference 
between methexis and koinonia; the former suggests a unity which overturns particularity while 
the latter speaks of a communion which does not deny the particulars who constitute it. A. 
Torrance, Persons in Communion. p. 256. 
70 Borowitz, Autonomous Self and the Continanding Communihj, p. 46 
71 Gunton, The One Me Viree and the Many, p. 37, offers a comment on this 'By relationality I do not 
mean what is sometimes taught, that things can be known only in so far as they are related to us, 
but rather the realistic belief that particulars, of %-,, hatever kind can be understood onIN, in terms of 
their relatedness to each other and the whole. ' 
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other existentialists, Buber does not allow for the monadic autonomy which 
would allow us to choose relations of communion independently of the matrix 
within which we find ourselves. 72 Buber's concept of relations is far more 
nuanced than that of Berdyaev in so far as it allows for human situatedness 
without seeing that situatedness as a threat to particularity. 
Buber is clearly concerned to avoid any dualist notion that true relation only 
happens in an interior realm or a spiritual encounter with God. He is opposed to 
the dualism which is so often a part of religion and seeks to establish that we do 
indeed relate as physical beings. Pamela Vermes discusses the distinction 
between Buber's I/ It and I/ Thou relations in terms of the words 'encounter' and 
'relation'. Where encounter in some models, is defined as the starting point for 
the development of relation with another person or entity Buber identifies 
encounter as a moment within the wider scope of relations. The encounter or 
I presence-with' another is something which does not happen simply at the 
moment of first contact with someone or something else but is when one 
encounters the other as a you rather than an it. Thus encounter is a vital moment 
in true relation in so far as it is engaging with another for whom that other truly 
is, rather than simply seeing the other as 'something'. This emphasis upon the 
I/ you encounter as a 'presence-with' is not to suggest that it is the only real or 
authentic moment of relationship within the greater framework of relation as 
I/ it. By situating the true 'presence-with' another within the whole framework of 
relation to another Buber has taken an important step forward in suggesting that 
the conscious encounter with another as a you is not to be sought as the realm of 
true existence. The I/ it relation is not to be seen as a negative or demeaning 
notion of relation but as the grounds within which true I/ you relations might 
take place. Therefore there is not a Gnostic sense in which the I/ it relation 
should be overturned in favour of the I/ you relation, rather, the I/ you relation 
arises out of the context of the I/ it relation. 
4.2. Concerns 
Buber's thesis remains profoundly influential today. Nonetheless there remain 
two concerns which have import for our thesis. The first is that in spite of 
Buber's concern. to balance the two forms of relation we are still left with the 
indication that the I/ you moment is the determining and therefore the authentic 
moment in relation. As a result traces of dualism remain in which the inner 
72'jBuberj knows of no utterly discrete Descartesian ego but only a self which is always engaged 
with another. ' Borowltz Autonomous Self and the Command'"ng Commmzl'ýI, p. 45. 
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relation is determinative of the outer self. This is for three interdependent 
reasons: first because he notes that the relation to God is always an I/ you and 
never an I/it relation, because God can never be objectified; 73 secondly, 
because the whole thrust of his argument is that I/you encounter is the lni-ssing 
element which leaves relationships inauthentic; and thirdly, when he notes that 
the I/ you relation is 'beyond' space and time; 'The world of it is set in the context 
of space and time. The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of 
these., 74 These points taken together reveal something of the concern which lies 
behind Buber's philosophy of relations with which he seeks to overturn the 
tendency to objectivise others. Buber, although he does not discount the 
objective element in relationships, wishes to counter the failure to relate to others 
in I/ you or 'presence- with' encounters. The result of this emphasis upon the 
I/ you encounter as the important or redeeming facet of our relationships, means 
that in spite of his concern not to end up in a dualism of spiritual/ material 
realms the direction of his focus is upon the spiritual or conscious encounter as 
the realm of real existence. Responding to the issue of objectification and 
allowing his thought to be shaped by that, there remains the sense that the 
pinnacle of relating is one which transcends space and time, that is not 
circumscribed by our physical constitution. 75 So although he appears to place 
significance upon the I/ it element to relations/ the thrust of his thought is to 
value our 'conscious' encounter above the physical engagement with another. 
The second concern we have with Buber's thesis is to ask to what degree his 
notion of person and relations is too strongly shaped as a response to inadequate 
forms of human relations. Not that there is anything wrong with seeking to 
redress inadequate forms of relation; rather we would want to affirm that our 
doctrine of God must not be shaped by human need. Declaring that God must be 
understood at least to some degree as a person is a bridge for Buber to establish 
that it is God's relationality which becomes the matrix of human relationality. 
'The Thou sets me free from the world in order to bind me up in solidarity of 
connection to it'. 76 As such Buber has recognised that the one God must be the 
basis of both unity and particularity if there is to be a context for human 
73 Buber, I and Thou, p. 129. 
74 Buber, I and Tlwti, p. 100. 
75 Too much stress on our spiritual natures- where 'spiritual' tends to mean inward rather than 
'in relation to God the Holy Spirit', however carefully that inwardness is qualified,... ", d] lose sight 
of the fact that we are related to one another through the medium of our bodies. Gunton, 77W 
Proinise, p. 126- 
76 Buber, I and Am, p. 93. 
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particularity. Yet, Buber's relational model fails to maintain any distinction 
between the being of God and his establishment of the relational matrix of the 
world. 
For Buber, on the other hand, the inter-human is as it were transparent to the 
eternal Thou. 'The thou which goes from man to man is the same as the Thou 
which descends to us from the divine and rises up from us to the divine. ' I do 
not think it is misleading to paraphrase this statement by saying that the question 
of God is for Buber not separate from the realisation of human community. 77 
We see the same concerns in some modern theologians who are concerned to 
emphasis the immanence of God in order to deal with the rampant individualism 
of our societal structure. 78 For example, Moltirnann's notion of perichoresis leaves 
us with a notion of relations which suggest that the same 'stuff' which constitutes 
God's being in relation also constitutes human being in relation and in fact the 
whole world's being in relation. The danger of this panentheist approach is that 
God becomes the relational matrix of the world, the distinction between Spirit 
and spirit is lost. The tendency in some relational ontologies is that God is used 
to address the need for a relational matrix to human social structure and to 
propose a comprehensive notion of relation which overturns substantialist 
notions of God's engagement with the world. 
Conclusion 
The existentialist turn to the particular has brought a whole new approach to the 
question of the person. Nonetheless, in the end we are still left with the question 
of how the particular is to be situated within the wider scope of the material 
world if we are to avoid sliding into a mystical or Gnostic dualism. Which raises 
the question of relations, how an 'individual' is located in relation to the other 
individuals and in relation to God or even transcendent values. It is clear that 
the essentialist notion of relation, as shared substance, cannot allow freedom to 
the particular, yet neither can the teleological and immanent relation of the 
Hegelian idealist. Relation cannot be prior to the individual if the individual is to 
have any freedom at all, yet, neither can relation be wholly the prerogative of the 
individual if other particulars are to be allowed freedom. The issue of how to 
allow 'equal' significance to the many particulars remains, whether Nve begin 
with the particular or the general. Doing away with an understanding of unity 
or of some form of transcendents has not solved the problem of particularity or 
otherness. Furthermore, the notion or belief in a personal God is no more 
77 R. G. Smith, A fartin Bubo- (London: The Carey Kingsgate Press Ltd. 1966), p. 33. 
78See the discussion on Catherine LaCugna, Chapter One section I C. 
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threatening to personal particularity than existentialist schemes which begin with 
the particular. What these arguments have served to do is to establish that any 
understanding of the one God, if it is to avoid static determinism or teleological 
monism, must hold together a God who is both transcendent and immanent. I Ve 
have returned to the question which the Cappadocians were faced with as they 
attempted to understand how the Christian God could be immanently involved 
with the world without that denying his integrity. Although today, in light of 
the turn to the particular, the primary question facing us is how can Nve 
understand a God who allows freedom for the particular. 
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Chapter Four: Vladimir Lossky on Person and Nature 
Introduction 
Vladimir Lossky has been a central figure in Orthodox theology this century-' 
The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, his major work, continues to 
influence theological thought. The concern for the integrity and irreducibility 
of the human person is central to his theology. His argument that Christian 
theology is personalist does not mean that he is simply using philosophical 
categories in a theological guise. 2 Working with the frameworks of both 
existentialist and idealist thought, attempting to deal with the concerns they 
raise, his clear intent is to remain on a theological path. He seeks to develop 
an understanding of the integrity and irreducibility of the human person 
from the Orthodox theological tradition using the distinction between person 
and nature. In fact the Chalcedonian language of person and nature is central 
to his effort and is the basis for his definition of the human person. In 
making this connection he allows that the full implications of personhood 
suggested by the patristic definition of God's personhood have not been 
imputed to the human person. 3 However, the thrust of his effort is to suggest 
that the notion of the divine person should be applied to the human person 
to define their possibility, if not their actuality. 
Lossky is recognised as one of the primary voices defending the Orthodox 
understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. With his concern to develop a 
theological anthropology from the context of Trinitarian theology he 
provides a good dialogue partner for John Zizioulas who has sought to clarify 
the notions of person and relation. Lossky was clearly a man of his 
generation and his people. His thinking is distinctly shaped by his 
engagement with a diverse grouping of important traditions and influences. 
Our desire in this chapter is to identify some of the key influences upon his 
concept of the person, particularly the Orthodox theological tradition and 
modern philosophy, in order that we might understand the context and 
I A. M. Allchin, Vladimir Lossky, The Witness of an Orthodox Theologian' Theology 72,1969, 
p. 204. 
2 I&L pA 12. See also Dictionarýl of Christian theology (London: SCM, 1%9) s. v. 'Personalism' 
by James Richmond. 'Personalism is, broadly speaking, a philosophical standpoint which 
takes as its starting point human personality, or which finds in such personality the main key 
to central metaphysical problems. Many personalities have posited a personal God as our key 
to understanding the ultimate nature of the world. ' 
3 I&L p. 112. 
96 
direction of his theological anthropology. While working with his 
person/nature framework we will situate this discussion within the 
discussion of relations begun in the last chapter. 
1.1. Influence of West on East 
The obvious starting point in an exploration of these 'sources of influence' 
must be the Russian theological and philosophical tradition. Although it 
may seem reasonable to assume that the Russian Orthodox Church has 
remained isolated from the tradition of western philosophy and theology, 
this would be inaccurate. Florovosky and Schmemann point out that 
Russian theology has been influenced for a very long time by the precepts and 
concepts of the west. 4 For those thinkers who were a part of the Russian 
Diaspora there is the additional impact of direct engagement with western 
thinkers. 5 Their work inevitably carries traces of western ideas and may at 
times be derived directly from western thinking; yet, they remain true to 
their own tradition in ways which are not always immediately apparent. This 
mixture of influences is further confused by the fact that many Russian 
thinkers view the heart or core of the tradition as unaffected or pure. Thus 
the call to return to the roots of the tradition implies an ability to separate out 
the influence of western thinking. 6 Lossky for example, claimed that the 
heart of Russian theology had remained unaffected by philosophy. 7 
Unfortunately the premise of a pure core to theology can lead to the naive 
acceptance of ideas or concepts simply because they are identified as a part of 
the tradition. The close relation between the Russian Orthodox Church and 
4 'The West was theologising while the East was mute, or even worse was repeating western 
lessons without reflection' Alexander Schmemann, The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy. 
(Harvill Press; London, 1963) p. 286. See also Alexander Schmemann, 'Russian Theology 1920- 
1972 An Introductory Survey' SVTQ 16: 4 1972 p. 172-195. See also Florovsky Aspects of Church 
History Vol. 4 of Collected Works (Nordlund Pub. Co.; Massachusetts, 1975), p. 199. 
5 Rowan Williams, 'Eastern Orthodox Theology'in The Modern Theologians 2nd ed. David 
Ford (Blackwell; Oxford, 1997), p. 506, discusses the same issue. 
6 Frederick Copleston, Russian Religious Philosophy (Search Press; London, 1988), p. 149, 
speaking of this tendency says 'When Kireevsky and Khomyakov asserted the need for a 
religiously oriented philosophy which would be free from the deplorable influence of western 
rationalism and would remain true to the traditions of Russian Orthodoxy, were they not 
manifesting a belief that truth, the important and saving truth at any rate, was to be found in 
the Holy Mother Russia? ' 
7 '[Tlhe theology of the church, constantly soteriological. in its emphasis has never entered into 
alliance with philosophy in any attempt at a doctrinal synthesis. ' AITp. 104 cf. I&L p. 96 See 
also R. D Williams The Theology of Personhood, A Study of the Thought of Christos 
Yannaras', Sobornost 6; 6 Winter 1972, p. 415. 
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the political power base of the country is an important factor in the idea that 
Russian theology and Russian thought as a whole is unique in reflecting the 
character and 'nature' of the Russian people. The image of Mother Russia, 
with its underlying idealist and communitarian influences, has both 
developed with and formed Russian thought in the past centuries. These 
influences have led to two powerfully shaping forces in Lossky's thought. On 
the one hand he is concerned to emphasise personal responsibility and the 
integrity of the individual in the face of determinative or collective forces of 
the Orthodox Church; 8 on the other hand, he appeals to the authority of the 
Orthodox tradition to legitimise his approach. In looking at Lossky's work 
one must carefully uncover the roots of his ideas and recognise that they may 
not be as pure as he asserts. 9 
1.2. Person/ Nature 
Scholars of Lossky's work agree that a distinction between f person' and 
I nature' is a central tenet of his work, it runs throughout his xvritings as a 
primary gathering theme. 10 Both the relation of a person to their nature, or 
to the universal human nature, as well as their freedom from that nature are 
the framework for his thinking. 11 While he wants to maintain a clear 
distinction between the person and their nature he also wants to establish 
that there is an indissoluble unity of person and nature as well. Alar Lats 
suggests that the relation of the person to their nature is more primary to 
Lossky than is the relation of one person to another person. ] 2 This is not to 
say that relations between persons are not important to Lossky, but that the 
primary issue or foundation of truly 'personal' existence includes the relation 
of the person to their nature or t he nature. This approach reflects Lossky's 
concern or even preoccupation with the relation of the general to the 
8 This too was undoubtedly a reaction against the monism of Russian idealism. Solovyev 
suggested that man must let himself be pulled by the forces that would bind him to the'all' 
from which all meaning and truth flow. Robert Sleisinski, The Spiritual Foundations of 
Society According to S. L. Frank', SVTQ 39; 2 1995. p. 164. 
9 The passionate nature of Lossky's approach no doubt colours his work. See A. De Halleux, 
'Personnalisme ou Essentialisme Trinitaire chez les Peres Cappadocians? ', Revite Theologique 
de Louvain 17,1986, p. 265. And A. M. AlIchin, 'Vladimir Lossky the Witness of an Orthodox 
Theologian', Theology72,1969pp. 203-209. 
10 Rowan Williams 'Eastern Orthodox Theology' in The Modern Theologian-,; P. 505 and Alar 
Lats, Unpublished PhD thesis 1996. p. 268 
11 ik[Tp. 120-121 and OTp. 42 
12 Lats Unpublished PhD thesis 1996 p. 265 
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particular which concerned Russian philosophy in the 19th century. 13 Like 
Berdyaev, Lossky attempts to move beyond the discussion of Russian 
idealism by maintaining the integrity of the many particulars in the face of 
the idealist tendency to collapse the many into the one. 
A central theme in Russian thought in the 19th century was the relation of 
the universal to the particular. The Russian idealists' concept of total unity 
was dynamic in contrast to the essentialists' emphasis upon a protological. 
unity of being. However, as we noted in the last chapter, their approach failed 
to allow for the particular subject in its own right, which meant that the unity 
of the many in relation to the one became just as determinative for the many 
as the essentialists'protological concept of being. Lossky and other thinkers, 
like Berdyaev, were concerned with the monist tendency in this idealism, 
especially in its failure to allow freedom and particularity to individuals. 
They attempted to address this problem by reversing the approach, beginning 
with the particular and locating the general within the particular. While this 
reversal certainly altered the focus of the debate it did not necessarily change 
the basic parameters within which Russian thought was operating. In other 
words they remained within the framework of the discussion which was 
concerned with relating the general to the particular. 
Lossky utilised the person/nature distinction to elaborate a turn to the 
particular subject. The idealists had identified the unity of the many as a 
teleological anticipation grounded in a union with the absolute subject. 
Lossky steps back from this teleological perspective and suggests that the unity 
of the many is protological rather than teleological. At first this might seem 
to be a return to the schemes of the essentialists with their emphasis upon the 
static essence or 'being' which constitutes the many,, yet it is not; rather, 
Lossky uses it to allow that there are in fact two aspects to the human being: 
the first is their nature, which is both the constitutive ground of their being as 
well as their protological unity and identification with the rest of humanity, 
and the second is their person, which is their free and transcendent self 
definition in relation to the one who is God. 14 In order to allow that these 
13'Russian religious philosophy attempted to discover a point of equilibrium between 
individualism and collectivism, a kind of personalism, in fact, which resolves the tension 
between the particular and the general by seeing the general in the particular' Rowan 
Williams Unpublished PhD Thesis 1972. 
14 'The person is always unique ... It is only to be seized through a personal relationship, in a 
reciprocity analogous to that of the hypostases of the Trinity, in an unfolding which goes 
beyond the opaque banality of the world of individuals. ' OTp. 43. 
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two aspects might be held together in the human person without 'confusion 
or loss of distinctness'he upholds the idea that the person exists as both 
person and nature, or exists by including two aspects, which are an organic or 
physical relatedness to the matrix of humanity and the freedom to transcend 
that 'givenness' in relation to God-15 Protological unity is the relatedness to 
all humanity or relatedness to being; it is not the relation to God. Using the 
doctrine of creation out of nothing, Lossky suggests that the relation to God is 
not to be confused with the unity of being. He discounts the notion that 
God's relation to the world is a determined relation, regardless of whether 
that relation is seen in protological or teleological terms. God is in fact, 
beyond 'being', beyond ontology. 16 His thesis overturns traditional 
discussions of ontology which operated from the assumption that God's being 
is true being and as such the source of all human being. 
In Lossky's desire to break free of determined notions of being, he is clearly in 
line with the existentialist rejection of traditional ontologies. Yet at the same 
moment, he maintains the notion that relation to God is essential for true 
personal existence. Thus he has separated out the question of the 'essential' 
or protological. unity of the many from the issue of free existential relation to 
God. In other words, Lossky balanced the concerns raised in the traditional 
ontological discussions, to see the relation to God or the one as primary to 
human identity, with the modern concern to uphold freedom to the 
particular. The person is able to transcend the material realm in a spiritual 
encounter with the one God. This is not intended to be a denial of the 
material realm for the person continues to live out of and incorporate their 
nature; the nature does not limit the person but provides the grounds of their 
constitution. Lossky's unique approach attempted to deal with the complex 
balance between freedom and being by positing a paradoxical unity of person 
and nature within the human being. 
Lossky is very clear in establishing that the idea of the person remains 
beyond conceptualisation: 'The mystery of a human person, which makes it 
absolutely unique and irreplaceable, cannot be grasped in a rational concept 
and defined in words. 117 This sense of the mystery of the concept of 
15'The relationship [to God] is unique for every being. It is made effective and real by means of 
the will which orders the entire nature towards God, in whom man must find the fullness of his 
being. ' MT p. 127. 
16 OT, p. 16 We will discuss this 'de-ontologising' approach of Lossky later in this chapter. 
17 I&L, p-107. 
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personhood is central to his theological anthropology, maintaining above all 
that the idea of person can never be encapsulated. 18 Where the irreducible 
complex of body, soul and spirit is the first aspect of the person19 the second is 
its freedom to transcend all definitions. In other words, the true essence of 
the person is not contained within the nature but is able to extend infinitely 
beyond the constraints of the nature -- almost as though the nature is simplý, 
a starting point from which the person might endlessly extend themselves. 20 
This argument sounds like an existentialist concept of transcendence and 
certainly reflects their idea of ecstasiS. 21 Lossky himself notes that he would 
use the heideggarian word ecstasis if it were not already connected with 
Heidegger's existentialism. 22 This does raise the question of whether or not 
he is simply expounding existentialist understandings cloaked in theological 
language. 23 
1.3. Freedom to Choose 
One of the primary concerns in the arguments of existentialists had been to 
return to the concrete particular being instead of trying to find the essence 
which is a portion of or lies behind the concrete existent. Sartre's famous 
dictum "existence precedes essence " inspired the belief that Particularity is 
derived from a person making choices which gives them an identity in self 
definition. The emphasis upon choice locates 'being' or the ontic content in 
the freedom of the individual rather than in some given quality or substance. 
Authentic existence becomes differentiation from one's givenness and from 
other existent beings. The existentialists have reversed the equation of the 
essentialists by linking ontology with particularity. Bringing the two issues of 
ontology and particularity together the existentialists certainly transform the 
dilemma yet it is not clear that they have challenged the central issues. 
18 OT, p. 42. 
19 MT p. 116,128. 
20 ... ]a personne", says Lossky, est une sortie du soi-me^me! ' Rowan Williarns, 'The Via 
Negativa and the Foundation of Theology: An Introduction to the Thought of Vladimir Lossky., 
In NeW Studies ut Theology Vol. 1 ed. S. Sykes, D. Holmes (London: Dudworth, 1980). p. 106 
21 Charles Lock, in a book review of BeUig as CoininmnOii, S VTQ Vol. 30: 1.1986 p. 94, suggests 
that for Lossky, 'ecstasis is a "reduction of being" to simplicity, a dissolution of the 
multiplicity in the One. For Lossky "ecstasy" is Plotinus's word not Maximus' s. ' 
22 I&L p. 120. 
23 Lossky is able to develop his emphasis upon personal encounter in the knowledge of God in a 
ways which at times seems consciously and deliberately to echo philosophists like Sartre. 
Rowan Williams, 'The Via Negativa' p. 111. 
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In many ways Lossky seems to have come to the same sticking point as the 
existentialists in which there is a concern not to reduce the person to one 
aspect or element, while desiring to establish some basis for the uniqueness of 
the person. Furthermore he is concerned to maintain the freedom of choice 
in order to establish the responsibility of each person. 24 In his call for human 
beings to take responsibility for themselves he is picking up a central theme 
in existentialist thought. The emphasis for Lossky, like the existentialists, is 
placed upon the freedom of the person to 'create' their own identity; 
particularity is to a degree rooted in what the person does with their given 
nature. 25 
It can be difficult to grasp exactly how Lossky understands the issue of human 
freedom to choose. While he acknowledges the problems with an emphasis 
upon freedom of choice he continues to maintain that it is a central aspect of 
personal identity. 26 Lossky turns the existentialist tendency towards 
individualism by saying that freedom is recognised in a transcendence which 
does not deny the other, dividing up nature, but finds identity through 
uniting human nature. For an existentialist all human beings become 
particular beings through the choice to find identity through distinguishing 
themselves in a qualitative way from other persons. In contrast to Sartre or 
Heidegger, Lossky changes the arena of choice -- identity is not found in this 
world alone but in choosing to relate to God. '[The] command addressed to 
human freedom is not coercion. As a personal being man can accept or reject 
God'sWill. ' 27 
The apparent advantage of this position is that it allows Lossky to uphold a 
notion of self constitution without thereby denying the integral rootedness of 
the person within the matrix of creation. Thus while the person locates their 
24 Lossky identifies sin with using determinist notions to refuse to take responsibility for one's 
actions. 'Adam is here the first determinist. Man is not free, he lets it be understood; creation, 
therefore God has led him to evil'. OT p. 82. 
25 OT p. 72. 
26'According to Saint Maximus, this freedom of choice is already a flaw, a limitation of true 
freedom: perfect nature has no need of choice, for it knows what is good in a natural way. its 
freedom is based on this knowledge. Our freedom of will reveals the imperfection of human 
nature ... It no longer 
knows how to choose, and too often yields to the impulses of nature which 
has become the slave of sin. In this way, what was made in us in God's image is drawn down 
into the abyss, although it still retains its freedom of choice and its ability to return to God. ' 
OT p 129. Here Lossky appears to accept the problem with the emphasis upon choice only to 
turn around and posit free choice as an integral element to the person. 
27 OT p. 128. 
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particularity in relation to God in a transcendence of the material realm, this 
does not imply a denial of the material realm but in fact allows the space by 
which the material realm might be incorporated and redeemed within the 
person. The person moves out beyond their givenness or 'nature' not so that 
they might find a spiritual existence but so that they might live as true 
persons who are both spiritual and material. The human drive towards 
individualism is a perversion of God's intention for human particularity 
which is not to be found in a dividing up this world and staking a claim on 
one aspect of this world as one's own but by accepting and incorporating this 
unity within oneself. 
1.4. Endurin2 Particulariq 
Lossky's concept of the person is thus rooted in a understanding of the 
endurance of each particular. One problem with existentialist arguments is a 
failure to give enduring particularity to the person leading to the 'being unto 
death' of Heidegger or the 'pessimism' of Sartre. While, perhaps giving 
I ontological' content to the particular temporal existent as a product of their 
own choice, they cannot give enduring content to it. The essentialist's desire 
to give human beings an eternal element remains unresolved in the 
existentialist's schematic. 
For Lossky, the hope for enduring content to the particular is rooted in the 
human person being made in the image of the divine persons. As we noted 
in chapter one the danger with using image language is that it readily lends 
itself to an essentialist interpretation. However, Lossky's emphasis upon 
creatio ex nihilo means that the created human being has no 'natural' 
connection with the uncreated. How is this disjunction between the created 
and the uncreated bridged? Lossky posits the image as something dynamic or 
personal rather than substantial. 28 Here again the person/nature concept is 
central to his description of human imaging of God. Man made in the image 
of God describes human nature as a whole- united in the same way as God's 
nature is one. 29 Yet, image is not located in 'nature' as the substantial and 
28 In fact, there is almost a sense in which the image is only realised in relation; 'this creation 
in the image and likeness of God implies the idea of participation in the divine being, of 
communion with God. That is to say, it presupposes grace. MT, p. 1 18. 
29 There is no distinction between the man formed at the beginning of the world's creation and 
him who will come at the end: they bear in themselves the same image of God. Consequently, 
man made in God's image is nature understood as a whole, reflecting the likeness of God. OT, p. 
124-25. 
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constitutive element of human being- rather, it is imaged in the human 
person who is able to unite nature while transcending it in relation to God. 
'What corresponds in us to God's image is not a part of our nature, but the 
person including nature in itself. ' 30 Therefore the image does not refer to 
some aspect or content to the person such as the soul, but, refers to the whole 
person. It is this personhood which images God and provides the link 
between created being and uncreated being. 31 This appears to be a 
profoundly important move in suggesting that enduring particularity is 
rooted in relation to God rather than in a substantial element of the 
individual's constitution. However, the direction of Lossky's analogy means 
that it is because the human being is a person that they are able to relate to 
God rather than establishing that a human being is a person because they are 
in relationship to God. 
1.5. The Ouestion of Nature or nature 
In order to understand the thrust of Lossky's notion of person/ nature we 
need to spend a few moments clarifying what he means by the word 'nature'. 
The multiple and confusing meanings for the word nature ensure that there 
will always be an element of mystery to Lossky's definition of the person. It is 
unfortunate that his use of the word 'nature' as a cornerstone of his theology 
leads so easily to misunderstanding. We can immediately disqualify the 
individualist notion of nature which has shown itself in various guises from 
behaviourism to materialism to Sartre's notion of nature. In fact the thrust 
of Lossky's argument is to negate the tendency towards believing that the 
individual has their own particular nature. His clear emphasis upon the 
universal aspect of nature directs us towards our three real choices. The first 
is the idea of a generic form or model which acts as the blueprint for all 
human persons, the second would be the actual existence of a human nature 
as the physical or organic unity of all humanity and the third would be an 
Aristotelian notion of a common nature as the second 'substance' of all 
human beings. Lossky accepts the notion that there must be some real form 
or structure to the unity of all humanity. In his anthropological focus he 
speaks primarily of nature as the raw ingredients which constitute all of 
humanity. As such nature is not an abstract thing nor an individual 
possession; rather it is both the basis of all humanity as well as the content of 
30 OT, p. 127. 
31 OT, p. 72. 
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each human person. Unfortunately, there is also the sense that this nature is 
the real substance which hes behind all particular human beings. Some of 
Lossky's statements seem to reflect the simple application of Aristotelian 
principles; 'Only one nature exists, common to all men, although it appears 
to us fragmented by sin, parcelled out among many persons'. 32 The problem 
with any notion of a universal nature including the Aristotelian model, is 
that it can tend towards nature having a determinative influence on the 
person, the individual person loses any particularity. That Lossky cannot 
accept any model which denies particularity is evidenced by his objection to 
the social determinism of Russian philosophy in the 19th century. Utilising 
the model of person/nature he is able to say that this nature which is 
constitutive of each human being is not absolutely determinative of their 
person. 
Because created in the image of God, man is to be seen as a person who is not to 
be controlled by nature, but who can himself control nature in assimilating it to 
his divine archetype. 33 
Identifying an individual's protological. constitution and their integral 
relatedness to the rest of humanity as their 'nature', all the while 
maintaining the freedom of the person, Lossky appears to be holding two 
positions at the same time. Has Lossky, in attempting to address the concerns 
of both idealists and existentialists fallen into a basic dualism? If he has, then 
it is a dualism which is overcome by the human person for he is not simply 
identifying two realms which a human being must choose between. Rather, 
by ascribing central importance to the person he is suggesting that it is the 
human person who must hold within themselves these two realms. To 
explore the coherence of his approach we need to turn first to his use of 
patristic theological themes. 
2.1. A Foundation in Patristic Theology 
We noted at the beginning of this chapter that Lossky validates his argument 
for the unity of the person and nature within a human individual by 
referring to the Chalcedonian model of Christ. . This is in contrast to the 
secular existentialists who root their concepts in their phenomenology. From 
the Cappadocian discussions on the meaning of hypostasis and ousta he 
suggests that we need to deconceptualise the notion of the human individual 
32MT, p. 120,0 T, p. 125. 
33 AIT, p. 120. 
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in the same way in which the Cappadocians did for the notion of divine 
persons. Lossky makes an important distinction in keeping with these 
Fathers by noting that they were trying to break through the substantialist 
interpretations of the Trinity. Significantly, he is attempting to use the 
interpretation of revelation to confront the essentialist or idealist tradition 
which itself often claims to be rooted in revelation. He is strongly opposed to 
a substantialist ontology which would see the person as a secondary or 
temporal expression of the one substance or the one true being. 
Indeed in the doctrinal conditions prevalent in the West all properly 
theocentric speculations run the risk of considering the nature before the persons 
and becoming a mysticism of the divine abyss, as in the Gotthart of Meister 
Eckhart: of becoming impersonal apophaticism of the divine nothingness prior 
to the Trinity. Thus by a paradoxical circuit we return through Christianity to 
the mysticism of the neo-platonists. 34 
While his broad grouping of all western theology might seem a bit 
condescending there is truth in his suggestion that much of western theology 
tends towards locating the ontic content of the divine persons in some inner 
aspect of their nature. 35 
Lossky's discussions of the Cappadocians does seem to reflect something of 
their struggle to bypass philosophical constructs which tended to encapsulate 
or limit God's being. The obvious danger is that in applying their language of 
divine persons to human persons he might confuse their theological 
constructs. To legitimate this application of the notion of divine persons to 
human persons he looks to Jesus Christ as the God/man, one person with 
two natures who as the 'image' of God in human form allows us to transfer 
this notion. 
The Chalcedonian two-nature Christology is the basis of Lossky's move to 
connect the language of image from the three divine persons of the Trinity 
through Christ to humanity. Christ, who united both God's nature and 
human nature in himself, becomes the paradigm for every human being. 36 
34 MT, p. 65. 
35 'if certain critics have wanted to see in St. Basil's Trinitarian doctrine a distinction between 
hypostasis and ousia which should correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between JIV64TI 
and be&etm oU'(-, Yt()E, this is because they have not been able to distinguish either the point of 
arrival from the point of departure or the theological construct, which is beyond concepts, from 
its conceptual scaffolding. ' I&L, p-I 14. 
36'[Thel refusal to admit two distinct personal beings in Christ means at the same time that one 
must also distinguish inhuman beings the person or hypostasis from the nature or individual 
substance. ' I&L, p. 118. 
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For in his unity of two natures Christ shows the priority or freedom of the 
person with reference to nature. Furthermore, in his microcosmic 
inclusivism of all human nature, Christ restores human nature to its 
absolute unity as the image of God's nature as absolute unity. 37 The existence 
of the three persons of the godhead becomes the principle for human persons 
in the unity of humanity. The divine persons are each fully God in 
themselves yet also fully God in unity. This way of being becomes the 
paradigm to which each human is called, yet instead of uniting God's nature 
within ourselves we are each called to unite all of human nature within 
ourselves. Lossky is careful to note that this unity is a mystery and one must 
be careful not to take this idea too far. In fact, he is simply saying that the 
mystery of how three persons can be one God is the basis for believing that all 
human beings can be united in human nature yet distinct as persons 
The fact that Christ incorporated both God's nature and human nature in a 
single person is evidence that it is not nature which determines the person 
but the person who incorporates nature. Without question Christology must 
be foundational to any theological anthropology; the question is how it is 
applied or used. There are several problems with Lossky's use of Christology 
in the development of his anthropology. In order to unpack and qualify what 
Lossky is saying in his person/ nature distinction we need to examine his 
application of patristic concepts in support of his thesis. We will look briefly 
at the legitimacy of his use of the Chalcedonian distinction between person 
and nature before turning to explore how he has interpreted the 
Cappadocians'ideas. 
2.2. Coherence with Patristic Theologj 
It seems as though Lossky is attempting to use the Chalcedonian language in 
a very technical way which stretches the meaning of the specific words 
beyond the breaking point. Although we would not agree with those who 
suggest that the language of person and nature is archaic and should be 
abandoned, we would allow that it must be used with caution. 38 The 
37'For God's image in man attains its perfection only when human nature becomes hke God's 
nature, when it begins fully to participate in uncreated goodness. ' OT, p. 125. 
38 'The Chalcedon Definition has been subjected to many criticisms by modem theologians, who 
complain that the terms it employs are no longer usable. It is true that the terms which are 
rendered 'nature'and 'person'do not coincide in meaning with their modern English 
equivalents, but it is doubtful if the Fathers at Chalcedon thought the terms they used were 
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primary problem, in Lossky's approach, is that he has taken a statement 
which was meant to affirm the mystery of the person of Christ, as both 
human and divine, and he has made it the cornerstone of his anthropology. 
The council's affirmation of one person and two natures in Christ was not 
intended as a positive fo rmuIa. Rather, it was an instance of what Bonhoeffer 
calls 'critical Christology'. 'The results of critical Christology are of a negative 
kind, because they determine boundaries and establish the rules for what may 
not be said about Christ. '39 
We noted earlier the problem of the multiple meanings of the word nature 
and it appears as though part of the problem in the fifth century was rooted in 
different interpretations of what the word nature actually meant. 40 Therefore 
to use the term nature, as described by the council in 451 ad, in a pivotal way 
in theological constructs is to deny the limits of its definition. If the issue of 
how Christ can be both God and man is reduced to a question of how he can 
contain two natures at once, we, in effect, have avoided the more important 
issue which informed the debates of the third and fourth century: which is " 
how can Christ be united with both the created world and uncreated God at 
the same time? Therefore the question of two natures in one person is not a 
question about the person of Christ alone, but a question of the matrix of his 
inter relatedness. 
Lossky's use of the person/nature formula is not solely founded upon the 
Chalcedonian statement. Rather., he goes back to the Cappadocian 
understanding of the divine persons. When one reads Lossky together with 
the Cappadocians there is a sense of real coherence between the two. He uses 
some of the central concepts of the Cappadocians to bring to light the issues 
they were attempting to express in their time. In spite of his clear desire to 
remain true to the tradition we see that, once again, his historical scholarship 
has been shaped by more modern concerns and ideas. 41 With the question of 
adequate to express the reality of God in Christ. ' A Dictionary of Christian Theology; ed. A 
Richardson. s. v. 'Christology', G. Hendry p. 58. 
39 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center Eng. trans. Edwin H. Robertson (San Francisco; 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1978) p. 74. 
40 Bonhoeffer referring to Chalcedon says 'It speaks about "natures", but expresses the facts in 
such a way as to show that the concept of "natures" is quite inappropriate for this use. It works 
with concepts whose formulations are declared to be heretical except when they are used in 
contradiction and paradox. It pushes the concept of substance, which lays the basis for the 
relationship between the natures, to such a point that it becomes meaningless. ' Bonhoeffer, 
Christ the Center. p. 88. 
41 Williams, 'The Via Negativa' p. 111, questions Lossky's historical accuracy. 
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his historical accuracy in mind we now need to turn to consider his 
interpretation of the Cappadocians. 
2.3. Lossky's Al! IRlication of Cappadocian Th 
The central theme of the Cappadocians, for Lossky, is clearly the comparison 
of the universal and the particular. 42 The Cappadocians use this analogy to 
explain the particularity of the three persons in the Trinity as a unity in 
diversity in the same way as each human being is a particular being united in 
the universal human nature. Where they used the analogy of the general to 
the particular to try to explain the distinction between hypostasis and ousia in 
the doctrine of the trinity, Lossky makes it the very basis for explaining his 
theological anthropology using the person/nature distinction. While he is 
using the same language as the Cappadocians he gives their work a different 
slant by focusing primarily on the one analogy. Thus in Lossky's model, we 
find nature being used in a different sense than the Cappadocians intended. 
Let us now look in. Christian anthropology for the same non-conceptual meaning 
of the distinction between hypostasis and ousia or physis. (These two notions 
coincide without being completely identical. ) 43 
In the context of the Cappadocians it must be noted that they used physis of 
both hypostasis and ousia, so, to align it with one of the two words is in fact 
confusing their usage of the terms. It appears that Lossky's use of the word 
nature as a synonym for ousia confuses the thrust of the Cappadocian 
distinction. In chapters one and two of this thesis we argued that the formula 
of one ousia and three hypostases was to be understood not as an equation but 
as two ways of speaking of God. Indeed if we make the formula into an 
equation or if we neglect to state both the oneness and the threeness of God 
we are in danger of denying the paradox which is at the centre of Trinitarian 
theology. Lossky has clearly recognised the need to maintain this paradox; 
however, when he equates nature or physis with ousia and then continues by 
speaking of the unity of the person with their nature he has, in effect, reduced 
the paradox of the three in one to an equation which the two ways of 
speaking of the one God must be 'added' together. 
In actual fact Lossky seems to almost go back behind the Cappadocians to see 
in hypostasis and ousia the similarity which allowed Athanasius to equate 
42 I&L, p. 114. 
43 I&L, p. 115. 
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the two terms. His suggestion that the difference between hypostasis and 
ousia is non-conceptual, seems to undermine the thrust of the Cappadocians' 
work, whose concern was to clarify the difference between the words 
hypostasis and ousia. Although Lossky is Nvanting to maintain the distinction 
between the two terms it is a 'mystery' which remains beyond conception. By 
focusing on physis Lossky has blurred the distinction they were making. 
2.4. God's Nature Differs From Human Nature 
The truth is that his interchangeable use of nature and ousia is not in keeping 
with the subtleties of the Cappadocians' argument. In particular he fails to 
draw attention to the qualifications which the Cappadocians made regarding 
the word physis. In his Christology he makes the link between human 
nature and God's nature by suggesting that while the two natures are 
absolutely different to the point of ensuring the distinction of the created and 
the uncreated, they are also of the same order. 
Men have therefore a common nature, one single nature in many human persons. 
This distinction of nature and person in man is no less difficult to rasp than the 
analogous distinction of the one nature and three persons in God-W 
Basically, Lossky has failed to account for the fact that the unity he is talking 
about is not the same between humans as it is between the persons of the 
Godhead. His use of nature as the basis of the unity in both cases reflects an 
understanding which sees the two natures being of the same order. As we 
noted in chapter one the Cappadocians were careful to distinguish the unity 
of human nature from the unity of God's nature. When they compared 
God's nature to human nature it was to maintain the distinction between the 
created and the uncreated,, it was not a statement with regard to the content of 
the two natures. 
While Lossky is right in seeing that the word nature is important in so far as 
it does point to the substantial content of God, he confuses the issue because 
he then turns around and reduces it to one aspect of the persons. His thesis, 
that it is the person who incorporates nature rather than the nature 
determining the person, forces us to ask if he is not trying to mask a 
contradiction in the guise of the mystery of the microcosmic person. 
Although the unity of the persons is a 'substantial' unity it is not a unity 
which involves the whole person. He appears to have put the emphasis 
44 
ýN IT, p. 121. 
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upon the particular persons in the same way as the West has put the 
emphasis upon the one unity. 45 Thus the criticism of Western theologians, 
who interpret the Cappadocians from the Latin perspective and see in them a 
basis for tritheism, does seem to be true of Lossky. 
The problem is that Lossky is conflating two questions in his understanding 
of the word nature. Nature does not answer the question- 'how might we 
describe the God who is three and one? ' Rather, it answers the question 'that 
these three are God and not created beings'. In fact, the ontological question 
of God's being is answered, albeit in a limited way, by the terms 'ousia' and 
'hypostases'. And as we discussed in chapter two,, the ousia answers the 
question 'what' and the hypostases answer the question 'how'. They are not 
terms denoting two distinct aspects of the being of God. 
The discussion of person and nature in the context of patristic theology has 
raised several questions with regard to the legitimacy of Lossky's claim to 
have recovered patristic theological themes. One of the arguments of this 
chapter has been that Lossky is far more influenced by modern philosophical 
conceptions than he would care to admit. At issue for us is not whether or 
not one uses modern conceptions but whether or not they serve to elucidate 
theological truths. Thus at this point we will turn to look more closely at 
Lossky's understanding of 'relations' in the light of some of the issues we 
discussed in chapter three. 
3.1. Person and Relation 
In the past two chapters we have discussed different understandings of 
relations in seeking to identify or describe different ways in which the 
individual human person might be understood to 'relate' to other persons 
and to God. Alar Lats has noted that Lossky's primary concern is to deal with 
the relation of a person to their nature or to the whole human nature. Lats 
suggests that this focus has resulted in a failure to deal adequately with the 
relations between one person and another; 
45 This is evident in his willingness to quote De Regnon, who we discussed in chapter two as 
having identified the key difference between the East and the West as simply two approaches 
to the same issue. I&L p. 78. See also Greg Havrilak, 'Karl Rahner and the Greek Trinity', 
SVTQ vol. 34; 1 1990. And J. Meyendorff, Byzantunn and the rise of RlIssia. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
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It is right to say that the idea of interpersonal relations is not unimportant to 
Lossky. For him one of the main characteristics of personhood is its openness to 
the other person. But this openness to the other is not fundamental. It is 
grounded in the relationship between a person and his nature. A person is 
related to the other through sharing the nature. A person is free in relation to 
the nature and does not own it exclusively. The relationship between two 
persons occurs if the persons are free in relation to their nature. 46 
Lats is clearly right in noting that Lossky's emphasis is upon dealing with the 
primary relation of a person to their nature, however, this primary relation is 
not to demean or dismiss the notion of interpersonal relations, of the 
relations of the persons which go beyond the matrix of the relations of nature. 
What is confusing at this point is that, for Lossky, the relation of a person to 
their nature is actually a form of relation from one human being to another. 
Nonetheless because it is a relation at the level of nature it might be said that 
it is not actually an interpersonal relation but person/ nature relation. 
Lossky deals first with the relation of a person to their nature, yet, this 
primary relation remains dependent upon and no more important than his 
concern for the person's existential encounter with God. 'The source and end 
of apophatic theology is therefore a fully conscious (though non-intellectual) 
relation of personal confrontation between man and God in love'. 47 The 
vertical spiritual encounter is seen to be very much in keeping with 
Berdyaev's notion of free existential relation. While Christ has transformed 
human nature, thus allowing a healthy person/nature relation, it is through 
the spiritual relation with God that the individual human being truly 
becomes a whole person. 
[Plersonal relation with God, a perfectly unique relationship for every human 
being. This relationship is made real by means of the will which directs the 
whole nature to God, in whom man must find all the fullness of his being. 48 
These two forms of relation, the person/nature relation and the existential 
encounter with God, are equally important in Lossky's thesis of the call and 
integrity of the human being. Furthermore, they are the grounds by which 
true interpersonal human relations might take place. While the 
person/nature relation deals with the human person's integrated unity in the 
whole of humanity on the level of nature, the intent is that the person to 
person relations should occur with the same freedom between human 
persons as they do between a human person and God. 
46 Lats, Unpublished PhD. thesis 1996, p. 258 
47 Williams, Unpublished PhD thesis. p. 186 See MT208,229,231. 
48 OT p. 131. 
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Lossky is concerned to establish that 'authentic' interpersonal relations are 
the hope or the telos of true humanity. This is evident in his discussion of 
the difference between the terms 'person' and 'individual', where person 
refers to the freedom for the person to value, rather than defining themselves 
in distinction from other persons. 49 The realm of true existence is a world of 
personal relations; the person, who is irreducible to nature, 
is only to be seized through a personal relationship, in a reciprocity analogous 
to that of the hypostases of the Trinity, in an unfolding which goes beyond the 
opaque banality of the world of individuals. For the approach to personhood is 
penetration into a personal universe, at once assumed and open-ended: that of 
the highest artistic creations., 50 
Given the importance that Lossky appears to be placing upon interpersonal 
relations it seems strange that Lats should accuse him of devaluing them. 
We need to explore in more depth exactly how Lossky perceives or develops 
the relational aspect of the person. 
3.2. The Place of Relationships 
Lossky approaches relationships in a very different light from classic 
existential positions where relations are reduced to the functional or causal 
interactions of an indifferent society. 51 Certainly no existentialist would deny 
that community or society has influence or impact upon the individual, yet 
they have tended to see this in a negative light, as something which needs to 
be overcome. Lossky is not the only one who has tried to alter the 
individualistic tendency of the existential emphasis upon the other as a 
barrier to personal freedom. The reaction against the individualism of Sartre 
or Nietzche has led people like Berdyaev or Buber to posit a communitarian 
or relational aspect to the focus on the concrete existent. Generally this has 
led to the recognition that a person only exists in the context of their 
relationships with others. 'Personal existence supposes a relation to the 
other; one person exists "to" or "towards" the other. '52 Freedom is not found 
in moving beyond that relational matrix but in shaping it in a particular way. 
49 A IT p. 121-22. 
50 OT p. 43. 
51 Heidegger's understanding of relations is far more developed than what we are referring to 
here as 'classic' emstentialist notions. 
52 [(',, L p. 106. 
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Perhaps the best known example of establishing the constitutive importance 
of relationships is Martin Buber's I/Thou relations contrasted Nvith I/it 
relations. 
The person becomes conscious of himself sharing in being, as co-existing and thus 
as being. Individuality becomes conscious of itself as being such and such and 
nothiný else. The person says 'I am', the individual says, 'I am such and 
such'. 5 
Lossky, like Buber, wants to reverse the individualistic trend of the 
existentialists but he has chosen a different path. He is in fact more in 
keeping with the personalism of Berdyaev. 
Berdyaev was concerned to maintain the importance of relationships in 
human existence. However, rather than attempting to describe the place of 
the individual within the matrix of society he began by questioning what true 
unity might look like. In distinguishing himself from the Russian idealist 
concern with 'total unity', he talks of the distinction between society and 
communion For him communion involves the free spiritual union of 
persons and has nothing to do with society or its structures. 54 His distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic relations was used to posit a free and 
existential and 'spiritual' communion as the form of true unity. This 
approach allowed him to emphasise the importance of unity and even to 
centre that unity on the one God without denying the place that each human 
person has within that unity. However, as we have already noted, in order to 
elaborate this thesis Berdyaev has had to resort to a dualism between material 
and spiritual realms. 55 
The Gnostic denigration of the material realm has remained a powerful if 
subliminal force in many philosophical constructs. In essentialist thought 
the mind/ body distinction led directly to a dualist perspective. The attempt to 
hold the material and immaterial realms together in the human individual 
failed to give any real significance to the physical body and corresponding to 
this, failed to give a basis for particularity. Lossky, in keeping with the 
concern of Russian idealists, takes a strong stand against the dualist 
53 Buber, I and Thou p. 64. 
54 'The person, indeed, can never be a part of society, because it can never be a part of anything, 
because it can only participate in communion' Nikolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society 
(Glasgow: University Press, 1938) p-182. 
55 Berdyaex,, Shivery and Freedoin, p. 31. 
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understanding of the west. We need to look to Lossky's understanding of 
relations to see if he has managed to avoid dualism. 
3.3. Losskv on Microcosmic U 
Lossky suggestion of a 'penetration into a personal universe' sounds silrnilar 
to Berdyaev's notion of communion. 56 Lossky, however, is not willing to 
overlook the need for unity in the material realm and is not suggesting that a 
person should deny the structures of society. A person does not locate their 
particularity through trying to divide up human nature. 
To put it briefly, let us say that the person can be fully personal only In so far as 
he has nothing that he seeks to possess for himself, to the exclusion of others, 
i. e., when he has a common nature with others. 57 
The idea of a common or shared nature would seem to allow for the situation 
of the person within the wider matrix of existence. If Lossky had developed 
this theme it could have proven fruitful. However, Lossky's priority is not to 
lose the basis for the particular person. This leads him to place unity within 
the person,, rather than placing the person within unity. 
But in the measure in which he is a person in the true theological sense of the 
word, a human being is not limited by his individual nature. He is not only a 
part of the whole, but potentially includes the whole, havin in himself the 
whole of the earthly cosmos, of which he is the hypostasis. 5 
Using Maximus' notion of the microcosmos, Lossky suggests that humanity 
is in a unique position to bring unity to the world. The goal for the human 
person is not to define themselves in contrast to another or others, but 
through unifying all nature -- in the same way as Christ united human 
nature -- to go beyond all division. 
instead of becoming "disindividualised" to become "cosmic" and to merge thus 
in a divine impersonal, his absolute correspondence of person with a personal 
God allows him to "personalise" the world. 59 
In fact, Lossky's singular emphasis upon the human person changes 
Maximus' whole approach. Maximus was concerned to express how God 
related to the world through human persons who are able to function as 
mediators in uniting the different elements which make up the world. 60 It is 
56 OT, p. 43. 
57 I&L, p. 106. 
58 I&L, p. 107. 
59 OT, p. 71. 
60 Lars Thu nberg, Microcos in and Mediator: Tile Theological Anthropology of Alaxinills tile 
Confessor, 2nd ed. (Illinois: Open Court Pub. 1995), p-151. 
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because human beings are themselves made up of the different elements, 
because they are microcosms, that they are able to function as mediators. In 
this mediation the differences are not lost in the unity, they maintain their 
integrity. The problem with Lossky's approach arises when he comes to 
describe how the unity of the cosmos is brought about. It is here that we see 
his concern to reverse the idealist's notions of the relation of the general to 
the particular by beginning with the particular. 
His relationship with the universe finds itself somehow inverted when 
compared with the conception of antiquity-man no longer saves himself 
through the universe, but the universe is saved through man. For man is the 
hypostasis of the whole cosmos which participates in his nature. 61 
The question of the general and the particular is no longer an issue of how 
man finds himself within the greater whole. Rather the unity of the cosmos 
only occurs 'in' the human person. Lossky's primary emphasis upon the 
person appears to deny the 'situatedness' of the person within the larger 
whole. Where Maximus identifies the human person, the microcosm, as the 
mediator between God and the World, Lossky appears to emphasise the 
human person as an 'incorporater. The whole of creation is taken up into 
the person. 'Man had only to give himself to Him in complete abandonment 
of love, and thus return to Him the whole universe gathered together in his 
own being'. 62 Upon closer inspection it seems that Lossky reverses the ideas 
of microcosm and mediator. For Maximus it is man's position as a 
microcosm which means that he is able to be a mediator, 63where for Lossky, 
the human person fulfils their calling to be a microcosm when their 
mediation brings all nature together within themselves. In Lossky's 
conception the emphasis is upon the human person's ability to unite the 
cosmos in themselves; this would appear to be in contrast to Maximus' 
understanding of the person as a bridge. With Lossky's concern to maintain 
the irreducibility of the particular in reaction to the monism of Russian 
idealism, the unity and integrity of the human person becomes his 
controlling agenda. 
61 OT, p. 70-71. 
62 MT, pA 10. 
63 'His microcosmic character points towards a task of mediation which is the aim of his life, 
while his divine call to act as mediator presupposes his microcosmic differentiation. ' 
Thunberg speaks of Maximus inVlicrocosni and Mediator, p. 350. 
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3.4. Transcendence 
Earlier in the chapter in outlining Lossky's position we noted that together 
with the existentialists he emphasises the importance of transcendence as the 
basis of freedom for the particular. The person is not determined by their 
protological unity of nature or essence, but is able to transcend nature. 
The creature, who is both 'physical! and hypostatic' at the same time, is called 
to realise his unity of nature as well as his true personal diversity by going in 
grace beyond the individual limits which divide nature and tend to reduce 
persons to the level of the closed being of particular substances. 64 
Lossky does not simply utilise the existentialists' notion, but argues that this 
transcendence does not mean, or should not mean a denial of the other, or a 
denial of the material realm. Rather, the person as a microcosm realises the 
unity of the material realm, of nature in themselves. Although we have 
already called into question Lossky's use of the concept of the microcosm we 
would argue that if he had emphasised the person as a mediator rather than 
as an inclusive particular, his notion may have been more fruitful. Lossky 
has sought to address the idealist concern to overcome material/ spiritual 
dualism alongside of an emphasis upon the particular. We would however 
question the coherence of his notion of transcendence. A notion of 
transcendence which suggests that a person is not simply determined by their 
protological givenness is quite different from a notion of transcendence 
which suggests that a person may 'move'beyond' the material realm into the 
spiritual realm. 65 
Although Lossky uses the notion of microcosm to suggest that the person 
does not deny their nature or givenness, the very fact that they are able to 
move beyond that givenness into a free spiritual relation suggests a radical 
ability to 'disengage' from the material realm. 66 A disengagement which 
appears to be far too close to the solipsism of Nietzche. If we are to do justice 
to the human being's situation within the larger matrix of creation then any 
64 I&L, p. 122. 
65 The distinction between the material and spiritual realms, as though the two realms existed 
as separate spheres, involves a confusion over the meaning of creatio-ex-nihilo and the 
understanding of God's transcendence and immanence. This issues have been discussed in more 
length in chapter one of this thesis. 
66The difficulty with Lossky's understanding of the existential encounter with God is that it 
suggests a 'private' relationship between the believer and God. This in turn causes us to ask 
with Robert Jenson, 'can faith, interpreted as an event exclusively between God and each soul 
separately, be plausibly presented also as the base of humans'true community with each 
other? ' Quoted by Gunton, The Proinise, p. 133. 
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notion of transcendence should not imply, as Lossky's notion does, an ability 
to disengage from that situation. Inevitably this perspective implies a 
distinction between the spiritual and material realms for an interior unity 
cannot account for the unity of the material realm. 
The internalising of unity is reflected in a comment upon 'external' relations 
as the result of sin; 'only in consequence of sin did these two first human 
persons become two separate natures, two individual beings, having between 
themselves external relationships. ' 67 At first glance this would seem to 
indicate that Lossky's notion of the unity of human nature is one which 
includes interpersonal relations in so far as those relations are not exterior to 
the person but intrinsic to their 'being'. Which would mean that when 
Lossky speaks of the unity of human nature he is actually trying to speak of a 
matrix of interpersonal unity which involves various forms of relatedness. 
However, the clear distinction between person and nature, his concern to de- 
ontologise relations and his emphasis upon the microcosmic inclusivism of 
the person prevents us from perceiving a dynamic interpersonal relatedness 
as a constitutive aspect of human nature. 
Recalling Buber's 'I/Thou' argument we might remember that his concern to 
avoid a dualism between material and spiritual realms led to positing a 
notion of relations which was constitutive of persons. At points Lossky 
seems to be attempting to account for human situatedness through using 
different forms of relation. However, maintaining the integrity of the 
particular is clearly the fundamental concern in Lossky's theological 
constructs. As a result he is careful to maintain that any notion of relations 
does not deny the freedom of the particular. By positing two distinct forms of 
relation Lossky seeks to address the need for a unity of nature and the 
possibility of free existential encounter without denying the priority of the 
particular; relation to the other or others is always secondary to the integrity 
of the particular. 
The emphasis upon the integrity of the particular which places relations as 
the prerogative of the particular calls into question Lossky's understanding of 
humanity as 'made in the image'. We noted earlier in this chapter that 
Lossky clearly seeks to move away from essentialist notions of image as one 
aspect or element within the concrete particular. However, given his concern 
67 OT, 127. 
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for the particular's integrity and freedom it is difficult to see how he can truly 
understand 'image' in relational terms; although he clearly wants to move in 
that direction. The result is that he is left with the same problems as the 
essentialists in which 'image' is interpreted in term of an analogia entis, 
Although he seeks to avoid the substantialist implications of locating image 
with one aspect of the human person he is still left with the idea that image is 
something integral to the particular. 
To understand how Lossky deals with the notions of constitutive relations of 
I natural unity' and free relations or existential encounter we need to return 
briefly to a discussion of divine relations which are the basis from which he 
develops his understanding. 
4.1. Relations of Opposition 
Western theologians are highly critical of Lossky's understanding of the 
western term 'relations of opposition'. 68 Lossky rejects the notion of 
'relations of opposition' because it seems to suggest that the ousia or nature of 
God precedes the particular persons. 69 In his perspective the western concept 
is in danger of reducing the persons to relations within the one God. 70 Lossky 
is concerned that western scholars are overly schematic at this point and are 
attempting to see how the relations of origin might be seen to be that which 
constitutes and defines the persons. He accepts the patristic concept of 
relations of origin but seeks to differentiate between those relations and the 
constitution of the persons. 
The Orthodox emphasise that, for the Greek Fathers, 'the relations [of origin] 
only serve to express the hypostatic diversity of the three; they are not the 
basis of it. It is the absolute diversity of the three hypostases which 
determines their differing relations to one another, and not vice versa. 71 
Lossky is not opposed to relations but he wants relations to be an attribute of 
the persons and not the persons to be seen only as relations. 'The relations 
are not what define the persons- they follow and are constituted by the 
68 See Yves Congar I Believe in the Holy Spirit: The River of Life Flows in East and West, Vol. 
3 Trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury 1983) P. 75-77. See also Ralph Del Colle, Christ and 
the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1994) p. 22. 
69 I&L, p. 77. 
70 The relationships, instead of being characteristics of the hypostases are identified with 
them. As St. Thomas %vas later to write: 'Persona est relatio', inner relationship of the essence 
which it diversifies. MT, p. 57. 
71 Quoted by Yves Congar, I Belime in the Holy Spirit Vol. 3, p. 74. 
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72 V persons, like inseparable properties'. In chapter two of this thesis Ne 
suggested that the relations of origin are constitutive of the persons without 
becoming fully determinative of the persons - We would agree with Rahner 
that; 'It has not been proved that a relationship that is peculiar to a person 
and a relationship that results in the constitution of a person are necessarily 
the same'. 73 Yet, rather than positing two forms of relation, one which 
accounts for the unity of the person with nature, and the other allowing for 
the free existential relations, we would wish to assert that the constitutive 
relations of the person might be seen to allow for and include the persons' 
'freedom' to respond. This might suggest that the relations of origin are part 
of the complex of relations which may be identified with the persons of the 
Trinity without becoming the whole constitution of the persons. As we 
suggested in chapter two, this should be the place in which the notion of 
ontological relations could be see to play an important role. 74 This would 
allow that the persons both constitute and are constituted by their relations. 
Unfortunately, this avenue of thought is not explored by Lossky. He is 
primarily concerned to avoid the approach of western notions which have 
sought to develop the understanding of the relations of origin in order to 
shed light on the identity of the three persons. 75 Thus he is opposed to any 
language of relations which might be seen to be primarily constituitive of the 
identity of the three persons. 76 In fact he suggests that the relations of the 
divine persons have to do with the unity of nature. 77 He deals with the 
problem of unity at its primary level which is the unity of the individual 
being as a coherent essence, yet he has, in so doing, simply moved the 
problem of unity to another level. The result is, in his analogy which 
emphasises the identity of nature with the three persons, he leaves us with 
72 Congar, I Believe ill tile Holy Spirit Vol. 3, p. 73. 
73 Karl Rahner, Mysterimn Salidis 1, French Trans. Paris 1971 p. 33, Quoted by Congar in I 
Belit'771' ill Me Holy Spirit p. 77 
74 This will be discussed in chapter five. 
75 M T, p. 62. 
761&Lp. 79. He also maintains that the Son and Spirit do not relate to each other in the 
economic activity of God- although this appears as a simple polemic stance against the 
filioque nonetheless, it does reflect that his theology has little room for a relational matrix 
which engages and sustains the persons. 
77 We might note as well that he is happy to use the notion of perichoresis to describe the unity 
of the two natures in Christ. AIT, p. 145 and OT, p. 99. While this was first suggested by 
Nazianzen, it in fact becomes problematic in later understandings of the term perichoresis, 
especially if we are to suggest that the unity of the three persons is akin to the unity of the two 
natures in Christ. 
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an idea of functional relations rather than truly dynamic interpenetration. In 
other words his strong emphasis upon the relation as a part of the persons 
leaves us with the choice of seeing the three as either related in a functional 
sense or with a definition of the three persons as truly autonomous. 78 
4.2. Essence/Energies 
One might assume that given more time Lossky would have moved on to 
address the issue of interpersonal relations, for it is clear that he was 
interested in a Christian faith wl-dch was engaged in real life. 79 Unfortunately 
there is little to suggest that he had any room for understanding a relational 
engagement of persons, whether divine or human, which involved any 
ontological significance. His basic existential reaction against ontology aside, 
there are elements to his theology which show that he wishes to uphold the 
irreducible integrity of the individual person as a primary concern. 80 
Earlier in reflecting on Lossky's understanding of personal relations we noted 
that there was some evidence that he perceived the relation of a human being 
to God as the foundational form of true encounter. Yet even this relationship 
is threatened by his understanding of the essence/ energies distinction which 
controls or describes the whole engagement of God with the world and with 
humanity. 
What is the nature of the relationship by which we are able to enter into union 
with the Holy Trinity? If we were able at any moment to be united to the very 
essence of God and to participate in it even in the very least degree, we should 
not at the moment be what we are, we should be God by nature. ýi 1 
The immanent engagement of God with the world is through God's energies 
not through God's essence. This Palamite distinction raises serious questions 
78 The degree to which Lossky's theology is informed by the modern notion of the person is 
evident from his suggestion of three centres of consciousness in the Trinity. I&L, p. 192. 
79 Allchin, Vladittur Lossky, p. 204-205. 
8() Lossky's use of the concept of kenosis would also appear to reflect a concern to guard the 
integrity of the particular in their engagement with. another. 'And the person [of the Son] 
fulfils himself in the gift of himself: he distinguishes himself from nature, not to avail himself 
of his natural condition, but to renounce himself totally. OT, p 101. Relating kenotically means 
that the integrity of those who relate and those who are related to remains intact; the self 
steps back to ensure that the individual maintains its integrity. In this we see a basic unspoken 
assumption in Lossky's thought; that is, the integrity of the person demands that engagement 
with the other does not in any way threaten or determine their personal particularity. 
(Williams in 'The Via Negativa' p. 108 has noted that the concept of kenosis is very important 
to Lossky. ) 
81 MT, 69-70. 
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82 regarding the character of the relation between a human person and God. 
For even when Lossky speaks of a fundamental notion of communion it is 
not simply an interpersonal communion but a communion with the 'energy 
of God. 
This is the communion with divine energy, inherent in the soul, which is 
denoted by the term 'particle of divinity'. Thus creation in God's image and 
likeness implies communion with the divine being, with God. 83 
Lossky has used the essence/ energies distinction as a basis to maintain the 
integrity of God apart from his engagement with the world while at the same 
time allowing for God's immanent involvement in the world In other 
words the essence/ energies distinction parallels the transcendent/ immanent 
distinction which we discussed at the beginning of chapter one. It appears 
that the former distinction uses more 'substantial' language than the latter; 
however, the terms used in both distinctions have potential to confuse the 
nuances which must be maintained through the definitions of God ad intra 
and God ad extra. In spite of the tendency towards substantialist language the 
essence/ energies distinction might have some positive functions if, and only 
if, one is very careful to maintain that there is no 'substantial' distinction 
between God's involvement in the world and God in himself. In Lossky's 
concern to maintain the integrity of God and indeed the integrity of 
humanity in relation to God, he appears to allow that the energies might be 
understood as 'a thing in itself'. 84 Of course the paradox of this approach is 
that in his desire to guard the integrity of God while accounting for the 
relation to humanity, Lossky has posited two distinct and even separate 
aspects in the being of God. His rejection of a constitutive notion of relations 
has led him to posit a complex of distinctions in the Godhead. Once again his 
primary concern to guard the integrity of particulars reveals itself in 
questionable assertions. 
82 The essence/ energies distinction is not developed in the writings of the Cappadocian 
Fathers, In spike of Lossky's ciaim that it begins there. in Palamas' writings it becomes a 
highly questionable distinction. 'in the Palamite tradition God remains independent of his own 
unity with the divinized Christian. ' D. Wendbourg, 'From the Cappaclocian Fathers to Gregory 
Palamas: The Defeat of Trinitarian Theology' in Sttidta Patristica Vol. 17,1 Oxford, 1982 
p. 195. Quoted by Alar Lats Unpub. PhD thesis. 
83 OT p. 123. And he says 'We are unable, therefore, to participate in either essence of the 
hypostases of the Holy Trinity. ' AIT, p-70. 
84 Williams echoes this claim. Williams, The Via Negativa' p. 105. 
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Conc 
In spite of the criticisms made in this chapter it must be acknowledged that 
Lossky's concern to redress the understanding of the person from a 
theological perspective has much to offer. His desire to maintain the 
irreducibility of the concrete existent person while attempting to establish a 
free relational context does offer an alternative to the abstract metaphysics of 
much western theology. A strong focus on the person clearly underlies 
Lossky's whole approach, with the result that it provides the link between his 
theological themes. The fact that he seeks to redefine personalism by 
returning to a patristic theology of the divine persons seems to be a positive 
endeavour, in so far as it brings to light the whole issue of the implications of 
the personalness of the God of the Christian tradition. Furthermore his 
attempt to redefine particularity from the typical qualitative focus is an 
important insight. While there is a tendency towards a spiritualisation of the 
concept of the person it is clear that his desire is not to posit the person as 
mystical but as a mystery. 
The difficulty arises when his concept of the person becomes too 
comprehensive. His development of the Chalcedonian terms of person and 
nature is used to establish a direct analogy between human and divine 
persons rather than emphasising the singular uniqueness of the unity of the 
created and uncreated in the person of Jesus Christ. Thus the connection 
between human and divine is rooted primarily in the fact that they are both 
persons rather than in a redemptive communion. By completing the circle of 
the analogy from the human particular and universal to the Trinity and then 
back to the human person, he appears not to have truly used revelation to 
determine his anthropology but to have simply used Trinitarian thinking to 
baptise his personalist understanding. 
In fact for Lossky, persons function as both the universal and the particular. 
By noting the tendency of the Russian tradition to negate the particular 
person we can understand Lossky's overt emphasis on the person which 
places unity within the particular. Yet it is apparent that his concern to 
address this imbalance has too strongly shaped his own approach. Where the 
idealism of the 19th century tried to fit the particular within the universal, 
Lossky tries to fit the universal within the particular. The result of the person 
being all inclusive, is that he finds it difficult to allow for dynamic 
relatedness. The result is that persons themselves actually lose their 
particularity and tend towards an all inclusive or mystical monism. 
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Although it is apparent that he has recognised the need for establishing an 
ontology which includes a dynamism of relations, he was not -VN-illing to allow 
this dynamism to threaten the comprehensive concept of the person. 
Lossky's refusal to use a notion of constitutive relations as an integral aspect 
of the person brings us to consider Zizioulas' thesis. The two theologians 
share many of the same concerns, including a desire to recover patristic 
theology and a desire to maintain the integrity of the particular. Nonetheless, 
the thrust of their arguments is vastly different from start to finish. Turning 
now to consider Zizioulas' work we will see that his desire to develop a 
ontological notion of relations brings a completely different perspective to 
some major theological themes. 
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Chapter Five: Zizioulas on Person and Relation. 
Introduction 
The independence of the individual remains one of the most jealously 
guarded principles of western civilisation. Zizioulas notes 'we accept the 
other only in so far as he does not threaten our privacy or in so far as he is 
useful for our individual happiness'l Even people who believe that relations 
are important in the formation of identity would still tend to see them as 
secondary to the essence of the person. It is almost as though the more one 
develops a particular identity the more one must withdraw from other 
relations in order to guard the identity which has been formed. ' Relations 
and identity remain in an uneasy but necessary balance. Zizioulas suggests 
that particularity is not to be found by erecting barriers to others but is only 
found when communion or relating to others becomes the very basis of a 
person's particularity. The thrust of his argument is that persons do not exist 
and then relate but they exist and relate simultaneously. 3 If we reflect back to 
Sartre's argument we will remember that he grudgingly admitted the 
importance of relations only to suggest that the individual was constantly 
caught in the conflict between identity and relations. For Zizioulas there is 
no conflict between identity and relation for 'communion does not threaten 
personal particularity; it is constitutive of it'. 4 A person does not first relate 
in order to gain an identity for themselves, nor do they relate only out of 
their identity. In order to flesh out what Zizioulas means by the hypothesis 
that a person is a 'hypostasis in ecstasis' we will review some of the key ideas 
he develops in his notion of the person, returning from time to time to the 
ways in which Lossky has handled some of the same issues. In this process 
we will seek to clarify what we mean by the term 'relation'. 
I. I. Freedom to the Particular 
Zizioulas follows something of the same track as Lossky in using the patristic 
person/nature distinction as foundational to his theological anthropology. In 
1 John Zlzloulas, 'Communion and Otherness' SVTQ, 38: 4,1994, pp. 347- 361. 
2 Taylor Sotirces of Hie Self p. 36, speaks of this perspective 'Its as though the dimension of 
interlocution were of significance only for the genesis of individuality, like the training wheels 
of nursery school, to be left behind and to play no part in the finalised person. ' 
3 BC, P. 51. 
4 BC, P-49. 
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spite of this apparent similarity in approach significant differences quickly 
become apparent. Both Zizioulas and Lossky wish to uphold the importance 
of freedom to the particular, reflecting a concern with the possibility of 
I nature'becoming determinative of the person. Lossky attempts to juggle the 
freedom of the particular with a concern for the unity of being(unity with the 
created realm) and the free existential encounter with the one God. 
Identifying the Chalcedonian distinction of person and nature as the 'image' of 
God that is found in human beings, Lossky uses it as a basis to establish the 
freedom of the human person to transcend their nature, to transcend their 
protological givenness. Use of this analogia entis leads to significant 
problems with how Lossky understands humanity. Fundamentally it leaves 
him trying to hold together an existentialist notion of the freedom of the 
person to transcend their protological givenness with an essentialist notion of 
the image of God as something intrinsic to the human person. 
Zizioulas, however, interprets nature as a far simpler and less comprehensive 
term. Nature as one aspect of the constitution of the person is not to be 
confused with the relational matrix or unity of the created realm; which is a 
integrated 'unity respecting the integrity and diversity (diaphora) of beings. '5 
Zizioulas adopts a far more comprehensive notion of ontology than Lossky. 
Being does involve the unity of all but it also involves the unity of the one 
with the many. The division which Lossky made between a protological 
unity of nature and a relational unity with God is avoided. As a result, for 
Zizioulas, the issue of a person's relation to nature does not take on the 
significance which is held in Lossky' scheme. Zizioulas quickly differentiates 
himself from classical understandings of 'being' as he establishes that this 
nature never exists except in hypostasis. The hypostasis is not perceived as 
the 'nature' or static substance which constitutes the person, but is the 
dynamic enhypostasisation of the nature. This means that for Zizioulas, the 
emphasis is taken off nature as the protological determination of a human 
person. 6 Nature becomes instead a descriptive and constitutive element of a 
human person. Zizioulas allows that ontological questions are not located in 
a question of nature but refer to the hypostasis. Thus where Lossky has 
continued to accept the essentialist notion of ontology, as located in nature, 
5 'Capacity', p-425- 
6'[T]he person, or hypostasis, is not generated by nature or derived from It (it would not be 
established in freedom and communion, if it were so). ' 'Capacity', p. 436. 
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Zizioulas moves to a more dynamic idealist notion of being where he locates 
ontology in a teleological matrix of relation to the one. 
Zizioulas in keeping with Lossky and the concerns of existentialism 
maintains the importance of freedom for the particulars. However, Zizioulas 
recognises that the understanding of freedom needs to be addressed. While 
he continues to maintain the possibility of volitional freedom, he uses 
Dostoevsky's argument to discount the notion of ontological freedom. 7 
Zizioulas remarks that suicide is the only way to exercise the complete 
transcendence of a person's constitution and yet, it is the negative denial of 
existence or being. There is however an alternative to freedom through 
suicide and that is freedom through love; 'personhood creates for human 
existence the fol-Iowing dilemma; either freedom as love or freedom as 
negation. '8 The understanding of freedom as for the other rather than from 
the other, lays bare the emptiness of modern notions of ontological freedom 
through choice. 
One may argue that the possibility of refusing existence Implies a choice 
between two things, thus leading us back into the moral concept of freedom. 
But, the alternative to existence, although it may appear to imply a choice 
between two possibilities, is not in fact an alternative with an ontological 
content (since its'content'is non-being)'. 9 
Suicide accomplishes a form of moving beyond the constitutive elements of 
the world but only through the denial of existence. Love in turn 
accomplishes this through affirming the individual's existence in an absolute 
sense by establishing it in relation to another. Love must become the 
ontological basis 'we must speak here of an ontology of love as replacing the 
ontology of ousia, i. e. we must attribute to love the role attributed to 
substance in classical ontology. 10 
Zizioulas' emphasis upon an ontology of love rather than an ontology of 
substance reveals one, if not the most, significant difference between himself 
and Lossky. The ontological union between God and humanity and 
humanity to creation is not a union of essence or substance but of love. Being 
made in the image of God is not the grounds for positing a shared substance 
7 BC, p. 43. 
8 BC, p-46. 
9 'Capacity', p. 428. 
10 Zlzloulas, 'On Being a Person' p. 42. 
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or even a shared capacity between humanity and God. 1 1 Instead, it is only in 
the love of God that humanity is able to image God. Following Barth in 
using an analogla relationis rather than an analogia entis Zizioulas is able to 
move to a dynamic notion of being. However, he goes further than Barth in 
acknowledging that an analogia relationis is still concerned with the question 
of being. 12 Being becomes Being as Communion, a dynamic relational 
matrix rather than a static essential notion. 
1.2. Hlpostasis: the Dynamic Particular 
Zizioulas focuses his discussion on the person as hypostasis rather than 
attempting to identify how a particular person holds together a static 
protological essence with a dynamic existence. This in turn reflects the 
Cappadocian discussion of the formula of the three hypostases/one ousia, 
rather than the Chalcedon person/nature distinction. He thus simplifies 
some of the confusion arising from a direct correlation of Cappadocian and 
Chalcedon terminology. 
The use of the term 'hypostasis' is central to Zizioulas' work. Zizioulas uses 
it in his anthropology both in reference to its patristic usage but also in an 
attempt to use it as a lever in redefining the notion of a person. Hypostasis is 
used to describe the mode of existence of a particular person. Stasis or being 
does not exist in itself but only enhypostasised or in hypostasis. There is no 
human nature apart from the hypostasis and no stage at which a human is 
anything more or less than a hypostasis, a human being is a hypostasis from 
the moment of conception. 13 The emphasis is not upon the essence of a 
person but their mode of existence. Therefore, in contrast to essentialist 
approaches the protological makeup of a person is not finally determinative 
of their being although it is a constitutive element. 
II 'I have excluded every possibility of regarding the person as an expression or emanation of 
the substance or nature of man (or even of God himself as "nature"). ' BC, p. 59. 
12 See the discussion on Barth's understanding of analogy in A. Torrance, Persons in Commiinion. 
p. 180-83. Torrance in the same vol. p. 258 suggests 'It is our view that if Barth's discussion had 
integrated more effectively the notions of Koinonia and "essence" or "being", this would have 
opened the door to a conception of the divine economy which involved a richer integration of 
communion and communication, a participative "worship model" in interaction with his 
"revelation model" and an exposition of the Triunity of revelation in terms of the mutuality of 
divine communion. ' 
13 BC, P-50. 
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Many of the arguments which Zizioulas uses to establish his case are taken 
from existential thought. Given his clear emphasis, in ontological categories 
upon the hypostasis as mode of existence rather than stasis as 'being-in-itself' 
there are good reasons to wonder how 'theological' his approach is. 
However, at the same time as we might identify existentialist influences, we 
must also acknowledge that his terminology appears to resonate with the 
distinction the apostle Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 2: 13-3: 3 and 14: 44-45 
regarding a human person existing according to the flesh (G(jpKL`VotS)14 or the 
Spirit. When Paul uses this distinction he is not suggesting that the issue is 
whether a human individual is living according to the physical side of their 
nature or the spiritual side of their nature and therefore subliminally 
assuming that a person is ultimately determined by their nature. Rather, the 
distinction is whether the human individual is living according to their 
nature' or is living according to the Spirit. At the same time his use of the 
termV'UXLKOs or I natural' which is a clear derivative from Vu " or soul, XTI 
suggests that Paul is not talking of a division here between substance and 
spirit (or nature and person) but between how the human individual as an 
integral whole is living. The spiritual person 'does not refer to those who are 
separated from material life by the practice of asceticism, but to those who 
have received, and have their existence determined by the Spirit of God'. 15 
This leaves little room for any notion of a spiritual/ material dualism with a 
Gnostic demeaning or denial of the material realm. It also supports the idea 
that questions of ontology involve the dynamic existence of a human person 
and avoids the tendency to perceive being or ontology as a question of 
substance. 
Although Zizioulas does not utilise the same terms as Paul there is a clear 
connection with how he understands the possibility of the person existing in 
different modes according to whether they are 'related' solely to 'nature' or 
are related to the 'Spirit'. Zizioulas places less emphasis upon the connection 
between sin and the flesh than Paul and it is important to examine why he 
does this, as we will be doing in the next chapter. Yet for our purposes here, it 
raises the question of why Zizoulas has not attempted to stick more closely to 
the language of scripture and tradition in his use of the words biological and 
14 Although there is a question whether the word Paul is using is GapKi"vous meaning'made of 
flesh' or cycipKwolts meaning'having the character of flesh'it makes no difference in our 
argument. See C. K. Barrett A Coininetitanj oil tile First Epistle to tile Corliltilialls. 2nd ed. 
(London, A&C Black, 1971) p. 79. 
15 Barrett, Corbithiatis, p. 79-80. 
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ecclesial. This is particularly noteworthy given his concern to respect the 
tradition of the Church; for example, in his argument that we should claim 
the terms 'person' and 'cause' for theology in light of their patristic usage. 16 
Zizioulas is clearly concerned to ground himself in the patristic theological 
tradition, yet, he is quite happy to use philosophical concepts and ideas to 
establish his argument. For example, he uses the presence-in- absence 
dilemma of Sartre to argue that the human person cannot be defined 
empirically. 17 Zizioulas notes that the problem of physical existence means 
that another human being will exist first as a quantitative static being before 
existing in ecstasis or communion with another. The very fact that the 
biological hypostasis begins as a physical entity before it relates means that it is 
existing as an individual rather than as a person. In other words the human 
being is not existing as a person but as a static or fixed quantity, an individual, 
which is contrary to the very definition of personhood. 18 
Zizioulas' use of Sartre's analogy needs to be questioned; while it apparently 
illuminates the problem of objectification, it is in danger of simply accepting 
an existentialist view of the problem from a subjective position. In other 
words,, it seems to assume that the problem of personhood is primarily a 
problem of consciousness rooted in an objective/ subjective divide. 19 This is 
certainly not Zizoulas' intention although there is this danger inherent in his 
description. We will explore the problems this raises later in this chapter. 
First, however, we need to recognise that while Zizioulas is happy to use 
Sartre's analogy to describe the person's capacity for transcending objective 
definitions, he is in fact seeking a different notion of transcendence. 
1.3. Transcendence/ Ecstasis 
In speaking of the freedom of the person to 'go beyond' objective depiction 
Zizioulas prefers the word ecstasis to the word transcendence. When we use 
the word 'ecstasis' it is natural that we should look to Heidegger's use of the 
word. In the twentieth century he certainly stands as a key exponent of the 
16 See chapter two of this thesis. 
17 See chapter three of this thesis. 
1.8 Zizioulas rejects the definition of person as individuality or consciousness. 'Capacity', p. 420. 
19 Zlzioulas' argument at times appears to deny his own rejection of any definition of the person 
on the basis of consciousness. 'A person who has become indifferent to the problem of existence 
has made a decisive step towards thinghood, and things are incapable of faith. ' 'Capacity', p. 
422. 
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ten-n. Zizioulas , identifies the word with 
Heidegger's use of it, in his paper 
20 It is interesting to note that 'Human Capacity and Human Incapacity'. 
several Orthodox theologians use the existential notion of transcendence in 
their theology. We have explored in the previous chapter how Lossky used 
the term 'transcendence' in his theological notion of the person. Yannaras, 
another Orthodox theologian builds his whole theology out of combining 
Lossky's theology with Heidegger's work, transforming the latter into 
theological concepts and principles. 21 
The notion of ecstasis, from an existential perspective, points towards a self 
transcendence where the individual is able to move outside of the necessity 
of their existence and the limitations inherent in it, in order to become an 
authentic person. We see this in various images from Nietzche's 'superman' 
to Heidegger's 'being unto death'. This idea of the fundamental openness of 
the human person is an attempt to allow freedom to the person to define 
themselves. In the article Human Capacity and Incapacity Zizioulas uses this 
concept of transcendence; 'Thus personhood implies the "openness" of 
being, i. e. a movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence 
of the boundaries of the 'self' and thus to freedom. '22 Alan Torrance 
suggests that in some ways Zizioulas has uncritically affirmed the approach of 
people like Yannaras and Heidegger. 23 While Zizioulas never held that 
ecstasis was a spiritual transcendence of the material body his emphasis upon 
ecstasis as a going beyond the limits of nature could lead to a Gnostic 
understanding of ecstasis. 24 Further it appears that while he upholds the idea 
of a transcendence that would lead to communion, he at times appears to 
20 The term ek-stasis in this sense is known today mainly through the philosophy of M. 
Heidegger. Yet, long before him, this term was used in the mystical writings of the Greek 
Fathers (Pseudo-Dionysis, Maximus, etc. ) in basically the same sense. 'Capacity', p. 408. 
21 See Rowan Williams, 'Eastern Orthodox Theology', in The Modern Theologians, 2nd ed. 
p. 510. 
22 'Capacity', p. 408. 
23 A. Torrance, Persons in Coininunion, p. 35 Although he does allow that Zizioulas' notion of 
transcendence is different than Rahners. p. 283. 
24 At the same time, and in contrast to the particularity of the individual which is subject to 
addition and combination, the person in its ekstatic character reveals its being in a catholic, 
i. e. integral and undivided, way, and thus in its being ecstatic it becomes hypostatic, i. e. the 
bearer of its nature in its totalitv. 'Capacity', p 408. It is interesting that at this point 
Zizioulas is in fact very much in keeping with Lossky's use of ecstasis as both of them have 
apparently adopted existential ideas. 
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suggest that ecstasis is fundamentally an 'openness'. 25However, there 
appears to be a development of clarity in Zizioulas' thought with regard to 
the notion of ecstasis or transcendence. When we move to Being as 
Communion we find that Zizioulas is careful to differentiate his idea from 
Heidegger's notion of ecstasis. Where in his earlier work he had identified 
Heidegger's notion with the history of the usage of the word in the Fathers, 
he is now careful to note that there are some problems with how Heidegger 
and Yannaras useit; 26 and we might also infer that there are problems with 
how Lossky used it as well. 
In Human Capacity and Human Incapacity, we see that Zizioulas' concern to 
uphold a notion of volitional freedom( not ontological freedom) means that 
he is walking very close to existentialism where the notion of transcendence 
is tied up with the presupposition of human freedom to choose. We see this 
worked out most clearly in Zizioulas' use of the idea of the person as an artist 
-- capable of creating freely, without JiMitS. 27 Zizioulas can appear to uphold 
a notion of radical freedom even at times when he is attempting to point out 
the paradox of such a notion: 'for the alternative which freedom poses for 
man's existence lies between accepting existence as a whole as something of 
which man freely partakes, or making existence something which man 
controls himself. '28 The very fact that Zizioulas can suggest that this is a 
choice which faces the human person appears to imply that he is using a 
concept of volitional freedom which fails to account for human situatedness. 
The paradox of a notion of radical freedom has already been identified in 
chapter three in the discussion of situated freedom. Any attempt to find 
ultimate freedom must involve a denial of the very matrix which describes 
our horizons. This means that any attempt to truly move beyond the 
elements and relations which constitute an individual's existence is doomed 
25 In the midst of his discussion of the paradox of presence-in-absence he refers to a passage 
from Pannenberg which more clearly illuminates the paradox he is trying to get at, which is 
that a person cannot be described as bounded. 'Capacity', p. 413. 
26 The concept of ekstasis as an ontological category is found in the mystical Greek Fathers 
(particularly in the so-called Areopagitical writings and in Maximus the Confessor) and also 
totally independently in the philosophy of M. Heidegger ... However, the use of Heidegger in 
the interpretation of patristic theology runs into fundamental difficulties. BC, p. 44-45. 
27 'just as God created the world totally as free grace, so the person wants to create its own 
other. This is what happens with Art; and it is only the Person that can be an artist in the true 
sense, i. e., a creator that brings about a totally other identity as an act of freedom and 
communion. ' Zizioulas Cominunion and Otherness, p. 359. 
28 'Capacity', p-431. 
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to failure. Although Zizioulas clearly rejects a notion of ontological freedom 
he continues to maintain a high degree of volitional freedom which can lead 
to some confusion in understanding his thesis. 29 In spite of his concern to 
overturn any solipsist notion of transcendence there remains in his thought a 
bias towards emphasising the integrity and freedom of the particular. We 
will address this issue later in this chapter; for the moment we need to look at 
Zizioulas' concern to identify ecstasis with relations. 
For Zizioulas, ecstasis is not seen as a simple going beyond or transcendence 
of one's nature into unconditional freedom, for any movement 'beyond' the 
self implies encounter. There is no 'empty' space where a person might 
escape to. 30 Nor is ecstasis to be understood as introspection or an ability to 
disengage from the world. Unlike Lossky this 'going beyond' is not perceived 
as a spiritual or inward journey- rather, it is understood as any form of 
engagement with others that is truly a move outwards. 31 Zizioulas suggests 
that ecstasis is fundamentally encounter with another, any move 'outwards' 
implies encounter. 32 Yet, more than this., ecstasis means relation, the 
individual does not first look outwards and then move outwards in order to 
encounter another; any movement implies encounter and relation. 33 
Ecstasis is not a move beyond the hypostasis but is the natural existence of the 
hypostasis. Where Lossky's use of ecstasis seems to lead to a spiritual 
transcendence of the material realm, Zizioulas unites ecstasis and hypostasis 
directly to suggest that ecstasis is not escape from the person but is the true 
existence of the hypostasis. There is no conflict between the notions of 
relation and particularity,, true particularity requires ecstasis, requires relation. 
The hypostasis does not go out of itself in order to relate or commune with 
others but is only truly a hypostasis as it is in ecstasis, as it is in communion 
with others. For Zizioulas ecstasis without a hypostasis is mysticism which 
29 BC, p. 43. 
30 1n his argument of the need for humanity to transcend the self, it is clear that this is not a 
going into nothingness; 'Those who accept this paradox as pointing authentically and 
ontologically to personal experience are not as far as they might think from an implicit 
assumption of God. ' 'Capacity', p. 421. 
31 Zizoulas'is concerned to discount any notion of transcendence through introspection. 
'Capacity', p. 405. 
32'[E]cstasis is not to be understood as a movement towards the unknown and the infinite; it is a 
movement of affirmation of the other. ' Zizioulas, CominuniOn and OtIzerness, p. 359. 
33 In this respect Zizoulas appears to be more in keeping with an Hegelian notion of the matrix 
of relations which constitute this world. 
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denies the person's concrete particularitY, while hypostasis without ecstasis 
leads to individual pietism which denies the other. 34 
2.1. Biological Hypostasis 
Zizioulas does not fall into a romantic notion of ecstasis or relations where 
the problems of this world and especially individualism will all be solved if 
we simply operate with or adopt a healthy concept of relations. Rather, 
Zizioulas identifies a problem right in the nexus of how human beings exist. 
The problem of holding together the hypostasis and ecstasis is the paradox of 
humanity. The nature of the human being leads to the conflict of these two 
essential aspects of true personhood. In the description of the biological 
hypostasis Zizioulas makes it very clear that the failure to be truly a 
hypostasis in ecstasis is the inevitable result of human nature when taken by 
itself. 'The body tends towards the person but finally leads to the individual. ' 
35 He is intent on making it clear that the human being within itself has no 
resources with which it may exist as hypostasis and ecstasis at the same time. 
The primary reason for this, which Zizioulas calls the passion of the 
biological hypostasis, is the problem of necessity which means 'constitutively 
the hypostasis is tied to the natural instinct, to an impulse which is 
'necessary' and not subject to the control of freedOM'. 36 
In our culture we tend to romanticise love, seeing the possibility of truly 
transcending one's own needs or givenness in the love of another, and in 
some ways it is evident that this is indeed a characteristic of the human 
person. However this ideal falls short, for human love tends to be exclusive 
and not inclusive whereby for example it is seen as normal for the husband to 
lay exclusive claim to the love of the wife. 37 Thus even in the very act of 
transcending the limitations of being there are new limitations put in place 
where the love is not truly free and inclusive but directed, described and 
exclusive. 
Zizioulas tries to develop his understanding of the paradox of human love by 
elaborating how in the ultimate physical expression of ecstasis it becomes its 
34 BC, p. 53. 
35 BC, p. 51. 
36 BC, P-50. 
37 BC, P. 57. 
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own defeat. He utilises a perspective on sexual relations which is clearly 
reminiscent of Sartre who 
reflects on the inescapable contradictory and frustrating character of the 
interpersonal and sexual relation. 'I try to escape being object to the other 
through love. In this context, love is understood as possessive love. It is the 
desire to assiirnilate the other to myself. But in order that this may happen, 
the other has to love me; and to make the other love me, I have to become an 
object to excite that love... In any case whatever partial satisfaction may be 
obtained in the sexual act is dispersed by its consummation., 38 
Although Zizioulas' use of this idea, in the text of Being as Communion, is 
somewhat vague it is clear that he does not limit himself to Sartre's 
explanation of this analogy. He admits that people can accomplish or realise 
significant acts of communion. He notes how erotic love is indeed a mystery 
of ecstatic self transcendence; 'erotic love, even when experienced coldly and 
without emotional involvement, is an astounding mystery of existence 
concealing in the deepest act of communion a tendency towards an ecstatic 
transcendence of individuality through creation. '39 Sexual intercourse is 
paradigmatic of the true transcendence which is possible for the human 
person. Nonetheless, the breakdown of human relationships which is so 
evident in our society today does speak clearly of the fact that the promise of 
'meaningful' relationships remains a vague unfulfilled hope. Much of what 
passes for ecstasis in sexual intercourse is a union of physical persons without 
involving the whole psychosomatic unity. In other words there seems to be a 
definite element of falling short of true ecstasis in the very act which purports 
to embody it. More significantly, the illustration of erotic love also reveals 
the problem that even within this act of creating a new life there are the seeds 
of death. The biological hypostasis is linked to the cycle of life and death. In 
the final account even the greatest examples of ecstasis end in death. 
2.2. Death 
Zizioulas is suggesting that there are two aspects to the death of the 
individual person. The first is that death means the abrupt and real cessation 
of existence for the concrete and particular person. It is tragic 'self negation' 
of its own hypostasis (dissolution and annihilation of the body and of 
individuality). From the perspective of this world we can only speak of a 
person as continuing to exist through their work or through the memory of 
38 John MacQuarrie, Existeithalism (London: Hutchinson and Co. 1972), p. 86-87. 
39 BC, P-50. 
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their life after they have died. 40 In some way this is a continuation of their 
existence but it is not the continuation of the concrete and particular 
individual. In a sense it does not matter how successful a person may be in 
transcending the givenness of their being, in the end it is their concrete and 
individual existence which through death renders them no longer a person. 
'this identity can never be fully realised in history as long as nature still 
dictates its laws to man, particularly in the form of death. '41 The second 
aspect of death is that when a person dies they die alone, ultimately their love 
dies with them, this is why death is so tragic. The love or ecstasis of a person 
does not continue to exist after the individual has died. Even if a person has 
managed to live in a way where their existence truly transcends the givenness 
of their being, in the end their death proves that they are an individual. 
Zizioulas calls this'the cession of "time" and "space" to other individual 
hypostases'. 42 Thus he notes that death is truly the final expression of the 
individual's inability to continue to transcend the givenness of their 
existence. 43 Heidegger would see 'authentic' existence as accepting the 
natural limitation of death without allowing that to determine one's 
existence negatively. 'For the Christian thinker, on the other hand, it 
remains the worst enemy of man, the most unacceptable of all things'. 44 
2.3. Enduring Particulariq 
If we examine human beings simply from the perspective of the created 
realm we are forced to acknowledge that personhood, at least in the way that 
Zizioulas has defined it, as an enduring hypostasis in ecstasis, remains an 
impossibility. Nonetheless, Zizioulas affirms that the hope of true 
personhood remains a possibility given the engagement of God with the 
world which he has created. He says 'only theology can treat of the genuine, 
the authentic person, as absolute ontological freedom must be uncreated. 45 
40 Which seems to be what Buber is suggesting when he talks of relating to someone who is long 
since dead. Yet, he lacks a way of identifying how the particularity of the individual is 
maintained. 
41 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person', p. 44. 
42 BC p. 51. 
43 Once again Zizioulas appears to be using an existential idea in Heidegger's thesis of being 
tinto deatli. However, as we have already noted Heidegger's notion remains inadequate for a 
Christian theology which needs to speak of an enduring particularity. 
44 'Capacity', p-4". 
45 BC, P-43. 
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The Church Fathers brought about two significant changes which broke free 
from the traditional philosophical understandings while giving ontology a 
basis which offered the hope of holding together relation and particularity in 
the absolute sense which their patristic definition of person suggested. The 
two essential changes which they suggested were a) a radical change *in 
cosmology which would free the world and man from ontological necessity and 
b) an ontological view of man which would unite the person with the being of 
man, with his permanent and enduring existence, with his genuine and absolute 
identity. 46 With these two points Zizioulas challenges most alternative 
approaches to ontology. Yet, to understand what he means by these points and 
how he intends to utilise them we need to discuss what he means by the ecclesial 
hypostasis. 
The ecclesial hypostasis realises true existence in a way which the biological 
hypostasis does not. It does this by allowing a hypostasis or mode of existence 
which is not controlled by ontological necessity. In order to offer this the 
'hypostasis must inevitably be rooted, or constituted, in an ontological reality 
which does not suffer from createdness'. 47 The key idea that Zizioulas is 
working out here is that the ecclesial hypostasis must have a source which 
allows truly free existence, an existence which is not rooted in necessity but 
allows the opportunity to transcend the limitations of our givenness. In 
other words this hypostasis must not be limited and constrained by being 
rooted in the natural cycle of life and death which are the parameters of the 
biological nature. This 'source' can only be found in a doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo which establishes that there is something 'other" than this world; that 
God is distinct from his creation. Only by continuing in ecstasis to this 'other' 
can a person truly hope to transcend the necessity of existence, to break free of 
the interrelated dependence inherent within a closed system. This requires 
an ontological change in the mode of existence or hypostasis of the person. 
This change is found in the basis of a relationship with God. God being 
uncreated,, that is outside the boundaries of necessity posited by our being 
created, offers the possibility of a source of being, or mode of existence, which 
is capable of loving in absolute freedom. 
46 See discussion in BC, pp. 38-39. 
47 BC, P-54. 
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ITIhe particular is raised to the level of ontological primacy, it emerges as 
being itself without depending for its identity on qualities borrowed from 
nature and thus applicable also to other beings, but solely on a relationship 
which it constitutes as indispensable ontological ingredient. 48 
Relation to God offers the possibility of authentic enduring personhood; a) 
because he has created the world out of nothing and therefore is not 
necessarily related to it but relates in true freedom and b) because God exists as 
true and enduring particular persons. God's absolute freedom is found in his 
Trinitarian being. If we return to our discussion of the Cappadocian doctrine 
of the Trinity we will note that God does not first exist and then relate, rather, 
God in his very nature is ecstasis and hypostasis, three persons in one. The 
ecstasis of God, his love, is extended to the created realm. Through the 
mediation of Christ by the Spirit what is valid for God becomes valid for 
humanity. This new mode of being, the ecclesial hypostasis, must in some 
way be free from the necessity which has led to the loss of personhood for the 
biological hypostasis. This hypostasis is realised in an ontological way in 
Christ who brings humanity into relation with God. 'Christology 
consequently is the proclamation to man that his nature can be "assumed" 
and hypostasised in a manner free from the ontological necessity of his 
biological hypostasis, which, as we have seen, leads to the tragedy of 
individualism and death. '49 Thus in Christ true personhood is realised and 
made available for humanity. 
Baptism is the 'new' birth into the Church which as the body of Christ forms 
the new community. The 'new' element in this baptism is the reconstitution 
of the human being in which the communion of relations becomes the very 
source of the new hypostasis; the network of relations is not exterior to the 
constitution of the hypostasis but is in fact the actual constitution of the 
hypostasis. The paradox of particularity and communion (ecstasis) is done 
away with by making the two elements mutually constitutive rather than 
opposing concerns. In the person being made new they are a new hypostasis, 
a new mode of existence. Where in the biological hypostasis the human 
being first is and then relates, in the ecclesial hypostasis the person is in and 
through their relations. It becomes possible to realise ecstasis and hypostasis 
at the same time. With the ecclesial hypostasis being rooted in a God who is 
48 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person'p. 41. 
49 BC, P-56. 
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the communion of these three persons, it, the hypostasis, is able to realise 
ecstasis and hypostasis at the same time. 
2.4. Is the Biological Nature Demeaned? 
Does this mean that human nature is overturned or obliterated? Staniloae 
suggests that in Zizioulas' work there is an apparent denigration of the 
human being as a psychosomatic unity where the physical or biological 
existence must be denied or put aside in favour of the ecclesial existence. 50 In 
fact, there is at times almost a Gnostic sense in which the body is seen as an 
impediment to the actualisation of true existence. 'The body leads to 
communion with others but at the same time is the 'mask' of hypocrisy, the 
fortress of individualism, the vehicle of final separation, death. '51 IS 
Zizioulas in fact placing physical existence in a negative light in which it 
becomes the central obstacle to the true or eternal life which Christ offers to 
us? Zizioulas is careful to state that 'the two basic components of the 
biological hypostasis, Eros and the body, should not be destroyed'. 52 To deny 
this would in effect deny that there was any connection between the biological 
nature and the ecclesial. hypostasis. Zizioulas is anxious to note that the 
hypostatic change is not a loss of that which constitutes the biological 
nature - but is rather a change in the mode of existence. The ecclesial 
hypostasis is constituted by relation to God and by human nature and not 
simply by the necessity of the biological existence. 'The ascetic character of the 
ecclesial hypostasis does not come from a denial of the world or of the 
biological nature of existence itself. It implies a denial of the biological 
hypostasis., 53 Zizioulas is careful to note that the denial of the biological 
hypostasis is not a denial of human nature itself: 'it is superfluous to stress 
that this does not suffice to bring about the transcendence of the biological 
hypostasis if nature is not hypostasised simultaneously in the eucharistic 
community. 154 Zizioulas is anxious to assert the importance of seeing the 
body not as a negative concept as in the Gnostic tradition, but as an integral 
part of the person. 
50 Staniloae criticises Zizoulas in this regard in 'Image and Likeness and Deification in the 
Human Person', Coynintinio 13 1986, p. 64-83. 
51 BC, p. 52. 
52 BC, p. 53. 
53 BC, p. 63 (italics mine). 
54 BC, ft nt p. 63. 
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Zizoulas distinguishes between the biological nature and the biological 
hypostasis. The biological nature is not wrong in and of itself, it is Nvhen the 
hypostasis lives only in accordance with the nature and not as an ecclesial 
hypostasis that the limitations of the biological nature become a problem. 
Yet, even as an ecclesial hypostasis we must be clear that the nature is 
absolutely necessary and not only necessary but fulfilled in and through 
relation to God. 'The biological being of man finds through its incorporation 
into Christ its true spiritual hypostasis. '55 The mode of existence of the 
ecclesial hypostasis does not deny the body or Eros but hypostasises them in a 
ecclesial way. It is no longer bound to the limitations inherent within the 
biological nature but is able to redeem the biological nature through 
incorporating it in the hypostatic movement of ecstasis in the Eucharist. 
2.5. Eucharistic HylRostasis 
The language of true ecstasis in the ecclesial existence sounds a little idealistic 
in the face of the history of the Church. This brings us to note that for 
Zizioulas the ecclesial hypostasis is not in fact something which is realised in 
a permanent way in this life. The human person is still subject to the death 
of the biological hypostasis. 56 The transformation from the hypostasis who 
lives biologically to one which lives ecclesially is not a once for an metanoia 
which leaves the ecclesial hypostasis as a totally new being who is no longer 
subject to the necessity of the biological nature. In fact, 
the encounter between the ecclesial and the biological hypostasis creates a 
paradoxical relationship in human existence. Man appears to exist as that 
which he will be; the ecclesial identity is linked with eschatology, that is, 
with the final outcome of his existence. 57 
The biological nature is not a 'condition' which is overturned or replaced by 
the ecclesial hypostasis; instead there is a sense in which the human person 
lives both biologically and ecclesially. The ecclesial existence is real in Christ 
and thus for each person in the Church it is the faith and hope that they 'will 
indeed become an authentic person'58 It is a faith and hope grounded in the 
55 Panayiotis Nellas Deification in Christ: Orthodox PerspectiVes oil the Natitre of the 
Hititiaii Persoti. Eng. Trans Norman Russell (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1987), p-124. 
56 All this means that the ekstatic movement towards personhood, remains for man an 
unfulfilled longing for a presence without absence of being as long as there is no way of 
overcoming the space-time limitations of creaturehood. 'Capacity', p. 420. 
57 BC, P-59. 
58 BC, p-58. 
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fact that in the resurrection Jesus realises the true person; 'the real hypostasis 
of Christ was proved to be not the biological one, but the eschatological or 
Trinitarian one'. 59 The truth of the person is not in fact something which is 
realised in the present but is a future reality which through faith and hope 
becomes an already but not yet dialeCtiC. 60 This future hope becomes a 
present reality in a concrete and material way only 'momentarily' in the 
Eucharist where a person relates in a free and inclusive manner. 61 
Thus, Zizioulas posits a third hypostasis which is the eucharistic hypostasis. 
In the Church this eschatological reality of the person is realised only in the 
Eucharist where 'the Eucharist is first of all an assembly, a community, a 
network of relations, in which man subsists in a manner which transcends 
every exclusiveness of a biological or social kind. '62 The eucharistic mode of 
existence is not in this sense a hypostasis which is discontinuous with the 
ecclesial or biological hypostasis. Instead, it is a mode of existence which 
accounts for the human being existing in both a biological and ecclesial 
manner. Legitimately one might say that the eucharistic hypostasis is an 
ecclesial hypostasis in so far as its ontology is proleptically determined, yet it 
continues to exist in a way which does not deny the biological nature but 
transforms it. This hypostasis reflects the character of the person in the 
Church who is still subject to the necessity of the biological hypostasis yet 
transcends this necessity in the "assembly and movement which are the two 
fundamental characteristics of the Eucharist". 63 The movement towards the 
future goal which has been realised in Christ is at the centre of the eucharistic 
celebration. 
3.1. Relations and Free Choice 
We have explored Zizioulas' idea of the biological and ecclesial hypostasis, 
now we will turn to consider more directly the notion of relations. Zizioulas' 
scheme which reflects something of an idealist approach to ontology "d 
59 BC, p. 55. 
60 BC, p. 62. 
61 Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church. Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in 
Dialogue. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1993), p. 266, cites Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the 
Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 298, using the term 'moment' to designate the temporary 
nature of the ecclesial mode of existence. 
62 BC, P-60. 
63 BC, P-61. 
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perceives the relations of the one to the many and the relations of the many 
to each other as constitutive of their being. Rowan Williams notes; 
John Zizioulas' work on ecclesiology links Afanasiev's themes (not without some criticism 
and refinement) to a whole metaphysic of relation, centered on the trinitarian Image of 
being as essentially relational: the great philosophical error is to look for isolated 
ahistorical substances, since the source of all reality is not 'a' substance but a relational 
system. 64 
While we must note that the source of all reality for Zizioulas is a person-in- 
relation rather than a 'relational system', Williams is right to illuminate 
Zizioulas' concern to establish a 'metaphysic' of relations. Lossky, in contrast, 
had reacted strongly against any idealising notion of relations. He insisted 
that relations were 'free' and were not ontological. While relations remain 
important in his scheme, they are the prerogative of the person rather than 
being constitutive of the person. In one sense Lossky and Zizioulas are very 
close in placing a high emphasis upon relations, yet, in the structure of their 
argument they are very different, even in opposition to each other. Lossky's 
de-ontologising of relations to ensure the freedom of the person is countered 
by Zizioulas' ontologising of relations to produce a dynamic and free, rather 
than a static protological, model of being. 
One of the difficulties with existential approaches, and in this case Lossky's, is 
that they are so conditioned by the emphasis upon free choice that even 
relations are not perceived as mutually constitutive but rather as secondary to 
the individual's self identification. Charles Taylor identifies the impact of an 
underlying solipsism on a notion of relations: 
corresponding to the free, disengaged subject is a view of society as made up of 
and by the consent of free individuals and, corollary to this, the notion of 
society as made up of bearers of individual rights. This is perhaps one of the 
most deeply entrenched images of society that modern civilisation has thrown 
up. It begins with the famous 17th century theories of social contract. but it 
develops and mutates, and emerges, interalia, today in a perhaps debased form 
on the interpersonal level in the contemporary notion of a love 'relationship' 
between two independent beings. 6 5 
It is this emphasis upon 'real' relations which lies behind much of the 
modern notion of relations. The element of free choice is so prominent in 
this idea of relations that the relations themselves are robbed of any content 
beyond the fleeting subjective feelings of the individual. The difficulty with 
the modem demand for freedom is that it attempts to define the integrity of 
64 Williams, 'Eastern Orthodox Theology Today', p. 510. 
65 Taylor, Sources of the Self p. 106. 
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the individual so strongly that the individual is not in any way determined 
by or conditioned by another except through their own choice. 66 Rather than 
providing a basis by which we might explain the complexity of relations, this 
idea of free existential relations leaves the individual more isolated in their 
subjective self. This, paradoxically, in the end robs the individual of any 
particularity. In this light Gunton drawing on the work of McFadyen traces 
the link between individualism and social homogeneity to Kantian ethical 
theory. The logic of this, [McFadyen] argues, generates a suppression of the 
individual, or more accurately of personal particularity. The weakness -and it is precisely the same weakness that we discerned in the discussion of the one 
and the many- is to be found in an inadequate conception of relationality, that 
is, of how we are each distinctive and different by virtue of and not despite the 
fact that we are related to each other. 67 
If we return briefly to Lossky's thesis we will see that his notion of relations is 
based more upon a concern to guard autonomy than upon a real 
understanding of constitutive engagement with another. The desire to guard 
the integrity of the individual person means that there is no basis by which 
we might understand constitutive relations. This is especially true with 
regard to the relation to God. It seems that in Lossky's thesis there is a 
tendency to impose a notion of free existential encounter as the qualification 
of 'authentic' relation upon our understanding of how God is engaged with 
the world. In his reference to the Spirit as the one who is most truly personal 
because he cannot be objectified we see the inherent bias in Lossky's system 
which betrays a latent gnosticism. 68 It implies that interpersonal relations 
must transcend the barriers of our physicality if they are to be truly whole. 
We would suggest that the model of free existential encounter is a false 
model which implicitly forces a dualist understanding upon the world and 
God's engagement with it. 
3.2. Defining the Basis for an Ontology of Relations 
The problems of individualism and dualism have acted as fulcrums to the 
modern focus upon relations and the place of relations in the constitution of 
persons. The question which must be asked of all models of communion, or 
relational ontologies, is the degree to which they are driven by a need to 
66 Lossky' scheme differs from the essentialists in so far as the individual is conditioned by a 
relationship to the new nature which Christ provides. Yet, beyond this their existence is 
determined by their choices. 
67 Gunton, The One the Three and the Maizy p. 194. 
68 AIT, p. 160. 
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overturn the destructive tendencies of individualism. The danger in this 
polemic approach to the questions of ontology is the tendency to replace one 
problematic model with another. The pendulum has swung too far the other 
way; 'for the fashion in many a work, especially theological work, is to affirm 
the superiority of relational to substantial thinking, as an altogether 
alternative way of conceiving of being. 169 Positing a relational matrix as the 
ontological foundation to reality does not eliminate fundamental concerns 
and issues. When we uphold a notion of relations or communion as 
ontologicaRy primordial, we can bring a whole raft of different problems into 
the discussion. 
In the paradox between being and freedom there remains the problem of 
holding together two disparate truths; the truth of the constitution of the 
particular by forces which lie outside of their power and their self 
determination in freedom. The paradox of these truths has always and will 
always plague theology. Unless we choose to resign ourselves to a radical 
apophaticism of what this relational basis might look like we are forced to 
examine how the particular is located. - 
Affirming a relational ontology offers a new approach by which we might 
hold together these two truths; yet, it does not erase the questions which must 
be dealt with. 
Returning to our discussion of Buber in chapter three, we noted that he 
suggests human beings are called to overcome the problem of objectivism 
through accepting the relational foundation to all existence. The problem 
with modem society for Buber, is not the objectivity of the world but the 
tendency towards objectivism -- towards living only with I/it relations. 
Buber's concern is two fold, on the one hand he is seeking to overcome the 
dualism between the spiritual and the material realm and on the other hand 
he is seeking to establish the importance of the relational matrix of all 
existence in contrast to individualist assumptions. By correlating the 
immanence of God as the foundation of the relational matrix of the world 
Buber seeks to overcome both individuahsm and duahsm. In his concern to 
establish the parallels between the relation to God and the relation between 
human beings Buber tends to suggest that the realisation of personhood is 
dependent upon the many accepting the dimension of I/you relations. 
69 Gunton, The Otie the Three atid the Matzy p. 194. 
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[Clonventional thinking is given a second jog by Buber's contention that perfect 
relation is the fruit and not the source of every other relation. The proposition 
that love of God is the fount of all other love is replaced b another claiming 
that love of the world is a precondition of the love of God. I 
In his desire to uphold a notion of authentic relations, as fundamental to the 
person, Buber posits relations as the substance of being. Zizioulas suggests 
that the danger in Buber's approach is a foundationalism of relation and 
seeks to differentiate himself from it. For Zizioulas, 
this communion is not a relationship understood for its own sake, an existential 
structure which supplants 'nature' or 'substance' in its primordial ontological 
role- something which is reminiscent of the structure of existence found in the 
thought of Martin Buber. 72 
The danger of holding a concept of communion as the primordial ontological 
reality is that it can become a determinative 'substance' in the same way as 
traditional essentialism sought to locate the essence of a person in one aspect 
of their nature. If we are to establish a model of dynamic relations as 
integral to ontology we must establish how relations do not become so 
comprehensive that the particularity of the many is denied, as it is in idealist 
models. In the very attempt to define what we mean by a relational ontology 
we are again forced to understand how the particular is constituted both by 
the other and by themselves. 
3.3. Zizioulas on Relations 
Zizioulas' thesis, which has many parallels with Buber's work, remains 
fundamentally different. 73 The relation to God is not realised through the 
relation to creation, rather, the relation to creation is realised through the 
relation to God. The in any of the created realm, in themselves, have no basis 
by which they might realise authentic relations. For to suggest that there is 
some inherent capacity in humanity to realise authentic personhood leads 
immediately to the concept of an analogla entis and the problems of an 
essentialist model of being. Zizioulas describes a distinction between 
necessary and free relations. In the existence as a biological hypostasis the 
human being first is and then relates. Therefore the relations they enter into 
are not free but necessary. This is not a distinction with regard to the quality 
71 Pamela Vermes, Buber oti God atid the Perfect Man California: Scholars Press, 1980) p. 213. 
72 BC p. 17. 
73McPartlan, Die Eticliarist inakes the Clzurcli p. 274, affirms that Zizioulas values Buber's 
thes. is but differentiates himself from it. 
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of relations but a distinction of the freedom of relations. In the Church there 
is a new network of relations which are not in any way fixed or exclusive but 
are open ended and are dynamic in their very nature. For the ecclesial 
hypostasis, 'new birth Erom the womb of the Church has made him part of a 
network of relationships which transcends every exclusiveness. 174 These new 
relations are not tied to natural necessity but are tied to the free communion 
with God. Zizioulas implies that we cannot allow the other to be truly free to 
be other, because our very existence depends upon who they are to us. The 
necessity of our existence means that in the last resort there can be no true 
freedom in human relations because our relations are based first on need. It 
is only in relation to God that there is the possibility of true freedom in 
relation because God is not constituted in relation to us but is truly 'other 
than' his creation. 
God's relation to the world is seen as the basis upon which the created realm 
is meant to function and through which it is to be completed. The person in 
relation to God does not deny or turn aside from their relatedness to creation 
as though in finding their free relatedness they are made complete and may 
therefore ignore their necessary relatedness. 75 Yet, Zizioulas does not allow 
that the relational matrix of this world is the immanent presence of the God 
for that would deny the freedom which is fundamental to his concerns. God 
who is transcendent is able to engage immanently with creation without that 
engagement threatening human or divine freedom. In free relatedness to 
God, in Christ and through the Spirit, human persons transform and 
complete their necessary relatedness to creation setting it free to also enjoy its 
intended end in communion with God. This freedom given by God means 
that human persons may relate to the world freely rather than out of 
necessi . 
3.4. Creatio-ex-nihilo and God's Relation to the World 
Central to Zizioulas is the understanding of how God is 
related to the world. In suggesting that divine ontological relations are the 
ground for authentic human relations we need to establish in what way these 
relations which are constitutive of God's being are also constitutive of 
74 BC, p. 58. 
75 Human capacity, therefore, does not require a departure from creaturely conditions in order 
to exist. Communion with God is possible for humanity- and through it for the entire creation- 
only in and through creaturely existence. 'Capacity', p. 439. 
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human beings and constitutive of 'inter-human' relations. We agree with 
Zizioulas that creatio ex nihilo is a vital doctrine to maintain that God is 
radically other than the world which he has created; as we noted in chapter 
four, it allows 'space' for both the world and God's self to avoid collapsing 
into an idealist scheme. 76 However, creatio ex nihilo should not be used to 
suggest that God remains disconnected or disengaged from the material 
world, existing only in a spiritual plane. The deist assumption, that after 
creation God gives freedom by disengaging from creation, is not what the 
Fathers were seeking to estabhsh. 77 
Zizioulas notes that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo can only make sense if it 
is held with a doctrine of personhood. 78 God who is Trinity exists as a 
dynamic communion of three persons. As a result God is free to relate to that 
which is other without, by that relation, denying the integrity of the three in 
one. The assumption that lies behind this argument is that God is free to 
relate to creation with the same fundamental freedom with which God exists 
in himself. 
This ecstatic character of God, the fact that His being is identical with an act 
of communion, ensures the transcendence of the ontological necessity which His 
substance would have demanded-if the substance were the primary ontological 
predicate of God-and replaces this necessity with the free self-affirmation of 
divine existence. 79 
Zizioulas locates the dynamic relationality of God in the very definition of 
how God exists ad intra. This protects us from a notion that God must relate 
to the world if he is truly to be himself -- i. e. to be relational -- as for example 
we see in Buber's notion that 'God needs US180 The significance of the 
freedom of God is grounded in God's dynamic unity and particularity. 
Therefore the freedom of God ad intra is not a freedom to relate but a 
freedom in relation. The description of freedom as a freedom for the other 
76 See chapter one of this thesis. Alistair McFadyen makes the same point; 'In Christian 
doctrine, creation begins with a physical letting be and it is this which gives creation the 
autonomy in which it can now stand over against God as an independent order of being'. Th e 
Call to Personliood p. 21. 
77 The divine human relation must be taken as non-constitutive for human being or else reduced 
to a primal originative determination, but one which did not endure beyond that creative act 
and which is no longer determinately effective in human existence. The most that is possible 
here is a form of deism, the affirmation of the existence of God such that it makes no difference 
McFadyen, Vie call to Personizood. p. 27. 
78 'Capacity' p. 416. 
79 BC, p-44. 
80 Buber, I and Thou p. 82 
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rather than a freedom from the other is rooted in the understanding that the 
fundamental unity of the three persons of the Trinity does not deny their 
particularity. The distinction of creatio ex nihilo does not mean that God is 
disengaged from creation, nor should it suggest that God is not in relation to 
creation, but that in the context of his relation to creation God is able to offer 
and sustain the space for the particularity and otherness of created beings. 
3.5. Is Human Finitude the Problem? 
Zizioulas has clearly identified the importance of the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo in order to maintain freedom for both God and humanity. 
Nonetheless there are some ways in which he appears to contradict his own 
position. His identification that human finitude(the biological mode of 
existence) is 'overcome' in relation to God(the ecclesial mode of existence) 
would seem to suggest that the freedom God offers to us is the freedom to 
move beyond the protological. relations which constitute US. 81 When 
Zizioulas makes the distinction between the biological nature and the 
biological hypostasis he appears to be offering a way in which the human 
person does not need to deny their situation, their natural constitution. Yet, 
on a closer look it is apparent that the matrix of our relatedness, our existence 
as biological hypostases, needs to be overcome. Speaking of the person who is 
living according to the ecclesial mode of existence and not the biological 
mode of existence Zizioulas says, '[tlhis means that henceforth he can love 
not because the laws of biology oblige him to do so -- something which 
inevitably colours the love of one's own relations -- but unconstrained by 
natural laws. 182 Our 'natural' relations do fall far short of the love of God, 
but if we posit this failure as an obligation of biology we are in danger of 
locating the fallenness of this world in our biological constitution and the 
matrix of our 'natural' relations. 83 
81 Zizioulas, f Capacity' p. 420, suggests that'Personhood prefers to create its presence as 
absence, rather than be contained, comprehended, described and manipulated through the 
circurnscribablity and individualisation which are inherent in all creaturehood. ' Zizioulas' 
intention is to posit this individualisation as inherent because humanity is not in relation to 
God. Yet, it sounds as though he is positing individualisation as an inevitable consequence of 
our createdness. 
82 BC, p. 57. 
83 it is Zizioulas' desire to move away from any moral categories which leads him to a position 
in which the limitations inherent in our createdness become the source of all the problems in 
this world. jTjhis failure of the survival of the biological hypostasis is not the result of some 
acquired fault of a moral kind (a transgression), but of the biological act of the perpetuation of 
the species. ' BC p. 52 
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We see the same concern with regard to the issue of theosis. Zizioulas' 
intention is not to suggest that theosis involves a denial of our natural' 
constitution: 
Theosis, as a way of describing this unity in personhood, is, therefore, just the 
opposite of a divinisation in which human nature ceases to be what it really is. Only if we lose the perspective of person-hood and operate with'nature'as 
such, such a nusunderstanding of theosis can anse. 84 
The implication is that theosis is not to be understood as a denial of our 
human nature. But, clearly one aspect of our human nature is that it has 
limits. Do these limits need not be overcome for a human person to be truly 
personal? We would suggest that in keeping with Zizioulas' own concerns, 
ecstasis should refer to a constitution in relation to others rather than a 
capacity to transcend our limitations. We would also suggest that an 
emphasis upon becoming truly human might be more helpful in 
emphasising that salvation is not about denying our situtatedness but 
reorienting it. 
In turning to Zizioulas' understanding of otherness it becomes clear that he 
has yet to deal fully with the situatedness of human persons. Attempting to 
overturn the tendency to reject another, because they are different than 
oneself, he insists that the Christian must be inclusive. The principle of 
inclusivity means that 'when the other is rejected on account of natural, 
sexual, racial, social, ethnic, or even moral differences, Orthodox witness is 
destroyed. '85 We would not argue with Zizioulas that Christians are called to 
accept one another; yet, while an acceptance that makes no distinction on the 
basis of moral categories may affirm the other, it remains a meaningless 
affirmation for it cannot serve to establish acceptance of the other in relation 
to oneself. In chapter three, picking up the argument of Charles Taylor, we 
noted a principle of inclusive homogeneity is far more destructive to human 
particularity and freedom than traditional notions of transcendent principles 
given by a transcendent God. Zizioulas' notion of inclusivity appears to 
resonate with the call to love our neighbour as ourselves, yet, it is in danger 
of displacing the first commandment,, 'to love the lord your God with all your 
heart'. In Zizioulas' emphasis upon a principle of acceptance which 
transcends objective differences he is in danger of supporting either a 
relativism which is ultimately destructive of human freedom and 
84 'Capacity' p. 440. 
85 Zizioulas, 'Communion and Otherness', p. 360. 
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particularity, or of suggesting a communion of persons which goes beyond 
our objective world. This latter option would leave Zizioulas close to 
Berdyaev's notion of a trans-subjective realm which presupposes a dualist 
framework. The seductive promise of a model of free relations 
unencumbered by our objective differences remains a popular ideal in our 
culture. One only has to look at the claim that the internet offers intimate 
relationships without the problems of objective discrimination to realise the 
idealist vision of authentic relations remains influential. If we are to develop 
an understanding of relations which accounts for the situatedness of persons 
we must establish how we differentiate between limitations which are 
destructive to particularity and limitations which are not. The freedom God 
offers to us is not a freedom from relation, or even a freedom to choose to 
relate, but it is a freedom in relation. 86 It is not therefore a freedom which 
denies human situatedness but one which enables a shaping of that 
situatedness to mirror or image God's own freedom of particularity in unity. 
We must be clear at this point that we are not calling the whole of Zizoulas' 
argument into question; rather, we are suggesting that there is a need to 
develop some clarity on the issue of human finitude. It would appear that 
his use of the language of necessity and finitude in the context of his 
discussion of the hypostasis does not do justice either to his understanding of 
the situation of the human person nor to his understanding of freedom as 
love rather than freedom as choice. 
A second point in which Zizioulas seems to betray his own concerns is with 
his insistence that the freedom of God is based upon the Father and not upon 
the claim that God is a dynamic unity of three in one. In Zizioulas' concern 
to emphasise the integrity of the person he can appear to parallel Buber's 
notion of God as the absolute person. 
For this communion is a product of freedom as a result not of the substance of God 
but of a person, the Father -- observe why this doctrinal detail is so important- 
who is Trinity not because the divine nature is ecstatic but because the Father 
as a person freely wills this communion. 87 
Of course as we have discussed in chapter two, the issue of the Father as cause 
is important to maintain that God's being does not take precedence over the 
particular persons. Nonetheless, emphasising that God is free because of the 
86 'Freedom, that is to say, is not an innate possession -- quite the reverse -- but has to be given. ' 
Gunton, The Protinse, p. 122. 
87 BC, p-44. 
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person of the Father would seem to confuse the issue and perhaps once again 
reveal the influence of existentialist concerns on Zizioulas' thesis. 
3.6. Personalism? 
It is interesting that Alan Torrance reproaches Zizioulas for straying too close 
to a monadic personalism. 88 On closer inspection it appears that it is 
Zizioulas' use of the concept of causality in connection with the person of the 
Father and not his notion of 'person' which Torrance feels leads to a position 
of emphasising the priority of the person over the concept of relation. The 
scope of this criticism can be confusing if we forget that it is held hand in 
hand with Torrance's affirmation of Zizioulas' notion of person-in-relation. 
Torrance suggests that Zizioulas contradicts his own thesis of being as 
communion' by his emphasis upon the primordial nature of the term 
I person' -- located in a notion of the Father as cause. He posits, in reference to 
Barth, that a properly developed notion of communion would lead beyond 
the traditional problems of monism. 
A more unambiguous affirmation of the primordial nature of the intra-personal 
communion of the Trinity than [Barth] offers would have exposed as vacuous 
any attempt to determine ultimate origins or ontological grounds in terms of a) 
monist or static notions of divine substance of essence, or b) monadic, Cartesian 
conceptions of a divine ego or'subject of consciousness'. 89 
We would concur with Torrance's belief that a notion of the intra-personal 
communion of the Trinity is necessary to unmask traditional monist notions 
of ontology. Nonetheless we wonder whether any such formulation can 
render 'vacuous' the tendency to objectivise God in a monadic notion of 
being. 90 It would seem that no formula can of itself avoid the deeply rooted 
tendency to objectivise God. 
Zizioulas groups Alan Torrance together with thinkers like Moltmann and 
Buber in the claim that they fail to maintain the particularity of the person in 
88 A. Torrance, Persons iii Coininunion, p. 290, asks 'whether a foundationalist ontology of 
personhood together with attendant notions of personal freedom, creativity and, in particular, 
causality do not threaten to become the driving force (or'critical control') in [Zizioulas') 
exposition of the doctrine of God. ' cf. p. 77-8,200-01,300. 
89 A. Torrance, Persons in Communion, p. 258. 
90 As Colin Gunton aptly notes, in Vie One Hie Piree and the Many, p. 213, JaIntiquity and 
modernity alike are deficient in their tendency to drive towards unitary conceptions of social 
being and order. ' 
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using an essentialism of relation. 91 The very fact that Zizioulas can group 
such diverse thinkers together should raise questions to his reader. Zizioulas 
desires to hold together the apparent contradiction of particularity and unity 
within the very description of the being of God and therefore the description 
of the created world as well. His approach suggests that we cannot in fact 
mask the paradox which has plagued philosophy since Herachtus and 
Parmenides; rather, Zizioulas suggests that the two poles of particularity and 
unity must be held together at the same time. Yet he in turn, utilises an 
emphasis upon the particular as a basis to hold together particularity and 
unity. The paradox of person and communion as two ontologically 
primordial categories are held together in the particular person of the Father; 
who in his very existence is neither a monadic being, nor the locus of a 
relational matrix. Returning to the discussion in chapter two of this thesis, it 
appears that we see Zizioulas inadvertently supporting De Regnon's thesis 
that in our doctrine of the Trinity we must choose between an approach that 
emphasises the persons or an approach that emphasises the unity. 
We would suggest that a concept of relation which resonates with Zizoulas' 
own understanding of the Trinity must begin with a notion of persons in 
relation; not only in term of God's being but in terms of human being. God 
constitutes humanity on two levels: the first is that he constitutes us as 
physical beings and the second is that he desires to constitute us as persons 
who order themselves and their world in relation to him. This does not 
involve a simple intellectual assent to our dependence upon God as a 
'source', for in a sense this would deny the freedom which and with which 
God gives to us. Rather, what is significant in our relation to God is that 
humanity is given the 'space' to respond to him. God is able to allow space in 
his relation to the world because he is not dependent upon the world for his 
existence, nor is he in some way tied to the world. Space does not precede 
relation but is an aspect of relation if it is to be more than a simple platonic 
continuity or idealist collapsing of the many into the one. In relation to 
humanity, God allows space, not by a kenotic denial of himself, nor by 
disengaging from the world in order that humanity in transcending this 
world might encounter God. Rather God allows a space of 'situated freedom' 
within the parameters of his dynamic and continuing engagement with the 
91 Zlzioulas has grouped Torrance together with people like Buber, Lossky and Moltmann in 
suggesting that his concept of communion becomes an essentialism of relation. 'The Father as 
Cause', Research Institute in Systematic Theology, Kings College London, October 14,1997 
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world. This space is not a 'letting-be' as though God steps back to allow 
humanity to reciprocate what he has done for them, rather, it is a freedom to 
live in response to God's continuous grace towards us. God's relation to the 
world is not alien to the truth of the world for it completes and realises the 
truth of the world. Gunton suggests that the notion of perichoresis might be 
used as a transcendental notion of how all things exist in a mutually 
constitutive matrix. 92 We would agree with this in so far as it is recognised 
that the relational matrix of the world is truly perichoretic when it is ordered 
towards God in response to his free relatedness to humanity. Therefore, God 
enters into the matrix of the relations which constitute the world and in 
entering into those relations God transforms them not by changing their 
form but by redirecting them into a dynamic communion with himself. 93 
Dynamic relations are the matrix of all created existence; 'we too are 
particulars in relation, both with respect to the primary constitution of our 
being by God and by its secondary constitution in patterns of created sociality 
by human society. '94 
Conclusion 
John Zizioulas' understanding of a relational ontology has a depth of 
coherence which many other modern relational models do not have. 
Utilising the patristic distinction of creatio ex nihilo, together with the 
understanding of God's being as the particularity in unity of the three in one, 
Zizioulas has provided a model which breaks through some of the 
fundamental problems of understanding how God is intimately engaged with 
the world while remaining transcendent from it. Using a model of analogia 
relationis he provides a basis for understanding how we are made in the 
image of God without lapsing into the problems of essentialist models of 
being. 
Zizioulas' willingness to use existentialist arguments to illuminate his 
argument is a double edged sword. On the one hand it serves to make his 
notions accessible and relevant, while on the other hand it means that his 
92 '[Tlhat we consider the world as an order of things, dynamically related to each other in 
time and space. It is perichoretic in that everything in it contributes to the being of everything 
else, enabling everything to be what it distinctively is. ' Gunton, The Otte tile Tilree atid tile 
Matiy p. 166. Cf. p. 169-170. 
93 Which, once again, returns us to our argument of chapter two of this thesis where we argued 
for the need for some concept of ordering in relation to God. 




ideas are at times diluted by an excessive emphasis upon the particular. The 
title of his book Being as Communion emphasises his concern to displace 
substantialist notions of being. Yet, the balance of his argument leans towards 
guarding the priority of the particular. 
It is our belief that Zizioulas' project provides a basis for reinterpreting the 
fundamental issues in a theological anthropology. There remain two pivotal 
issues which need further discussion in light of Zizioulas' thesis. The first, 
which will be the basis of chapter six, regards the understanding of human 
finitude and the issue of sin and the fall. The second, which we will take up 
in chapter seven, is to do with the understanding of how Christ and the 
Spirit, the two hands of God, together constitute the ecclesial community. 
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Section C. The Mediation of Personhood 
Chapter Six: Human Limitation and Corruption 
Introduction 
In chapter five when we discussed Zizioulas' relational ontology we raised some 
questions with regard to his understanding of human finitude. It may seem 
strange to question how he understands the limits which are inherent to 
humanity when he is clearly concerned to unmask traditional attempts to define 
human beings on the basis of capacity or incapacity. In order to provide a 
context for these issues we need to enter into the discussion of the implications 
and significance of the fall and human sinfulness. This argument becomes 
particularly complex when we attempt to understand an Orthodox position on 
the issues of sin and the fall, for the East approaches these issues from a radically 
different perspective than the West. 
Many western theologians remain highly critical of the failure of the East to deal 
with the issue of sin. That Zizioulas devotes little time to the issue of sin may 
appear as a startling omission to a western thinker in so far as western theology, 
on the whole, has invested much time and effort in attempting to understand and 
describe human sinfulness. For many theologians in the West to fail to address 
the primacy of sin in any understanding of the person would be 
to trivialise the cross of Jesus Christ,... to ignore, euphemize, or otherwise mute 
the lethal reality of sin is to cut the nerve of the gospel. For the sober truth is that 
without full disclosure on sin, the gospel of grace becomes impertinent, 
unnecessary, and finally uninteresting. 1 
While one might appreciate Plantinga's concern that we not overlook the 
seriousness of sin,, it is important to realise that he is speaking in the context of a 
wide ranging debate in western theology regarding the doctrine of sin. The 
question of the place and significance of a doctrine of sin has been hotly debated 
in the West, particularly in the past two centuries, with some theologians arguing 
for a central place for it and others who believe that an overemphasis upon sin 
has shaped theology in negative ways. It is vital to attempt to understand some 
of the issues which lie behind the Eastern position rather than 
interpretingEastern thinkers from within the Western debate. Space does not 
allow us to do deal with the full scope of the issues involved in this debate. 
I Cornelius Plantinga Jr., Not the Way it Was Stipposed to Be. A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994) p-199- 
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Therefore we will focus upon those issues which are most pertinent to our 
understanding of Zizioulas' relational ontology. 
The fall and the sinfulness of humanity have certainly been central questions in 
the Christian tradition. There have been all kinds of models which have 
attempted to juggle the different issues of humanity's freedom, the question of 
evil, the inherent 'goodness' of creation and the present reality of humanity's 
condition. Inevitably there is some confusion and apparent contradiction in 
whatever way these elements are put together especially with the question of 
how the individual person is to be held accountable for sin. The doctrine of the 
fall has been an important element in attempts to affirm that the world is not the 
way it was supposed to be. However, we will argue that much of the western 
tradition has sought to use the doctrine of the fall to account for the apparently 
contradictory 'forces' of human existence in inappropriate ways. 2 
I. I. The Western Debate 
Central to the debate in the West, with regard to the significance of Adam's sin 
for all of humankind, has been Augustine's concept of original sin. The question 
it sought to answer was what was the 'essential' difference between humanity 
before the fall and humanity after the fall. The force of Augustine's argument 
was shaped by his response to Pelagius' anthropological optimism. 3 Augustine's 
concern was to emphasise that the result of the fall was a substantial change in 
humanity's situation. Unfortunately the emphasis upon the substantial change 
which occurred as a result of the fall may easily appear to suggest a change in the 
substance of human nature either through an imposed limitation or through the 
addition of some foreign substance. The danger in suggesting that the fall has 
led to the limitation of humanity is the assumption that before the fall humanity 
was not limited. Augustine's suggestion that the fall was a fall from perfection to 
imperfection suggests that before the fall humanity was 'complete. This 
suggestion tends towards a Gnostic denigration of the 'natural' limits of the 
material world. 
The other danger which arises in seeking to establish the substantial results of the 
fall is that sin might be seen as substantive. As the concept of original sin has 
2 The nineteenth century attempt to do away with the doctrine of the fall could be seen to reflect 
the desire to unmask the fact that the doctrine was carrying far more than it should have. 
3 Douglas Farrow, The Fall'in Oxford Coinpattion to Cliristian Thotight, ed. Adrian Hastings 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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developed and been interpreted, the nexus of sin has been located in the static 
substance of human nature. 4 
The concept of human nature as an'essence'or as at bottom an essentially 
unvariable type, or as a simple instead of a complex whole inevitably before the 
idea of development altered our mode of conceiving of things, is one which must 
share with the loose usage of the term 'sin' and its derivatives... the responsibility 
for the confusion which has enveloped the discussion of human sinfulness and 
its cause. 5 
Where ontology has been described in terms of a static essence, sin has been 
necessarily identified as something static and essential as well. The fallacy 
behind all of this is the assumption that our problem is sin, as though sin were 
something substantial in itself. That this continues to be an issue is evidenced by 
the number of people who are careful to assert that sin is not something in its 
own right. 6 Sin is not 'something' in the sense of a force or power which exists in 
its own right. 7 
Augustine's thesis that human 'nature' had been infected with guilt which is 
transmitted from generation to generation has been difficult to accept in modern 
times. It must be acknowledged that, 
at each step the old theory which traces human sinfulness to an original acquired 
defect of nature encounters difficulties when examined closely. Apart from its 
precariousness, if we may not say its untenability, from the point of view of 
empirical science, it is a nest of psychological and ethical inconsistencies. 8 
It is not therefore surprising that in the nineteenth century there was a strong 
reaction against the concept of original sin. In the West the question raised by 
historical criticism with regard to the existence of the historical Adam forced a re- 
evaluation of the origin of sin. 9 Furthermore in both East and West Augustine's 
4 We must avoid thinking of sin in static terms. Alistair McFadyen, 'Sins of Praise: The Assault 
on God's Freedom' in God and Freedom ed. Colin Gunton( Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995). 
,5 McFarlane Christ and the Spirit p. 31. 
6 Paul Ricoeur The Hermeneutics of Symbols: p. 303, asserts that'sin is not something, but a 
subversion of a relation'. Yet, he denounces any attempt to belittle the significance of sin by 
suggesting its 'non-being'. It has being in that it is the subversion of an intended objective reality, 
a reality which refuses to be thwarted by sin, but overcomes only by grace. Cited by McFarlane 
Christ and the Spirit. p. 120. 
7'[S]in is a parasite, an uninvited guest that keeps tapping its host for sustenance. Nothing about 
sin is its own; all its power, persistence, and plausibility are stolen goods. Sin is not really an entity 
but a spoiler of entities, not an organism but a leech on organisms,... the old Augustinian idea that 
evil has no existence except as a privation of good. ' Plantinga, Not the Way it Was Supposed to Be. 
p. 89. 
8 FR Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1908) p. 30- 
31. 
9 'Nineteenth century biblical criticism discredited the historical nature of the Adam and Eve 
story. At the same time the wide acceptance of the evolutionary hypothesis led to the view that 
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concept of the transmission of original sin has been discounted as a 
misinterpretation of Romans 5: 12-10 
At the same time there has been a reaction against the juridical terms of 
punishment which appeared to be hard to justify in light of a loving God. The 
idea of Jesus appeasing a wrathful God develops all too easily into an idea of a 
petty God who was intent on wreaking vengeance on those who had slighted 
Him. 
[EIxcessive preoccupation with the juridical aspects of the doctrine of justification 
has led to versions of penal substitution which do appear to attribute to God an 
excessively punitive character. So much hangs on a sensitive appreciation of 
what are the possibilities and limits of the legal metaphor. II 
The polarisation between those who insist on the inherent goodness of humanity 
and those who insist that humanity has done wrong and needs to be punished 
for it has led the debate into the question of what humanity is in its own right, 
'good or bad'. It is not difficult to see that in both instances the basic question 
rests on what humanity is in itself. This in turn was compounded by Rousseau's 
ideal of the essential goodness of human nature. As a result, there was a 
growing unwillingness to accept the thesis that humanity was corrupted at the 
core. 
1.2. Realignment of the Understanding of Original Sin 
In the twentieth century in the light of two world wars, it has become more 
difficult to sustain an ideal of the inherent goodness of humanity. 12 Yet, with the 
adoption of the Cartesian notion of individual autonomy there has not been a 
general reacceptance of the notion of original sin as the basis for a concept of 
man had progressed from his primeval state instead of falling from a higher one. Nineteenth 
century theology tended to see man, not as a sinner, but as an essentially good creature who was 
destined to become better. The doctrines of the fall and original sin have been revived in the 
twentieth century. Few theologians today accept the view that guilt can be inherited. But 
theologians are widely agreed that the state in which we find man is out of harmony with God's 
will and purposes for him. ' William Horden, Dictionary of Christian Theology ed. Alan 
Richardson, (London: SCM, 1969)s. v. 'Man, Doctrine of'. 
10 See Panayiotis Papageorgiou, 'Chrysostorn and Augustine on the Sin of Adam and Its 
Consequences'. SVTQ 39: 4,1995 p. 361. 
11 Colin Gunton The Actnality of the Atonement: A Shidy of Metaphor, RatlOiwlity and the Christian 
Tradition (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989 p. 101. 
12'Before two world wars 'our grandfathers in their simplicity found it hard, if not impossible, to 
believe in original sin; it is not so with us; perhaps among the traditional dogmas this one alone 
can now be accepted as self-evident. ' JH Walgrave 'Incarnation and Atonement'in 7he 
Incarnation: Ectitnenical Shidies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitian Creed AD 381, (Edinburgh: Handsel 
Press, 1981) p. 153. 
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inherited guilt. Montaigne's thesis which emphasised individual 'nature' over a 
general human 'Nature', called into question the notion of a universal human 
nature and by implication the idea of inherited guilt. 13 Rather than describing a 
doctrine which addresses the condition of the whole of humanity and creation, 
the focus has been upon the individual. This in turn is compounded in that, 
the Western concept of original sin led to a tendency to operate with a dualism of 
inner and outer person. Original sin came to be seen as that which qualified the 
inner being, and was wiped away by baptism. 14 
The understanding has developed that what needs to be set right is the inner 
person and the important distinction between original sin and actual sin has been 
collapsed into the context of the individual. 15 The development of the notion of 
individual autonomy combined with the loss of accepted transcendental values 
has led to a realignment of the notion of sin. 
The increasingly subjective turn of the modem mind has meant that treatments 
of the human plight and its healing have taken an increasingly inward and 
individualistic direction, as the thought of two modem heirs of Luther, 
Kirkegaard and Bultmann, demonstrate clearly. Some forms of pietism and 
mysticism illustrate the same trend. 16 
Far from identifying the fall and original sin with something which has affected 
all of humanity, and through humanity the world as well, the context of sin 
became identified with the inner substance or life of the individual. 17 With the 
understanding of the fall as a movement from perfection to incompleteness 
combined with a concept of individual autonomy there is a tendency to see 
salvation in terms of the completion of the individual. 18 
13 See chapter three of this thesis. section II-A. 
14 Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonement, p. 186. 
15'Only a Christology which meets with and resolves both characteristics [actual sin and original 
sin] of the tensives symbolism of sin can be deemed relevant to the human predicament. ' 
McFarlane Christ and the Spirit. p. 118. 
16 Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonement. p. 101. 
17 This in turn made possible the idea that sin was solely subjective. Tennent The Origin and 
f-'ropagation of Sin P. 68, notes 'it is Schleiermacher's peculiar doctrine that sin has no objective 
reality, but is only sin from our subjective point of view. It is real, but only in our consciousness. 
Sin, in fact, is consciousness of sin. ' 
18 'Western theology has by and large ... shown a repeated tendency to overmoralise 
its 
understanding of the atonement. Its vision has become increasingly anthropocentric and 
individualistic at the expense of aspects of the tradition which see salvation as being in and with 
the whole created order. ' Gunton, The Actuality of the Atoneinent p. 137. 
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2.1. The Eastern Response 
Given the parameters of the debate it is hardly surprising that those on the 
outside have been, at times, bemused by the positions taken by various parties 19 
Eastern theologians have reacted more often than not against the extremes of the 
western debate. For them the foundation of the argument is itself flawed they 
would not question the sinfulness of humanity but they do question the notion of 
inherited guilt. 'The idea of transmitted guilt, a central feature of Augustine's 
later doctrine of original sin, is totally absent from the Greek patristic tradition'. 20 
This has led them to reject soteriological motifs which are heavily concerned with 
a legal justification. At first glance it may appear that Orthodox thinkers are 
siding with the humanists who want to do away with the idea of judgement for 
sin and are concerned to emphasise human dignity and freedom. However, to 
group Orthodox thinkers with the humanist response to a doctrine of sin is to 
misunderstand what lies behind their position. There are several layers to the 
differences between the East and the West on these issues. In order to 
understand why their perspectives seem at times to be so radically different we 
need to examine some foundational concerns. 
2.2. The Incarnation: Redemption or Deification? 
It is commonly noted that the East approaches the issue of soteriology through 
theosis where the West focuses on redemption from sin. Behind the distinct 
emphases of the East and the West lies a significant difference in perception with 
regard to the nature of humanity before the fall. The East, following Irenaeus' 
notion of recapitulation, believes that humanity was not mature before the fall. 
This does not mean that they thought of humanity as imperfect or incomplete, 
rather,, it means that humanity was immature yet, with the hope of progressing 
to maturity in relationship with God. The West, in turn, has tended to follow 
Augustine's lead in perceiving the fall as a fall from a perfect state to an 
19'There developed in the West a tendency to conceive the human relation to God largely -in 
terms of legal obligations (and, it might be added, a corresponding perplexity in the Eastern 
church about Western atonement theology as a whole). The central motif is demand: ... Without 
doubt, many Western theologies of atonement have tended to be legalistic, making it appear that 
God is a God of law before he is a God of love. ' Gunton, The Achiality of tile Atolleinent p. 86-87. 
20 Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus both taught that infants are born without sin, an 
idea which stands in contrast to Augustine's doctrine of the universal sinfulness of fallen 
humanity. McGrath, Cliristian Theolcýgy p-370 The idea of inherited guilt is indeed absent from 
much of the Greek tradition but it is certainly not totally absent as Nellas testifies. Panaylotis 
Nellas, 'Redemption or Deification?: Nicholas Kavasilas and Anselm's Question "Why did God 
Become Man? "'Sottrozli 66 Dec. 1996 p. 10. 
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imperfect one. Nellas speaks of two axes which have been used to define the 
work of Christ in the incarnation: An axis of fall -- redemption and an axis of 
creation -- deification. His point being that the issue of sin and the fall is not the 
basis for a new axis but is in fact a segment on the axis of creation -- deification. 21 
In light of this difference it is immediately apparent how the Western position 
points to sin as the problem which needs to be addressed while the East sees sin 
as a secondary issue which has simply complicated the fact that humanity was 
not created fully mature in the first place. Orthodox thinkers would not deny 
that sin must be dealt with in order to restore humanity. Rather, they would 
emphasise that what has happened or what should be focal to the discussion is 
that humanity has been returned to the possibility of developing to maturity in 
relation to God. 
2.3. Original Sin and the Results of the Fall 
For Zizioulas, like most Orthodox, the fall did not result in 'original sin' as 
though human nature has been stained. For Zizioulas the result of the fall is that 
humanity is alienated from God. This alienation in turn means that the biological 
hypostasis is limited ultimately by death. Rather than speaking of a 'corruption' 
of human nature Zizioulas is suggesting that the result of Adam's sin is that 
death became the limit on humanity. He is not suggesting that death is a result 
of the fall but that death became inevitable for humanity because of Adam's sin. 
Reversing Augustine's faulty interpretation of Romans 5: 12 which would suggest 
that in Adam all have sinned and therefore all will die, Zizoulas suggests that sin 
or the sinfulness of the human person is the result of the limitation of death. The 
fall is not the grounds for a doctrine of the transmission of sin but simply for the 
limitation of mortality. For Zizioulas it is as a result of this limitation of death 
that all human persons s1n; actual sin is not to be confused with Adam's sin. 
Zizioulas' emphasis that the single result of the fall is death distinguishes him 
from other Orthodox thinkers, such as Lossky, who would allow that the results 
of the fall include some form of corruption as well as the 'penalty' of death both 
of which'distance'humanity from God. 
[A]fter the fall, two obstacles intervene to make this distance unbridgeable: sin 
itseff, which makes human nature incapable of receiving grace, and death, the 
outcome of that fallenness which precipitates man into an anti-natural state 
where the will of man, contaminating the cosmos, gives to non-being a 
paradoxical and tragic reality. 22 
21 NeHas ,I Redemption or 
Deification? ' p. 11. 
22 OT p. 84. 
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And Timothy Ware notes, 'humans (Orthodox usually teach) automatically 
inherit Adam's corruption and mortality. '23 The view that humanity inherited 
both mortality and corruption (without inferring an inheritance of guilt) can be 
traced all the way back to ChrySoStoM. 24 This calls into question Zizoulas' 
singular emphasis upon mortality as the ultimate result of the fall. We must be 
clear at this point that Zizioulas believes that the ultimate corruption of 
humanity is death, thus to speak of death is to speak of a radical corruption of 
humanity. We would not deny that death, as we experience it, is a significant 
determinant in human constitution; rather, what concerns us here is whether or 
not the whole of the corruption of humanity and the created world can be 
equated with death. Is Zizioulas at this point appropriating a modified view of 
Heidegger's 'being unto death' where the paradox of existence is oriented around 
death? 
In some ways it might be possible to identify the corruption of the world with the 
implications of and the response to death. For example we might move on from 
Zizioulas' position to suggest that sin or sinful behaviour arises from the attempt 
of human persons to escape the limitation posed by death by looking to 
themselves rather than God. There certainly are grounds for understanding 
human sinfulness in this light, as though we attempt to create our own world, or 
reality, to avoid the truth of our own finiteness. Whether this is through 
deception, distraction, or pride all of these responses can reflect our reaction 
against the limitations which are imposed upon us through our mortality. 
Furthermore, this model avoids the tendency to identify original sin as a change 
to the static substance of humanity or as something transmitted genetically. Yet, 
if we are to develop this line of thought then we are in fact returning to a more 
broadly developed notion of corruption than Zizioulas seeks to emphasise. 
Zizioulas'move away from describing the results of the fall as a change in 
human nature may not be as negative as it first appears. One way that some 
Orthodox writers have understood the results of the fall is that the body which 
was created immortal has now become mortal. Lossky, following an idea which 
goes back through Palamas to Gregory of Nyssa, speaks of the garments of skin 
which have been given to humanity as a result of the fall. 25 The idea of the 
change to the constitution of our physical bodies does allow for the significance 
23 Timothy Ware, 77ze Ortliodox Cli urcli , 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 
1963) p. 224. 
24 Papageorgiou, 'Chrysostom and Augustine on the Sin of Adam', p. 366. 
25 MT p. 104. 
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of the corruption of human nature which has happened after the fall. However, 
it also seems in danger of running into exactly the same problems as Augustine's 
notion of the transmission of sin by linking it to a change in the substance of 
humanity. Furthermore, emphasising a change in human nature could seem to 
suggest that the limitations which are a part of the 'fallen' human condition are 
associated with original sin. Thereby the goal becomes overcoming the 
limitations of human nature; which again returns us to one of the problems with 
the doctrine of original sin. 
Zizioulas insists that sin has not resulted in any change to human nature or the 
logos of humanity. What has changed is the tropos or mode of existence of 
humanity. This distinction prevents the perception of the results of the fall as a 
change in the 'substance' of humanity. Of course if we begin with a notion of 
relational ontology we must ask whether or not we can even speak of the static 
substance of humanity; which in turn forces the issue of how we might speak of a 
change in the constitutive elements of human existence as a result of the fall. 
That will be an issue we pick up a little later in the chapter. At present we would 
simply affirm that Zizioulas' approach, which steers clear of the idea of a change 
in the substance of humanity in favour of the limitation of mortality,, may be 
preferable to models which try to do justice to the corruption of humanity 
through a change in human nature. 
2.4. Christology and Harmart 
Returning to the difference between the approaches of the East and the West we 
note that Eastern thinkers are concerned with a tendency to ignore that the 
incarnation has restored humanity on its initial course, which is both to be in 
communion with God and to be stewards of creation. Instead, they perceive that 
in the West, the work and life of Christ is identified primarily with the need to 
deal with individual human sinfulness: 'the Christian life is regarded not so 
much as the realisation of Adam's original destiny, as a dynamic transformation 
of man and the world and as a union with God, but as a simple escape from 
sin. '26 The incarnation is determined by sin rather than sin being determined by 
the incarnation. Thus the incarnation becomes an emergency measure which is 
instituted in order to correct something which has gone badly wrong instead of 
being the very basis of God's continual and active extension of love towards us 
26 Neflas, Deification in Christ. p. 95. 
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which is not changed by sin but simply re-routed. 27 For the East, the mystery of 
Christ's death and resurrection is not that somehow God was able to deal with 
sin but that sin was proved to be an insignificant force in the face of God's grace 
and power. 28 Sin which at times seems to be the controlling and shaping force of 
our lives was exposed as a second rate impostor which did not have any hold 
over the humanity of Christ and through him need not have any hold over US. 29 
Zizioulas and Lossky are both concerned that in the West the telos for humanity 
becomes forgiveness of sin rather than theosis. 30 Zizioulas seeks to balance the 
two concerns of redemption and theosis. 
Christology should not be confined to redemption from sin but reaches beyond 
that, to man's destiny as the image of God in creation. There are two aspects in 
Christology, one negative (redemption from the fallen state) and another positive 
(fulfilment of man's full communion with God; what the Greek fathers have 
called theosis). Only if the two are taken together, can Christology reveal human 
destiny in its fullness. 31 
Zizioulas is anxious to propose an alternative to what he sees as a preoccupation 
in western soteriology with a focus on sin. In fact, his concern is to step outside 
of the boundaries in which the argument over sin and salvation is usually 
conducted. 
Within the Western tradition the tendency to interpret Christology solely in 
terms of God's response to the sinfulness of humanity has led to placing the 
doctrine of sin as a precursor to Christology. 32 As a result the doctrine of sin is 
27 This assumes Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation where the original state of created humanity 
was not one of perfection but a state in which the possibility of communion with God was at its 
starting point. Thus the work of Christ was not primarily to deal with sin, although he did that, 
but to establish the basis for communion between the created and uncreated in a incontrovertible 
way. In this we also see the concept promoted by Scotus, that Christ would have come even if it 
were not for sin. Nellas in Deification in Christ pp. 37-38,94-95, discusses the positive and 
negative aspects of the Scotus thesis. 
28'However frightening evil may be, since it and not Christ constitutes an event or an episode, it 
is shown in the last analysis to be puny. The understanding of man, -of salvation, of the spiritual 
life, and so on- is detached from evil and united with Christ. Evil is made relative. Even the 
greatest depth of sin does not touch upon the origin and destiny of man. ' Nellas, Deification in 
Christ. p. 41. 
29 But the place of God was not destroyed by the sin of man; the vocation of the first Adam was 
fulfilled by Christ, the second Adam. MT p. 133-34. 
30 There is a tendency for Orthodox theologians to overlook the understanding of theosis in the 
West (albeit a different understanding than that of the East) which we find in many places for 
example Aquinas, ý 'vision of God'. 
31 Zizioulas 'Capacity' p-434. 
32 This is not true of the whole of the Western tradition, 'for Barth there is no discrete treatment of 
the doctrine of sin; rather, hamartiology falls under the larger rubric of reconciliation. Kathryn 
Greene-McCreight, 'Gender, Sin and Grace: Feminist Theologies meet Karl Barth's Hamartiology. ' 
SIT 50: 4,1997 p. 425. 
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discussed as a category before or apart from the doctrine of the incamation. 33 
Rather than sin being located within the context of a broader understanding of 
Christology it has become the means by which the incarnation is understood. 
Not only has this distorted Christology but it has also resulted in confusion over 
the doctrine of sin. There is a failure to establish that sin is only revealed as sin Mi 
the light of Christ. 
[W]hile a person may certainly be conscious of immoral acts and false motives, 
the reality of man's sinful state can never be perceived merely by self knowledge. 
The totality and inclusiveness of Adam's sin and the consequent depravity of all 
is an issue that is only truly made known in the cross. 34 
Apart from Christ there can be no adequate doctrine of sin; first because only 
Christ reveals sin for what it truly is and secondly because sin is bound up with 
the rejection of CMSt. 35 
We would argue that the concept of sin remains abstract apart from God's 
engagement through Christ and by the Spirit. 'It is only through the triune God's 
being and relation to the world that we know what it means to speak of sin as a 
refusal of or assault on God's sovereignty and freedom. '36 There is a failure to 
recognise that apart from the Spirit engaging with and relating to a person there 
is no possibility of truly recognising sin for what it iS. 37 
In the classical Christian story as presented in John's gospel, judgement is not 
effected by uttering words of condemnation but by a quite complex process of 
interaction. The words and works of Jesus ... force to light hidden directions and dispositions that otherwise never come to view. 38 
33 Barth CD IV: l p. 359, distinguishes himself from the tradition on this point. In Jesus, God and 
Man, Wolfbart Pannenberg devotes some time to discussing how the approach to Christology 
through different soteriological motifs has significantly altered the essential understanding of 
Christ. 
34 J. E. Colwell Nezv Dictionary of Theology, ed. B. Ferguson and D. F. Wright (Illinois: tntervarsity 
Press, 1988) s. v. 'Sin' p. 643. 
35'We can only see the infinite guilt in which we stand over against God; the God who became 
man. ' Karl Barth DogtnatiCs in Otitline Trans. by GT Thomson (London: SCM Press, 1949)p. 105. 
36 McFadyen, 'Sins of Praise'. p. 42. 
37 John 16: 8-11 The Spirit convicts (EkiyýFL) the world of its sin. EXEYýFA means expose'where the 
object of the process is not simply to prove an opponent wrong but to persuade him that he is 
wrong and so to change his mind'. C. K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St John: An Introduction 
7vith Conzynentary and Notes on the Greek Text. 2nd ed. (London: SPCK, 1978) p. 486 Yet the world 
cannot receive him (John 14: 17) Therefore the Spirit convicts the world in and through the 
Church. 
38 Rowan Williams 'Post-modem Theology and the Judgement of the World'. In Postinodern 
Theology ed. FB Burnham (New York: Harper Collins, 1989) p. 96. 
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A doctrine of sin developed apart from Christ and the Spirit can fail to take into 
account that sin is primarily about the disruption of our communion with God 
and can only be understood in the context of God's engagement withUS. 39 
2.5. Sin and the Moral Code 
One result of interpreting Christology simply as a response to the fall is that sin 
can be described first and foremost as the transgression of a moral code. 40 
Influenced by the western teaching on original sin, we usually place sin in a legal 
setting. We regard it as disobedience to the commandments of God, and its 
results as punishments inflicted by God. 41 
The danger Nellas is seeking to illuminate is that a primary focus upon a moral 
code can all too easily lead to abstracting that code from the God who gives it 
context and meaning. 42 'The essence of sin consists not in the infringement of 
ethical standards but in a falling away from the divine eternal life for which man 
was made and to which, by his very nature, he is called. '43 When the legal 
metaphors are pushed too far they result in a contractual rather than a personal 
and relational conception of the Christian life. For those in the East it is the 
tendency towards a polemic emphasis which is of primary concern. 
Zizioulas picks up on and clearly rejects a polemical use of the legal metaphors. 
While he does not reject the issue of sin he wants to suggest that it is not an issue 
of individual morality, or psychological guilt but an issue of the perversion of 
our relation to God and to the whole of creation. The fall has to do with the 
rejection of God rather than the rejection of a moral code. Human beings have 
looked to themselves rather than to God for meaning, purpose and identity. 
39 Barth expresses this point in Dogrwtics in Outline p. 105-106. 
40'[T]he western ordo salutis was characterised at the epistemological level by the primacy of law 
and nature over grace. ' A. Torrance, Persons in Cominunion p. 61. 
41 Nellas Deification in Christ p. 177. 
42 The relational emphasis is also clearly the perspective of Paul who 'understands sin not as a 
collection of individual acts but as a relationship of hostility towards God. ' Stephen H. Travis, 
'Christ as the Bearer of Divine Judgement in Paul's Thought' in Jesus of Nazareth, Lord and Christ. 
eds. J. B. Green and M. Turner (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) p. 345. 
43 Archimandrite Sophrony quoted in McFarlane, Christ and the Spirit p. 110. 
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For since the fall results from the claim of created man to be the ultimate point of 
reference in existence (to be God) it is, in the final analysis, the state of existence 
whereby the created world tends to posit its being ultimately with reference to 
itself and not to an uncreated being, God. Idolatry, i. e. turning created existence 
into an ultimate point of reference is the form that the fall takes but what hes 
behind it is the fact that man refuses to refer created being to communion with 
God. 44 
For Zizioulas the question is what has been distorted -- a moral code or a relation 
with God. He insists that the problem is not essentially a moral problem but it is 
that human beings are not existing as persons in communion. The broken 
relationship with God is not primarily an issue of morality: '[S]in reveals itself 
not in the form of a juridical relationship between God and man, but mainly as a 
perversion of personhood'. 45 Zizioulas is concerned that an emphasis upon a 
moral code takes the focus off the relational issues. To understand his position 
we need to return briefly to his understanding of human capacity and incapacity. 
3.1. CaRaciV/Incapacitv 
When Zizioulas discusses the issue of human capacity and human incapacity, he 
is seeking to move beyond the polemics of the western discussion. Zizioulas 
opposes what he sees as the very basis of the debate: 'man has been presented 
either by stressing his state of sin (e. g. R. Niebuhr) or emphasising his capacity for 
God (e. g. K. Rahner)'. 46 In the language of the biological and ecclesial 
hypostasis, Zizioulas is concerned to establish that the failure to become a person 
is not the result of an acquired fault but of the very constitution of the biological 
hypostasis. 47 This inevitable failure is in fact the natural outcome of the 
biological existence when it is taken in itself. It is not wrong,, in the sense with 
which we in the West normally view sin and moral culpability. 48 It is rather the 
natural outcome of the givenness of our existence. 'Sin is not to be understood as 
bringing about something new (there is no creative power in evil) but as 
revealing and actualising the limitations and potential dangers inherent in 
creaturehood,, if creation is left to itself. '49 Furthermore, Zizioulas rightly 
44 BC p. 102. 
45 Zizioulas 'Capacity', p. 434. 
46 Zizioulas , Capacity', pp-404-05. 
47 'The tragedy of the biological constitution of man's hypostasis does not lie in his not being a 
person because of it, it hes in his tending towards becoming a person and failing. Sin is precisely 
this failure. And sin is the tragic prerogative of the person alone. ' BC p. 52. 
48 For Zizioulas sin is more or less a fault of the human being's immaturity and innocence, it is 
not primarily a question of guilt but of failure. Conversation Oct. 21,96. 
49 BC p. 102. 
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emphasises that the limitations which are natural to human constitution should 
not be considered sin. 50 
There are in fact two key concerns which must be held together at the same time: 
the first is that humanity and not God must be held responsible for the 
corruption of the world after the fall and secondly it must be clear that humanity 
is not capable of undoing the results of the fall. The apparent solution to this 
paradox is to suggest that humanity had a capacity which they then lost in the 
fall. This of course is the target of Zizioulas' argument that the issue is not one of 
capacity and incapacity. 
That these concerns are not always understood is evidenced by some western 
models of salvation which seem to place repentance as a condition of redemption 
or any engagement with God. 51 The goal becomes dealing with sin rather than 
relationship to God. The direction of this excessive focus upon sin means that 
the emphasis can be placed upon a person dealing with sin in order to present 
themselves righteous before God. Paradoxically this pelagian idea is itself sinful 
in so far as it suggests that a human being can in themselves do anything to 
restore communion with God. And it is this suggestion which has been the 
target of Augustine and the Reformers in their insistence on human incapacity. 
The argument appears to be between those who would seek to affirm the 
responsibility and dignity of human persons and those who would seek to affirm 
the significance of the corruption which has resulted from the fall. 
The question of how a person is implicated in original sin clearly becomes more 
of an issue when the individual is given a high degree of autonomy. However, 
the fact that it is difficult to assign responsibility for our current condition does 
not mean that the culpability of humanity should be overlooked. 52 The 
definition of personhood is central to this argument. The very elusiveness of this 
definition makes it very difficult to agree on assigning responsibility. Clearly, 
50 In this ZtZioulas is actuafly echoing the words of Barth. jTjhe imperfection and problematic 
nature of his existence is not as such his sin. ' Barth CD IV: I p. 360. 
51 James Torrance, 'The Vicarious Humanity of Christ' in The Incarnation: Ecianenical Shidies ill the 
Nicene-Constantinopolitian Creed AD 381, ed. T. F Torrance (London: Handsel Press. 1981) p. 142, 
discusses the distinction Calvin made between legal and evangelical repentance to suggest that 
'in the New Testament forgiveness is logically Imor to repentatice. ' 
52 "The true and f inal question, then, is not about the 'what' and 'how it happened'. This is a 
mystery beyond our understanding, the more so because, as P. Geach says, we ourselves are too 
much involved in it. The question is about the'that'and the'why it happened'. " J. H. Walgrave, 
'Incarnation and Atonement'. in TIw Incarization: Ectanenical Shidies ill tile Nicelle- 
Constantinopolitian Creed AD 381, p. 154. 
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responsibility and the concept of personhood are closely linked. 53 (It is 
interesting to note that several theologians suggest that the refusal to 
acknowledge responsibility is itself an act of sin. ) 54 Yet, as we have argued 
above, the 'capacity' to recognise sin and assume responsibility is itself a gift of 
God's relating to us. Not only must we assume responsibility for our own 
actions but in overturning the myth of the autonomous individual we need to 
address the concept of culpability. justice should never be limited simply to 
individual culpability based upon a cognitive will. Rather it is only in turning to 
and relating to God that the implications of disordered humanity and our own 
individual responsibilities within that disordered state will become clear. 55 The 
Reformers' emphasis upon utter human incapacity need not deny the 
responsibility of humanity for the fallen situation. A human person is held 
responsible not for what they are in themselves but for who they are in Christ. 
That God has reached out to us and related to us means that we are responsible 
for our response to hiM. 56 
Zizioulas has correctly reacted against a tendency in the West to identify the 
moral failure of humanity in terms of individual capacity or incapacity. Yet, has 
he come far enough in redressing the confusion in these issues and has he 
understood the importance of the issues in the western debate? 57 It appears as 
though Zizioulas has failed to recognise that for many in the West the emphasis 
upon utter human incapacity after the fall is not to suggest that human finiteness 
is the result of the fall but to affirm the significance of the fall in disrupting God's 
intention for humanity. This in turn affirms that the corruption of the world as 
53'Before long it began to become clear that those whom we do not blame we do not regard as 
responsible. Those whom we do not regard as responsible we do not see as fully human. And 
those we do not see as fully human we are wilting to twist and manipulate to suit our own 
convenience. ' C. Plantinga Jr. quotes Koestler. Not the Way it Was Supposed to Be.. p. 67. 
54 'Environmental determinism and the no-fault morality which usually accompanies it are 
pretentious. Environmental determinists pretend to know what is almost always hidden from 
us-namely, the real cause of wrongdoing ... In general, we do not know to what extent evildoers 
are themselves, as agents, the main cause of their evil and to what extent they have fallen into a 
trap set by others. Only God knows the percentages in these matters. ' C. Plantinga Jr. Not tize 
Way it 7vas Supposed to Be, p. 65. 
55 'Here it becomes manifest what sin is. Sin means to reject the grace of God as such, which 
approaches us and is present to us'. Barth, Dogmatics in Outline p. 105. 
56 'The language of responsibility remains here a theological language, since it may only be 
understood in the context of our being called by God. ' McFadyen, Sins of Praise p. 51 
57 McPartlan in Vie Eucizarist Makes the Citurciz, p. 297 suggests that Zizioulas has simply not yet 
addressed these issues. 'De Lubac dwells on the moral as well as the ontological barriers to the 
salvific achievement of personhood. However, Zizioulas focuses only upon the latter barriers. 
Consideration of the former is particularly necessary in a theological approach as existential as 
that of Zizioulas. ' 
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we know it is not part of God's good purposes, but a result of human rebellion 
against God. Rather than entering into a debate over the capacity and incapacity 
of humanity the emphasis upon the utter incapacity of humanity to restore the 
relationship with God is intended, by many in the West to illuminate how the fall 
has radically altered the human situation. 
3.2. Perversion of Relation or Moral Disorder? 
Zizioulas simply does not accept the need to describe a moral code. 58 For him 
morality implies a non-relational criterion as a judge of relations. He believes 
that we can avoid the language of morality without downplaying the significance 
of the corruption of the world. Believing that the legalistic and moralistic 
concepts are a threat to the relational character of existence he seeks to avoid 
them. Instead, he would prefer to develop the description of the relational state 
of existence as a means to fully describe the human situation. For Zizioulas to 
describe just relations we must simply describe more fully the relations we are 
speaking about. In his concern to avoid identifying the fall with moral categories 
he goes so far as to suggest that the fall is simply a result of immaturity and is not 
an issue of guilt but of failure. 
It appears as though Zizioulas' singular emphasis upon the need to restore a 
right relationship with God is in danger of overlooking the significance of the 
disruption which has been caused by our turning away from God. Alan 
Torrance is concerned that Zizioulas' approach fails to do justice to the full 
impact of the corruption of sin. 'The question also requires to be asked whether 
the distinction between the biological and ecclesial hypostasis does not 
circumvent too easily the issues posed by the extent of human alienation -- the 
distortive ravages of social exploitation, extreme poverty and personal tragedy'. 59 
While Zizioulas has moved away from the problems with identifying the fan 
with a static doctrine of original sin has he in fact adequately established the 
extent of corruption which has resulted from the fall? 
58 It is interesting to note at this point that Lossky sees no difficulty in holding that 'the 'physical' 
concept of sin and its consequences does not, in the teaching of the Eastern church, exclude 
another element which must always be remembered, the personal, moral aspect, the aspect of 
fault and punishment. ' MT p. 132 Lossky is more willing to hold onto the moral aspect of sin 
although he uses his person/ nature distinction to legitimise holding together the 'physical' and 
moral aspects of sin; once again underlining how his notion of the person retains a high degree 
of autonomy. 
59 A. Torrance, Persons in Communioti p. 301. 
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tt is not a case of either/ or where we can identify the dislocation of the fall as an 
issue of a relationship which needs to be restored or a disordering which needs 
to be set right. In fact, the difficulty with Zizioulas' position is in suggesting that 
we must choose between identifying the fall with a perversion of relationship or 
with moral disorder. For the emphasis upon the need for restored relationship 
might be seen to deny that sin is the very real barrier to that restoration. 'There 
can be no restoration of relationships unless the nature of the offence against a 
universal justice is laid bare and attacked at its root'. 60 The difficulty is to 
acknowledge that original sin has resulted in a real barrier to communion with 
God without suggesting that sin is something, that it has its own hypostasis. The 
purpose of the doctrine of original sin is to assert that the fall has resulted in a 
change to human situatedness which means that communion with God is no 
longer 'natural' to humanity. 
It is a mistake to suggest that all western approaches to anthropology deal solely 
with the need to overcome sin to the neglect of our need for restored relations 
with God. 61Calvin and Barth among many others have identified original sin 
with the separation from God, with the broken relationship. 62 
Several scholars see justice as a relational concept, to be understood against the 
background of the covenant relationship of God with Israel. In the New 
Testament, however, it has a meaning far beyond the notion of God's covenant 
faithfulness to his people: in Paul it refers to God's eschatological, revealing 
power, in which the sinner is taken up into a new relationship by the grace of 
God. The point about justice being a relational concept is very important, and 
worth developing, for it emphasises that justice is not a state but something that 
takes place between God and the world or between people. 63 
As Gunton's comments show, placing the emphasis squarely upon a relational 
ontology does not mean that we must needs dispense with the language of 
justice. The importance of speaking of justice within the context of a relational 
ontology is more important today due to the significant development of the 
understanding of human relationality which has grown out of personalist 
philosophies. The new emphasis upon our constitution in relations needs to be 
60 Gunton, Vie Actuality of the Atonetnetit. . p. 161. 
61 'Without doubt, many Western theologies of atonement have tended to be legalistic, making it 
appear that God is a God of law before he is a God of love, rather than the reverse, and so failing 
to do justice to the personal, relational, aspects of the matter. But that is not true of the Western 
tradition at its best. ' Gunton The Actuality of the Atoneynent, p. 87. 
62 William Horden, Dictwitanj of Christiati Theology ed. Alan Richardson, (London: SCM, 1969)s. v. 
'Man, Doctrine of 
63 Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonemetit. p. 104. 
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qualified to identify what are'right relations'. McFadyen elaborates this point in 
reference to feminist views. 
There is naturally, a very live awareness of the ambiguities of speaking of 
relational terms, and of the consequent dangers of such talk being (deliberately? ) 
misconstrued, so that it is turned again into a justification for dependence and 
domination ( of weak, relational selves [stereotypically women] by strong, 
unrelated selves [stereotypically men])'. 64 
In fact, to avoid idealising relationships for their own sake we must maintain a 
concept of justice as descriptive of the type of relations we are speaking of. 65 If 
we are to avoid an inclusive monistic description of relations (and in that to deny 
particularity and freedom) we need to describe what those relations are about. 
Zizioulas' concern to react against the excesses of certain western positions leaves 
him In the place of downplaying the moral aspect of the broken relationship with 
the creator. Thus, while we affirm with Zizioulas that the whole context of 
redemption must be directed towards a relational ontology we would also insist 
that the ontology be qualified as a particular type of relatedness; that it be 'just' 
relations. 
3.3. The Cross 
A concern raised by Alan Torrance is that the cross lacks significance in the 
theology of Zizioulas. '[T]he question to which we must now turn asks how far 
Zizioulas' ontology takes seriously the brokenness' of the cross -- with which 
both Jungel and Moltmann have sought to engage so powerfully'. 66 Indeed 
when Zizioulas speaks of the suffering of Christ he couches it in terms of Christ's 
suffering unjustly, but he does not establish how Christ's death has dealt with the 
brokenness of the world. 
The "suffering Son of Man" was a scandal, and yet Jesus by accepting the cross, 
offered to be that scandal and thus to give to the eschatological reality a 
dimension of suffering, humility, and service as the way to glory. The cross and 
the death of Christ became the cornerstones of Christian spirituality, in that they 
made the way clear from the start that the way to God passes through the 
"narrow gate" (Matt 7: 13) of suffering, humiliation, and service, and not through 
domination and power. 67 
64 McFadyen, 'Sins of Praise' p. 39. 
65 This picks up on something we discussed in chapter two, which was the need to allow 
for a 
concept of ordering in relations rather than asserting a principle of homogeneity onto relations. 
66 A. Torrance, Persons in Communion p. 303. 
67 John Zizioulas, 'The Early Christian Community' in Otristum Spirittiality: Origins to Hie Tweýfth 
Cetiffiry eds. B. McGinn, J. Meyendorff, J. Leclerq (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1986) p. 24. 
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It appears as though, for Zizioulas, the cross is viewed simply as a model of 
humility and obedience which all humanity is called to follow. When this is 
combined with the view that the Orthodox generally emphasise the victory of the 
resurrection rather than the scandal of the croSS68it can appear as though there is 
no room in this understanding for the significance of the death of Christ in 
dealing with the corruption of the world. We need to be clear at this point on 
how Zizioulas understands the death of Christ. 
Zizioulas' position is certainly different from those of Moltmann or Jungel, yet, it 
should not be understood as bypassing the significance of the death of Christ by 
a focus on the resurrection to the exclusion of the crucifixion. We would not 
agree with Alan Torrance's implication that Zizioulas has interpreted the death 
of Christ through the light of the resurrection by suggesting that Christ escaped 
the passion of his biological nature. 69 We might suggest that Zizioulas'point is 
not that the person of Jesus did not suffer and die but that he did not try to 
escape from death, for as we discussed earlier in this chapter, for Zizioulas the 
'passion' of the biological nature is to escape death. On the cross the person of 
Jesus did not escape death as though he had passed straight on to resurrection. 70 
That the death of Jesus was a real death and as such a true disruption of the 
cosmos cannot be denied, yet there must remain a measure of apophaticism with 
regard to the implications of that death for God's being ad intra. Thus, Alan 
Lewis' comment that Zizioulas seems reluctant to acknowledge the death of Jesus 
as significant for God's being actually resonates with Lewis' own account where 
he says we 'are compelled to confront the 12ossibihiy that God's own Son is dead 
and buried among the transgressors, and that God himself has failed in his 
fatherhood and deity. ' 71 (The significant word in that sentence being 
'possibility. 172 ) Zizioulas is doing nothing more than maintaining a certain 
apophaticism in positing the significance of the death of Jesus for God's being ad 
68 Barth comments on this distinction in Dog"wtics in Outline, p. 116. 
69 A. Torrance in Persons in Coinmunion p. 304, by his selection of quotations appears to take 
Lewis' criticism of Zizioulas further than Lewis himself intended. 
70 Zizoulas maintains that Christ did die in so far as his unity with human nature was a personal 
unity. This does not however mean that his relation to the Father as his constitutive relation was 
destroyed in the death of his person. 
71 Alan Lewis, 'The Burial of God: Rupture and Redemption as the Story of Salvation', SIT 40 
1980 p. 347. 
72 Lewis comments later in the same paper that'[I]n his identity with death, God has not been 
inactive, defeated or concealed... [God's] identification with mortal 
finitude revealing and 
defining his own identity as the God who is neither mortal nor the process of the finite world. ' 
Lewis, R itphire a? zd Rede? nptiotz, p. 355- 
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intra. He asserts that'the Cross is the only way to the Resurrection, and this does 
not take away from the Cross it utter shame and repulsiveness'. 73 Is this simply 
a situation in which Zizioulas has not adequately elaborated his position? We 
need to look more closely at how he understands the implications of the death of 
Christ on the cross. 
The idea of the death of Christ as a victory rather than a defeat is consistent with 
an emphasis within the Orthodox church74 (and following Aulen's Christu-,; Victor 
in the West as well). Zizioulas' emphasis upon Christ passing through the 
I narrow gate' suggests that Christ, in his humanity, has triumphed by not 
denying his relationship to the Father even to the point of death. 75 Given that 
Zizioulas views death as the primary result of the fall it is possible to see the 
death of Christ as a victory over the sinful attempt to avoid our human finiteness 
at all costs. (Even to the point of turning away from God. ) In this case the death 
of Christ could be seen as a victory over the tendency to choose to live 
independently of God's will and grace. Lossky develops this idea in his chapter 
on the economy of the Son. 76 Unlike Aulen's emphasis upon the divine victory 
won in the death of Christ, the Orthodox position points to the idea of 'the life 
and cross of Jesus as the victory of the 'proper man' over human temptation and 
sin'. 77 This is clearly not the same as seeing that the death of Christ involves 
paying the price for sin in a substitutionary way, yet, equally it need not 
avoiding the significance of the death on the cross as an aspect of dealing with 
the power of sin. It is dearly possible to posit that the power of sin over 
humanity is broken in Christ's obedience to the Father. 78 Lossky seems to reflect 
something of this idea as he spells out the implications of the life of Jesus for the 
unity of humanity and divinity. 
73 Zizioulas, 'Capacity' p. 431. 
74 Ware 77he Orthodox Church p. 228-9. 
75 This is not to deny that the death of Christ is also a divine victory simply that'it is a divine 
victory only because it is a human one'. Gunton, Achiality of the Atonemetit, p. 
59. 
76 MT p. 135-155. 
77 Gunton Ae Achiality of ffie Atotteinetit p-58 In this interpretation Zizioulas is closer to Edward 
Irving than Aulen. 
78 Travis in'Christ as Bearer of divine judgement' p. 343, discusses how both Old and New 
Testaments identify obedience with sacrifice. 
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The mere fact of incarnation overcomes the first obstacle to this union: the 
separation of the two natures, that of man and that of God. Two other obstacles 
then remain, linked to the fallen condition of man; sin and death ... thus the death 
of Christ removes, from between man and God, the obstacle of sin; and his 
, 79 resurrection takes from death its 'sting. 
The truth of this perspective is that it ties the death of Christ in with the whole 
I career' of Jesus of Nazareth rather than separating it out as the only significant 
event. 
The difficulty with Zizoulas' emphasis upon Christ's victory is that his reticence 
to use the language of judgement, guilt and morality does leave us with an 
incomplete picture of the significance of the cross. First because the language of 
'obedience' to the Father suggests an understanding of morality albeit a morality 
which is not simply psychological. (Once again we see that relations and justice 
are not mutually exclusive. ) But secondly, the emphasis upon the victory of the 
humanity of Christ in his obedience unto death is only one part of the argument. 
The other issue which must be acknowledged is the role of God in dealing with 
the evil of the world. In looking to Lossky we see that he clearly states that 
Christ has dealt with the condition of all humanity. 'Fascinated by the felix 
culpa, we often forget that in breaking the tyranny of sin Our Saviour opens to us 
anew the way of deification, which is the final end of men. ' 80 Yet, at this point 
Zizioulas is not as clear in identifying that the work of the Cross was how the 
corruption of the world has been dealt with. It is this issue which lies behind the 
concerns of Alan Torrance who believes that Zizioulas might be failing to 
establish the vicarious humanity of Christ. 81 It was only the Godman who was 
able to accomplish the victory over the corruption of sin and the restoration and 
realisation of our hope of communion with God. We in turn participate in this 
victory only inCMSt. 82 Christ who is God was alone able to deal with the 
corruption of creation. In obedience to the Father and in the power of the Spirit 
he accomplished what was impossible for humanity. Yet, he was only able to do 
this because he was truly human. Jesus is 'not only a man but the Man in whom 
God has given himself to the world and for the world. '83We too pass through the 
79 OT p. 92. 
80 MT p. 134 - And a conversation with 
Zizioulas on Oct. 21,96. 
81 Private conversation March 1998. 
82 "Participation in Christ's death and resurrection" is a central theme in Paul's presentation of 
Christ's death and its effect on humanity. Travis, 'ChTist as the Bearer of Divine Judgement' 
p. 344. 
83 J. Torrance, 'The Vicarious Humanity of Christ' p. 140. 
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'narrow gate'not simply because of what Christ has done but in what Christ has 
done. 
The death of the Son of God is a judgement in that humanity has rejected the 
grace of God offered to the world in the deity of the person of Christ. 84 Thus in 
the incarnation we are in fact'judged'in three senses: we are judged in that 
Christ reveals that true humanity is humanity in relation to God; secondly we are 
judged in that God's gracious and redemptive action towards us in the person of 
Christ means that our'capacity'is not what we are in ourselves but what we are 
in relation to God; and finally we are judged in that we have rejected what God 
has offered to us in Christ. It is the rejection of Christ which reveals so clearly 
that the evil which has enslaved humanity has gone far beyond individual or 
psychological categories. 85 Jesus is rejected by a humanity which is unable to 
respond to him because of the power of sin in enslaving them/ us. The death of 
Christ, the rejection of the grace of God extended towards us is the final and full 
indictment of humanity's refusal to live in the relationship which God had 
destined for it. 
While Zizioulas illuminates some of the problems with the western 
understanding he has failed to adequately address the cosmic dimensions of the 
corruption which has occurred as a result of the fall. At issue is the actuality of 
the atonement: whether the real evil of the real world is faced and healed 
ontologically in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. 86 The various 
metaphors which attempt to explain the mystery of the cross are not 
comprehensive in themselves yet they do direct us to an appreciation that 
Christ's death on the cross did effect a change in the power of sin. 
84'The fact that Jesus the Son of God has suffered under the Jews and the heathen reveals -- and it 
alone does reveal -- evil in its reality. From this point alone can we grasp the 
fact, the extent, and 
the content of the impeachment of man. For the first time we are faced here with the root of all 
great and petty transgressions. So long as in all our sinning and our mutual guilt in great and 
petty ways we do not recognise this root and see ourselves accused in Christ's suffering, see 
ourselves again in that rebellion of man against God Himself, all knowledge or recognition of 
guilt is in vain. ' Barth, Dognwtics bi Outline p. 105. 
85 Gunton Actitality of flie Atotzeynetit p. 69. 
86 Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonement. p. 165. 
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4.1. The Significance of Sin and its Implications for the Mode of 
Existence 
Existentially sin also has significance, in part, to describe the process by which 
the biological hypostasis becomes an ecclesial hypostasis. 87 We do not want to 
see sin as simply a necessary 'aid', 88 leading us to the ecclesial hypostasis; nor do 
we want to see sin and the need to deal with sin as the only issue involved in 
becoming persons. But we do want to emphasise that sin and the ontological 
effects of sin mean that the recapitulation by Christ has not simply returned us to 
the original starting point but to a different path altogether. This path leads us to 
the same telos of full and unbroken communion with God but it is ultimately a 
very different route than it might have been. Knowing and accounting for that 
difference must be part of any theological anthropology. 
We noted earlier that for Zizioulas the result of the fall is not a change in human 
nature but a change in the 'tropos' of human existence. This allows that when we 
choose to speak of the effects of sin, we will not be speaking of a change in the 
substance of humanity but in the dynamic matrix of human existence. The 
advantage of this approach is that it deals with the issue of how the sin of one 
person can affect the whole of creation, without having to adopt a complex 
metaphysics that attempts to explain how the substance of sin might be 
transmitted. We must quickly note that this need not unden-nine the significance 
of sin; rather, to do this without losing the ontological significance of sin we must 
be willing to move to an ontology which is relational. If we are to elaborate this 
idea we might say that all human relatedness, which is essential to our being in 
the ontological sense, is affected by the fact that humanity has closed itself off 
from the source of free relatedness in God. In this sense the ontological burden 
of sin might be established not simply on an individual level but on a societal 
87'The reconciliation of the persons enables the acknowledged evil of the past to become the 
basis for present and future good. ' Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonement p. 188. 
88 In the history of theology many thinkers have allowed sin a necessary and positive status in 
the development of humanity. Graham McFarlane 'Strange news from a distant star' in Persons 
Diz4ne and Human eds. C. Schwoebel, C. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991) p. 112 quotes 
Irving 'It was necessary that Adam should pass into a fallen state, to shadow forth Christ in the 
fallen state, and to this very end was paradise created with all its ordinances. ' Although 
McFarlane goes on to defend Irving in this position one is left with the apparent contradiction of 
his position. Cf. Tennent Vie Origin and Propagation of Sin p. 64, 'Thus sin is, for Hegel, a necessary 
factor in the development of men. In this connection he often refers to the scriptural account of 
the fall, which he regards as a myth eternally realised in man and expressive of the mode in 
which he lives to be a person. 
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level. 89 The significance of the 'individual' acts of sin are within the context of 
the cOrrUPtion of the created world. 
Sin will , inevitably, pass beyond the boundaries of the sinners' own life to burden 
all humanity and thus affect the fate of the whole world. The sin of our forefather Adam's was not the only sin of cosmic significance. Every sin, secret 
or manifest, committed by each of us, has a bearing on the rest of the universe. 90 
What we must admit is that the fall has affected the whole of the created realm at 
all levels, not through a tainting of the static substance or gene pool of humanity 
but through a corruption of our relatedness. Each human person is born into a 
state of sin, not through their inherited genetic corruption but through being 
born into a world which is not oriented in its relatedness to God. That the effects 
of the corruption of sin have affected the created world at all levels including our 
genetic constitution is a result of our perversion of relations and not the cause of 
it. 
One of the issues we noted in our critique of the western understanding of 
original sin at the beginning of this paper was its tendency to focus upon the 
individual and its failure to address the significance of sin for the whole of 
creation. The corruption of sin has cosmological significance. The relational 
matrix of the world is disordered and the work of Christ both enables and 
models our calling to be about healing this corruption. 'Forgiveness is therefore 
about being placed in a position -- in the life of the community -- where the evil 
past can be acknowledged while at the same time being used as a basis for a new 
form of life; where it can be atoned because it has been atoned'. 91 
Conclusion 
Setting the doctrine of sin aside as we attempt to deal with the 'real' problem, 
which is the breakdown of communion with God, may help to see the issues in a 
fresh light. Nonetheless, we cannot deny that the issue of sin must be a 
formative part of any theological anthropology. Having established the direction 
of Zizioulas' argument and his very valid concern that we emphasise theosis over 
89 Several theologians in the past have suggested that sin should be viewed at the societal level 
without thereby negating the individual responsibility. 'He (Coleridge) saw like Kant, the 
necessity of grounding every man's sin in his will but he avoided the Pelagian and Kantian 
individualism by predicating sin of the race instead of the individual; and he admitted, like his 
master, that the origin of sin ultimately disappears in mystery' Tennent Vie Origin and 
Propagation of Sin p. 59. 
90 Archimandrite Sophrony The Monk of Mount Athos. Quoted in Christ atid Hie Spirit. 
McFarlane 1996 p. 110. 
91 Gunton The Actitality of the Atonemetit p. 190. 
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redemption from sin, we are still left with the very real truth that sin is serious 
and that it is an essential part of our existence. The corruption arising from the 
fall is real and needs to be dealt with if we are to relate to God. 
The doctrine of the fall establishes that humanity and creation as x", -e now know 
them are not the way they were supposed to be. The 'substantial' effects of the 
fall cannot be identified with a change in the static protological substance of 
either human nature or with the world. Nonetheless, the corruption which has 
resulted from the fall remains a 'substantial' corruption which has radically 
altered what it means to be human in the present context. The primary source of 
the corruption of this world is the broken relationship with God; from this 
corruption arises the disordering of the relational matrix of the world. Christ, the 
God who became man, was rejected by a world which was held in the grip of a 
corruption that had permeated every level of creation; including our relations to 
each other and to the world around us. Thus it is the cross which reveals not 
only Christ's obedience to the Father (unto death) but it also reveals and judges 
the extent of the corruption which has resulted from human sinfulness. In 
Christ, and him alone, is realised the hope of restored and realised humanity. By 
his grace we too are able to enter into the relationship with the Father, not on our 
own but in and through Christ and by the Spirit. 
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Chapter Seven: The Dynamic Relations of Christ and the Spirit with 
Humanity. 
Introduction 
We have arrived at the point of pulling together some of the threads which we 
have worked with throughout this thesis. It is not our intention to reiterate what 
we have already discussed but to seek to apply some of the issues to the 
fundamental question of what it means to be a person whose being is located in 
relation to God. In the previous chapter we introduced the issue of the fall and 
identified the importance of addressing the implications of the fall for human 
corruption and for the corruption of the whole of creation through the disruption 
and disordering of humanity's relation with God. We have now arrived at the 
point of looking more closely at how a dynamic relational conception of God's 
being impacts the understanding of his involvement with humanity. There are 
three particular issues which we will concern ourselves with: they are the 
relation of Christ to the Church; the relation of Christ to the Spirit in the economy 
of God; and the relation of human persons to the Spirit. 
I. I. Christ is the Church 
Zizioulas makes a very clear identification of Christ with the Church. 'The 
Church is catholic only by virtue of her being... inseparably united with Christ 
and constituting his very presence in historyA In this strong declaration of 
identity of the Church with Christ, Zizioulas takes a different position from other 
theologians including Lossky, Miroslav Volf, T. F. Torrance and Colin Gunton 
who are all concerned to emphasise that there must be a distinction between 
Christ and the Church. 2 These theologians suggest that the close identification 
of Christ with the Church must be qualified by enough space to allow for the 
humanity of the Church and the particularity of Christ. 'The Church is by 
analogy-and only by analogy, for the Church is not Christ -to be seen as the 
object of the Spirit's particularising of the action of the ascended Christ in the 
1 BC p. 160, cf. Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition' in One in Christ, 
4 1988 p. 297. 
2: Lossky utilises the bridal imagery to speak of the Church as distinct from Christ the 
Bridegroom. MT p. 192. Miroslav Volf in After Otir Likeness; The Cluirch as the hnage of the Trinity, 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 90, also uses the same image although vvith a much more 
central concern to overturn Zizioulas' whole model of ecclesiology which he identifies as a 
monistic subsuming of human personhood. 'Zizioulas ignores those particular New Testament 
metaphors underscoring the difference between Christ and the Church (e. g., the Church as bride 
or as flock). ' 
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world. '3 These theologians suggest that at the same time one affirms the close 
relationship between Christ and the Church there must also be space for a 
distinction between the two. 
In one of his more sweeping statements Zizioulas suggests that'the insistence of 
certain people on a clear-cut distinction between Christ and the Church 
presupposes an individualistic understanding of Christ'. 4 In fact, the discussion 
is not solely bound up with the question of personhood, for it appears as though 
what fuels the debate is the issue of the degree to which the Church, as we knoxN- 
it, truly reflects or lives its own identity. Therefore while looking at Zizioulas' 
understanding of how Christ's identity is bound up with the Church we must 
also look at the relationship of the Church as it now is, to the eschatological 
people of God. 
When theologians such as T. F. Torrance call into question the identity between 
the Church and Christ one concern they are seeking to address is how the 
Church, as it exists in the present is to be understood. 5 The institution of the 
Church cannot claim to be doing Christ's work or even representing Christ in all 
of its endeavors. Furthermore the recognition that institutions, including the 
Church, seem all too often, to denigrate or deny the very people they purport to 
serve, calls into question the relationship between Christ and the Church. 
The protest against the Church as institution is to be heard on many lips: often, of 
course, for simplistic and individualistic reasons, but not only for that. Why is it, 
we may ask, that a faith at whose centre is the notion of freedom should have 
taken shape in the world in ways widely regarded as a threat to freedom? 6 
The institution of the Church seems to exist in a form which counters the 
possibility of the ideal of a free community. Clearly there must be some basis for 
speaking of the distinction between the institution of the Church and the 
eschatological hope for the Church. Not only does a distinction allow that the 
3 Gunton, Christ mid Creatim. p. 110. 
4 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 299. 
5 T. F. Torrance, Royal Niesthood, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1993) pp-31-35, devotes a 
discussion of Christ as head of the body, to emphasise that the body has no identity apart from 
the head which is the ascended Christ. His emphasis is meant to affirm that while the church is 
directly Identified with Christ and his saving work, it is not to be confused with Christ who 
remains distinct from it. He is concerned that too strong an identity of Christ with the church 
may be used to validate absolute authority on the part of church leadership. 
6 Gunton, Theolov Arwigh the Theologýms. p. 197. 
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Church is not what it should be but it also allows room for the Church to 
change. 7 
Miroslav Volf in After Our Likeness raises another issue when he criticises 
Zizioulas' strong identification of Christ with the Church. Volf is concerned that 
Zizioulas' emphasis upon the Church is in danger of placing the institution 
before the particular persons who make it Up. 8 The danger in his eyes is that the 
person is simply subsumed within the framework of the institution whose 
existence precedes them and is to all intents and purposes unaffected by them. 
Volf, recognising the threat posed by the Church, if it is perceived as an 
institution which precedes the persons who constitute it, seeks to move away 
from the institutional basis of the Church altogether. Thus he emphasises the 
distinction rather than the relation between the Church as an institution and the 
Church as the body of Christ. Volf notes that the Church is nothing more than 
the collection of people, united by the Spirit, who together form the Church. The 
event of the gathering of the people is the true Church, the true community. 
Zizioulas' notion of the corporate Christ provides the contours for his 
identification of Christ with the Church. We do not have the space to go into a 
full discussion of his notion of the corporate Christ at this point. 9 (It has already 
been discussed by Paul McPartlan in The Eucharist Makes the Church. ) However, 
we will raise a few issues. Zizioulas' conception of the corporate Christ is 
twofold: first, that Christ's identity is never understood apart from the Father and 
the Spirit; 10 and secondly that Christ is never understood apart from the human 
persons who constitute the Church. 11 In both cases the premise of Zizioulas' 
thesis is that in God the conflict between the one and the many is overcome in a 
relational being which does not deny particularity but actually makes 
particularity possible. The one does not in this way take precedence over the 
many. The notion of the corporate Christ allows Zizioulas to say that it is the 
7 Christoph Schwoebel, 'The Creature of the Word: Recovering the Ecclesiology of the Reformers' 
in On Being Me Omi-cli; Essays on the Cliristian Cominwilty, eds. Gunton and Schwoebel (T&T 
Clark: Edinburgh, 1989), p. 152. 
8 Voff, After Our Likeness, p. 106. 
We should note that Zizioulas does not use the notion of the corporate Christ as a substitute for 
the notion of the Church as the body of Christ, for he uses both images at different times. BC 
PA II 
10'The identification of the Church's ministry with that of Christ is possible only if we let our 
Christology be conditioned pneumatologically. ' BC p. 212. 
II 'Christ considered apart from the church is the worse kind of individualism. ' Zizioulas 
'Capacity' p. 435. 
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way in which Christ is the Church that allows space for humanity and 
particularity. When he refuses to allow for a distinction between Christ and the 
Church it is because the Church has no hypostasis of its own. 12 This should not 
be taken to mean that the persons who together constitute the Church lose their 
particularity; the whole thrust of Zizioulas' project is to speak of relations which 
allow rather than deny particularity. Nonetheless we would agree ivith Volf 
insofar as Zizioulas' thesis could use a more clear affirmation of the distinction 
between the ascended Christ and the persons who constitute the Church. 
Surprisingly Volf's reference to the Church as event has echoes in Zizioulas' 
thought and his emphasis upon the Church as event. Furthermore, Zizioulas is 
not naive with regard to the problems of the institutional Church. With his work 
towards ecumenism he is more aware than most people of the problems that the 
institutional Church struggles with. So how does Zizioulas understand the 
Church? Space does not permit us to fully explore the ecclesiological issues 
which are involved. 13 However, we need to look more closely at two issues; his 
understanding of the eschatological orientation of the Church and his 
understanding of the Church as event. 
1.2. Eschatological Orientation 
When Zizioulas suggests that the Church is Perfect he is not by that idealising the 
Church. 14 
The Church is made of sinners, and she shares fully the ontological and cosmic 
dimensions of sin which is death, the break of communion and final diastasis 
(separation and decomposition) of beings, And yet, we insist that the Church is 
in her essence holy and sinless. 15 
The Church exists as the paradox of a community which is still very much in the 
world yet, with an identity which is eschatological. It is the way Zizioulas 
12''By being the eikon of the Kingdom the Church is at the same time maximalised and 
minimalised. She is maximalised in that he will definitely survive eternally when her true 
identity will be revealed in the Parousia. And she is minimalised in that she has no hypostasis of 
her own but draws her identity from Christ and the Kingdom to come. By existing in history "in 
persona Christi", she is guaranteed the glory and eternal life of her head. But for the very same 
reason she is no autonomous entity vis-a-vis either Christ or the Kingdom. Her existence is 
iconic. ' Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 300. 
13 McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church, pp. 265-273 explores these issues in more detail. 
14 Nor is Zizioulas proposing an over-realised eschatology as suggested by Volf, After Oil? - 
Likeness, p-102. 
15 Ztz ioulas, 'Comm union and Otherness', p. 351. 
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understands the eschatological orientation of the Church that allows for the 
failures of the Church. 
Quite often she is tempted herself, either for the sake of survival or for the 
fulfillment of her mission, to adjust so much to the world as to forget that her 
true citizenship is in heaven and her identity is not drawn from history but from 
the eschata: she is what she will be. 16 
For Zizioulas the statement that the Church is perfect is not to claim that there is 
no need of transformation. Quite the opposite in fact,, the Church is called to 
continually live towards its true identity. He is insisting that the church's 
identity is not located in what it 'is'but in what it will be. 
When we speak of the importance of eschatology we sometimes think of it as the 
end of the Church's pilgrimage, I suggest that we must think of the eschata as 
the beginning of the Church's life, the arche, that which brings forth the Church, 
gives her identity, sustains and inspires her in her existence. 17 
For Zizioulas locating the identity of the Church eschatologically is a vital step in 
understanding what the Church'is'. 
Too strongly asserting an eschatological orientation can lead to a denial of the 
historical institution. Human institutions may fail to reflect the free involvement 
of God in the world but they are an inevitable aspect of our human sociality and 
to deny that the Church is in some ways an institution does seem to deny the 
humanity of the Church. 18 Zizioulas avoids this pitfall by allowing 'no room for 
the slightest distinction between the worshipping eucharistic community on 
earth and the actual worship in front of God's throne'. 19 Zizioulas is careful to 
speak of the Church as a eucharistic community rather than an institution. 
Nonetheless while he has chosen to speak of the close connection between the 
eucharistic community on earth and the eschatalogical community he is not 
denying the connection between the eucharistic community and the institution of 
the Church. What he does call into question is the way in which the institution 
might be understood to make the claim of being the Church. Unlike Volf 
Zizioulas seeks to affirm the relation between the institution and the true Church; 
he accomplishes this through his understanding of the event of the eucharist. 20 
16 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 300. 
17 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition'. p. 296. 
18 'Now, without doubt the Church needs to be an institution in the sense that it must - 
theologically must -- be a historically given reality. ' Gunton, Theology Throiigh Hie Aeolog u*1115 
p. 198. 
19 BC p. 233- 
20'l can say that for the Orthodox the Church is not an institution but an event -- which sounds 
Protestant to Roman Catholic ears. Or I can say the opposite, namely that the Church is an 
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1.3. The Event of the Eucharist 
Although this thesis has considered Zizioulas' understanding of being as 
communion'it has not explored the relationship between 'communion' and the 
celebration of the eucharist. Space does not allow us to do justice to the full 
extent of his understanding of the eucharist, nonetheless it is necessary to at least 
briefly explore its significance. For Zizioulas, the eucharist is the realisation in 
the present of the future hope of true communion between creation and the 
creator which is grounded upon the history of that engagement. 21 In Zizioulas' 
thought the eucharist is the central sacrament of the Church because it is the 
eschatalogical realisation of the future hope of communion in God's presence, 
'being as communion'. To speak of the concept of communion is to speak 
abstractly of what is concretely realised in the eucharist. 'The eucharist is 
nothing less than the reality which makes it possible for us to exist at all. '22 
The eucharist is the event in which the Church as institution and the Church as 
the body of Christ become one reality. 23 Emphasising the importance of the 
eucharist as an event does not avoid the tendency towards qualifying the Church 
through institutional criteria. When Zizioulas suggests that'[I]f the Eucharist is 
not celebrated properly, the Church ceases to be the Church'24 it might appear as 
though he is proposing certain criteria to determine the authenticity of how the 
eucharistic celebration is conducted. Yet, Zizioulas' focus is upon the eucharistic 
community in which the eucharistic celebration takes place rather than a 
particular form or structure to the celebration. 25 
It is in the eucharist, understood properly as a community and not as a'thing', 
that Christ is present here and now as the one who realises God's self- 
communication to creation as communion with his life and in the existential form 
of a concrete community created by the Spirit. 
26 
institution and not an event -- which would cause total confusion to the ecumenical listener. ' 
Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 294. 
21 '[Tlhe Church unites in the Eucharist the two dimensions, past and future, simultaneously as 
one indivisible reality. This happens "sacramentally", i. e. in and through historical and material 
forms, while the existential tension between the "already" and the "not yet" is preserved. ' BC, p. 
188. 
22 McPartlan, Vie E ticharis t Makes the Ch urcli, p. 270. 
23 'For the Eucharist is perhaps the only reality in the Church which is at once an institution and 
an event. ' BC p. 206. 
24 Zizioulas, 'Communion and Otherness'. p. 355 My italics. 
25 Zizioulas distinguishes his position from that of Afanasiev to avoid'the opinion that eucharistic 
ecclesiology is founded simply on the concept or on the celebration of a sacramental act'. 
BC p. 23. 
26 BC p. 213-214. 
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Furthermore while Azioulas affirms that the eucharistic community can truly 
realise its eschatological hope it does so only momentarily. 'The mystery of the 
Church does not involve a conflict between Amt and Geist, institution and event, 
as long as all institutions draw their justification from the event of the celebration 
of the Kingdom in each place'. 27 Zizioulas' position serves to take the emphasis 
off the historical institution of the Church as the source of its legitimation and 
calls it to reaffirm continually its constitution in the communion event. 28 
The Church is called to be a different mode of existence, a free inclusivity which 
continually breaks into the fixed 'closed' structures of our societies including its 
own institutionalism. 29 Any particular institution which makes a claim to be the 
Church of Christ must also admit that it is so only in part and that it fails to be 
what it should be. Therefore the Church does not affirm its identity from 
tradition but from the event in which it realises its eschatological hope. 
[Tihe only way to preserve the eschatological identity is the celebration of the 
sacraments, particularly the Eucharist, and the encounter of the Word, not as a 
message coming to her as passed through channels of historical experience, but 
as an echo of the future state of things. She is obliged to live by faith not by 
sight. 30 
A local community can only call itself a Church in the faith and hope that it is 
God which makes it So. 31 In seeking to define what the Church should be it does 
so not as a measure of its efficacy but in the desire to know and grow into the 
fullness of its calling. 
27 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition' p. 301. 
28 '[Bly stressing the fact that God's being consists in community it asserts the theological 
priority of community over institution or anything impersonal. (The church has always behaved 
her worst when she has likened herself to an empire or understood herself as primarily a legal 
institution). The church must cease to be looked on primarily as an institution and be treated as a 
way of being. ' Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God the Trinity' p. 29 Agreeing with this approach it 
is still important to qualify what is meant by community given the fact that it is all too easy to see 
communities themselves as institutions rather than in the dynamic event sense which ZtZioulas is 
directing us towards. 
29 Lossky also wants to maintain the uniqueness of the Church in so far as it is defined as distinct 
from any solely human institution. MT p. 175 However he does not suggest the eschatological 
determination in the same way as Zizioulas does. 
30 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in the Orthodox Tradition', p. 300. 
31 'According to the Reformers we can only hope that God will use our human actions and 
institutions which can do nothing but witness to God's work for achieving his work in creating 
his church. ' Schwoebel, 'The Creature of the Word', p. 150. ZiZioulas makes this 
hope more 
concrete by pointing towards the eucharist. 
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2.1. Christ and the Spirit, the Two Hands of God 
Zizioulas avoids the determinism which a close identification between Christ and 
the Church might suggest by clearly defining the work of the Spirit in the 
constituting the Church. Zizioulas'whole conception of the Corporate Christ can 
only make sense in the context of the work of the Spirit in relation to ChriSt. 32 
The Church allows space for humanity to encounter God because the concrete 
historical institution in Christ is balanced by the eschatological constitution in the 
Spirit. 33 In Zizioulas' definition of the constitution of the Church we are pointed 
towards a Church that is in fact nothing more than the persons who, in Christ 
and together with the Spirit, make it Up. 34 What Zizioulas has done is to allow 
that the unity of the Church is continually realised and effected not through its 
identification in continuity with its tradition, but through the dynamic event of 
the Spirit uniting people in Christ. The roles of the Son and Spirit in the life of 
the body of Christ are distinct yet not separate. They together realise the Church. 
As the Son institutes the Church -- gives it immanent historical existence -- it is 
the function of the Spirit to constitute it, to free it from institutionalism. As 
Zizioulas points out, without some such distinction the tendency is to regard the 
Spirit as rather like the fuel for a vehicle. 35 
That the Spirit again and again constitutes the Church as what it will be, means 
that the Church is the Church not solely by virtue of its confessional stance, nor 
by its historic continuity, but through its constitution in the Spirit. This does not 
mean that the continuity with the tradition is not important, nor does it mean 
that the confession of the Church is not important; what it does mean is that the 
Church is authentically the Church in so far as it realises its identity in relation to 
its eschatological. hope; a hope which is reahsed in and with the historical and 
eschatological person of Christ. 
When Zizioulas proposes his particular understanding of the relations of Christ 
and the Spirit he recognises that the whole area of the relation of Christ to the 
Spirit and the Spirit to Christ remains a contentious issue. 36 This is hardly 
32 BC p. 130. We would suggest that Zizioulas needs to be more consistent in his affirmation of 
the role of the Spirit in the context of the Corporate Christ if he is to avoid Volf's charge of a 
tendency towards monism. 
33 ZiZioulas, 'Doctrine of God the Trinity Today', p. 28. 
34 'The celebration of the Eucharist by the primitive Church was, above all, the gathering of the 
people of God 'E'Al -10 (X'U'-UO, that is, both the manifestation and the realisation of the 
Church. ' BC 
p. 21. 
35 Gunton Theology Arough the Aeologians. P. 199. 
36 BC p. 123. 
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surprising given the implications it has for understanding how God engages 
with the world and ultimately, for our purposes in this paper, how humanity is 
understood to be in relation to God. There are some who posit a Spirit- 
Christology which in some instances goes so far as to collapse the Spirit into the 
person of Christ. 37 On the other pole is posited a complete separation of the 
work of the Son and the Spirit as is evidenced in some aspects of the Protestant 
tradition. Splitting apart the tzvo hands of God has allowed the Church to 
apply the work of the Son and the Spirit in different ways to the human situation. 
However, this distinction easily lacks coherence if it becomes a disjunction. In 
order to understand the significance of Zizioulas' eucharistic theology in terms of 
the relation of Christ and the Spirit we will compare his model with those of 
Lossky and Volf. This comparison will inevitably lead us into the discussion of 
how the Spirit is understood to engage with human persons. 
2.2. Losskv on Christ and the 
Returning briefly to Lossky's understanding of the relationship of Christ to the 
Spirit we will see a very different conception from what we have glimpsed of 
Zizioulas' model. Lossky's theological anthropology involves a developed notion 
of the work of Christ and the Spirit. He seeks to maintain the common focus and 
unity of their work, yet he insists on the independence of the two persons to the 
point that he posits two economies. 39 'Intimately linked as they are in the 
common work upon earth, the Son and the Holy Spirit remain nevertheless in 
this same work two persons independent the one of the other as to their hypostatic 
being'. 40 The independence of the persons should not be taken to say that the 
work of the Son and Spirit remain detached from each other. 41 By maintaining 
the independence of the persons of the Son and the Spirit while insisting on the 
unity of their work, Lossky seeks to remind us of the different facets of God's 
operation ad extra. 
Lossky's concern is to establish that the two divine persons engage with human 
persons in different ways. The Son deals with the material relation of human 
37 Mackay's binitarian model is one example. See Del Colle, Christ atid the Sptrit. p. 148. 
Gunton, Theology throtigh the Theologiatis. p. 106. 
39 Thus the titles of two chapters of AIT, 'The Economy of the Son' and 'The Economy of the 
Spirit'. 
40 MT p. 159 (italics mine) The idea of the distinction of the persons as to their hypostatic being 
is a problem in itself, as we have discussed earlier in this thesis. 
41 'The work of the Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit are therefore inseparable. ' A IT p. 167. 
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unity, the union of human nature, while the Spirit is the one who affords the 
personal and spiritual relation to God. Lossky suggests that it is Christ who 
institutes the Church in transforming human nature to provide a new human 
nature which the individual may enter into through baptism. The path to the 
realisation of personhood follows on from that gift of the new nature through a 
person growing in ever closer communion or union with the Spirit. For Losský, 
the unity in the Church is the basis by which a person may transcend human 
nature to a true identity in a personal relation to the Spirit. Although it is the Son 
who is clearly united with the Church, Lossky affirms that the Spirit operates 
within the Church. In fact there is a place for the Spirit even in the institution of 
the Church. The Spirit's role in unifying the Church is only the first 
communication of the Spirit, when the Spirit was breathed out by Christ, and it is 
not to be confused with the second communication of the Spirit which is the seal 
of personal and unique relationship to God. 42 Nonetheless Lossky's 
understanding leads to some concerns with how the Son and Spirit are seen to 
be united in their personhood and in their operations. We would not take issue 
with the idea that the Spirit is 'communicated' in a different way after the 
ascension, but with how the Spirit is seen to engage with the human person and 
from that how the work of the Spirit and the work of Christ are united. 
3.1. Indwe 
Central to Lossky's understanding of the work of the Spirit is the union of the 
human person with God. His concern to maintain the independence of the two 
persons, the Son and the Spirit, is mirrored in his care in emphasising the 
integrity of the particular. To describe this in the life of the human being Lossky 
speaks of an inner unity with God. 
The Christian mystic, on the other hand, entering into himself and enclosing 
himself in the 'inner chamber' of his heart, finds there, deeper even than sin, the 
beginning of an ascent in the course of which the universe appears more and 
more unified, more and more coherent, penetrated with spiritual forces and 
forming one whole within the hand of God. 43 
We must carefully qualify that Lossky's intention is not to suggest that the turn 
inward is to discover oneself nor is it solely introspection for it would appear to 
be, by definition, the engagement with another person. For Lossky the turn 
inward is to ascend to God through the energies of uncreated grace which the 
42 MTp. 167-68. 
43 MT p. 106. 
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Spirit gives to the person in the Church. 44 However, the question is in what way 
does the Spirit engage with us? Is it through an inner and private union, or 
perhaps though vitalising an inner capacity to relate to God? Lossky's clear 
suggestion is that the work of the Spirit involves a transformation of our 
inwardness. 
[TIhe soul is not in itself subject to passions, but becomes so when it leaves its 
interior simplicity and exteriorises itself. Renunciation of the world is thus a re- 
entering of the soul into itself, a concentration, a reintegration of the spiritual 
being in its return to communion with God. 45 
Lossky does not intend that this inward transformation should remain private, 
without implications for our life among other people although it begins in a 
private encounter. 46 
In love directed towards God each human person finds his perfection; 
nevertheless, individual persons cannot arrive at perfection without the 
realisation of the fundamental unity of human nature. Love of God is necessarily 
bound up with love of one's fellow-man. 47 
For Lossky our inner relation to God should not come at the expense of our 
relation to the world. On the contrary it is only through this inner 'union' that we 
are able to relate properly to the world. Our concern wl-dch we will seek to trace 
out in the argument which follows is that there remains a dichotomy between the 
inner and outer person (which correlates with the work of the 'independent' 
persons of the Son and the Spirit) as though the inner or true centre of the human 
person remains in some way free from or disconnected from the outer person. 48 
It appear that the work of the Spirit is to allow the inner person to transcend the 
outer self, or union of nature. Clearly Lossky sees that a central aspect of our 
union with God is to bring about the union of the inner and outer person; our 
argument however is that while the functioning of the person as a psychosomatic 
unity may be disjointed as a result of the fall this should not be taken to mean 
that there are 'inner' and 'outer' elements to the person. 
44'[Tlhe way of the created persons, on the other hand, must be that of ascent, a rising up 
towards the divine nature by means of union with uncreated grace communicated by the Holy 
Spirit. ' MT p 215. 
45 MT p. 200. 
46'The Spirit is present with everyone who receives Him as if there were but one receiver, but 
bestows sufficient and complete grace on all. ' MT p. 166. 
47 MT p 214. 
48'The spirit the highest part of the human creature, is that contemplative faculty by which man 
is able to seek God. The most personal part of man, the principle of his conscience and of his 
freedom, the spirit (vous) in human nature corresponds most nearly to the person; it might be 
said that it is the seat of the person. ' MT p. 201. 
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3.2. 'Inte 
Nfiroslav Volf, in After Our Likeness, provides another approach to this debate. 
Similarly to both Lossky and Zizioulas, Volf seeks to use the doctrine of the 
Trinity to describe theological anthropology particularly in the context of 
ecclesiology. Central to his thesis is a conception of the perichoresis of the 
Trinity as mutual 'interiority'. He correlates this interiority to humanity through 
locating the work of the Spirit primarily with the interiority of the person. 49 His 
position appears to resonate with Lossky's notion of the 'inner' relation to God of 
the 'individual' person and is reflected in his criticism of Zizioulas' suggestion 
that the Spirit does not indwell individuals. In Volf's thesis we see something 
closely akin to Lossky's insistence upon the Spirit's 'private' relationship with the 
individual believer. He suggests that the only way in which the human 
community can in some degree 'participate' in the divine perichoresis is through 
the interiority of the Spirit in the life of the individual believer. 50 This is why 
Volf can insist that'the unity of the Church is grounded in the interiority of the 
Spirit'. 51 In spite of the significant differences between Volf and Lossky, there 
remains the basic assumption that the Spirit works in union with the'individual' 
person. Particularity is located in the private relation of the Spirit to the person. 
Both Volf and Lossky would argue that community is very important yet they 
would also assert that it is through the individual's relationship with God that 
the individual is set free to create community. 52 
Fergus Kerr has engaged with the thought of Wittgenstein (in Theology After 
Wittgenstein), who is recognised as one of the great antagonists to the concept of 
the inner self. Kerr uses Wittgenstein's ideas to attack the concept of inwardness 
in the Christian tradition. 'Kerr's claim [is] that Spirituality understood as 
inwardness is a consequence of a philosophically false and existentially 
inadequate picture of the human being as an individual related in the first 
instance to its (inner) self'. 53 Kerr is not simply arguing against the idea that by 
49 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness,, p. 208-13 In this he is clearly holding with what has been 
identified as the 'Reformation's concern to liberate the Spirit from the control of the ecclesiastical 
institution'. Gunton, Theology Through the Theologians, p. 108. 
50 Volf, After Our Likeness,, p. 208-13. 
51 Volf, After Out- Likeness, p. 213 Italics in the original. 
52 Volf, represents an understanding of the Spirit which is often found in the Protestant tradition. 
'Within the Protestant tradition there has been a tendency 'to stress the function of the Spirit as 
the awakener of the individual. ' Wesley Carr, 'Towards a Contemporary Theology of the Holy 
Spirit' in SIT 28,1975 p. 510. 
53 Adrian Thatcher, 'Spirituality Without Inwardness'. SIT 46,1996, p. 221. 
191 
looking inward we will understand ourselves, he is arguing against any notion of 
'looking inwards'at all. It is the idea that there is an 'independent' interiority to 
the individual, rooted in Cartesian thought, which Kerr and other thinkers are 
concerned with. The target of Kerr's thought is the seductive idea that in our 
thinking we can be truly free from outside influence, that we can disengage from 
the relations to the world and to people around us to the extent that we can enter 
into reflection in a truly objective manner. Not only does Wittgenstein's work 
discount the whole tradition arising from Descartes, it also deprecates the vein in 
the Christian tradition, which may be traced all the way back to Augustine, 
which has held that we will discover something about God and ourselves 
through a turn inwards. 
The notion of the independent inner self is clearly evident in Lossky's theology. 54 
Lossky, who, paradoxically, was concerned with a practical and engaged 
Christianity, claims that there is the possibility of a person isolating themselves 
to the degree that they are able to operate objectively. Lossky's proposal of an 
inner objective realm remains a popular notion. 'The fallacy that there is an inner 
private self to the person is one which is difficult to displace. '55 We would argue 
that human persons are irreducibly interdependent not only in terms of our 
physical dependence upon each other but also in terms of our constitution in the 
matrix of existence. The possibility of a truly objective stance denies the 
situatedness of the human person. 
A difference between Lossky and Zizioulas shows up in their understanding of 
interiority. Zizioulas in rejecting any tendency within the tradition to look for an 
inner mystical union with God suggests that St. Augustine introduced 
a dimension that was bound to create a dichotomy within Western Christianity 
ever since, namely the importance of introspectiveness, of consciousness and the 
inner man, from which sprang the important mystical, romantic and pietistic 
movements of the Christian West. 56 
Zizioulas has here clearly rejected an emphasis upon introspection and by 
implication called into question the notion of a dualism between the inner and 
outer persons. He is clearly opposed to any notion of 'inner' union with God. 
54 I&L P. 193 -94. 
55 'The age old dream is repeating itself: thinking is something better done independently of 
bodiliness, in some clear and pure zone, beyond time and space, into which our muzzv heads 
rarely rise. The desire to think away our incarnate nature remains as seductive as ever in our 
culture. ' Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstel'ti (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986) p. 186. 
56 John Zizioulas, Lambeth Conference Address, Sourozh Feb. 1989 p. 30. 
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Sin-dlar observations may be made for spirituality and piety. There is a tendency 
towards mysticism among many Christians which would either direct the soul 
towards a personal relationship with Jesus and especially his humanity, a kind of Christo-mortistic piety, or else involve a kind of absorption of the soul into the 
very divine essence, a sort of loss of the self in the love of the divine. In both 
cases the Trinity is irrelevant. 57 
The rejection of a notion of interiority is not developed to any great length in 
Zizioulas' thought for he is Primarily concerned to emPhasise the corporate 
nature of our relationship with God. He does not utilise Wittgenstein's argument 
against the idea of an independent interiority to the person. 58 Rather, in his 
rejection of individualism he is primarily concerned to emphasise that persons 
are irreducibly relational. Zizioulas' opposition to an emphasis upon interiority 
is grounded in his eucharistic theology and echoed in his downplaying the role 
of cognition in human personhood. 
3.3. Cognition 
Volf suggests that the lack of the expression of a cognitive element in the 
theology of Zizioulas means that there is not a basis by which we might 
understand how a human person responds to God's initiative. 
Zizioulas' description of union with Christ, however, maintains no activity on the 
side of human beings, not even receptive activity made possible by God. For if 
human beings were to participate actively in this union, their activity would have 
to be accompanied by cognition. 59 
We would agree with Volf in so far as there are times when Zizioulas' reaction 
against psychological categories or the self consciousness of the individual are 
too dismissive. However, Volf has mistakenly assumed that in Zizioulas'model 
there is no room for initiative on the part of the person. 60 In the wider context of 
Zizioulas' thought there is a place for cognition. It is not that cognition cannot 
play a role in relation to a person's entry into the Church, but that cognition is 
not finally determinative of ontology. Zizioulas allows that a person may choose 
to enter into the Church or someone else may choose for them and although he 
would not see this choice as simply a rational choice there is clearly room in his 
conception to see some element of cognition in the entry of a person into the 
57 Zizioulas, The Doctritte of God the TY-Mity Today. p. 21. 
58 Rowan Wifliams, 'Review of Being as Communion'SIT 42 p. 103, suggests that there would be 
benefits to comparing Zizioulas' thesis with some of Wittgenstein's ideas. 
59 Volf, After Oity- Liketzess p. 96. 
60'This is why human beings, once having become persons in Christ, do not have a choice 
whether to remain such; the possibility of saying "no" would mean that personhood is constituted 
not through communion, but rather through the individual. ' Volf, After Oiir Liketies-s p. 96. 
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community. For Zizioulas a singular emphasis upon the cognitive element is to 
confuse the question of being or ontology with a capacity that is shared by other 
creatures in this world. 61 The belief in the centrality of the cognitive ability, in 
determining our 'being',, is part of the basis for Zizioulas' reaction against the 
concept of 'inwardness'. 
The whole argument about the role of the rational capacity in determining 
ontology is wrapped up in the emphasis upon choice and the freedom of choice 
in self- determination. 62 This causes us to question whether or not there is, 
underlying Volf's and indeed Lossky's emphases, a presupposition which 
suggests that the locus of personal identity is the human cognitive capacity. We 
would take issue not primarily with the recognition of the importance of the 
cognitive ability but with the temptation to separate out cognition from our 
relations. 
[Olur thinIking not only shapes but is shaped by our whole socially participative 
and semantically molded apperception. Our proper functioning at the cognitive 
level is thus inseparable from our social participation and communal being. 63 
The dislocation of cognition is evidenced in Lossky's and Volf's failure to 
establish relations as that which both constitutes and exists 'between' persons. 64 
As we discussed in chapters three and five allowing for the scope of the 
constitutive role of relations is vital to deal with the reality of human existence. 
There is certainly no reason to allow the cognitive ability the elevated status 
which it has enjoyed in many western soteriological models. However, we 
would suggest that as a component of the human person's constitution as a 
61 Zizioulas argues that cognition is not part of determining 'personhood'. His argument to 
support this is that humanity shares its cognitive ability with some animals. While we would 
agree that it is important to move away from some of the western models which have confused 
cognition with ontology we find Zizioulas' argument somewhat strange at this point. In effect he 
is reversing the traditional arguments in favour of identifying the rational capacity with ontology. 
By suggesting that the rational capacity does not distinguish humanity from the rest of creation, 
he argues that it cannot be the basis of ontology. We would prefer to question the emphasis upon 
cognition (either positive or negative emphasis) by utilising the point Colin Gunton raises with 
regard to the same issue which is that what lies behind this argument is a confusion of the 
comparative and ontological questions. See chapter Three Section 1.2. 
62 Volf, Aftff Our Likeness, p. 97, in criticising ZiZioulas reveals exactly how the notion of choice 
and cognitive capacity are often seen as the central elements of what it means to be a person. 
'Choice, however, is a characteristic not of the person, but rather of the individual, and derives 
from the fall. Is this non reflected movement toward communion anthropologically plausible? I 
think not'. 
63 A. Torrance, Persons in CominutilOn, p. 99. 
64 McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, uses the notion of 'betweenness' which helps to clearly 
establish that the notion of relations we are speaking of is not an Interiority. 
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psychosomatic unity it does or can play a significant role in determining whether 
or not a person lives in communion with God. 65 Our concern with Zizioulas, 
thesis is not that he allows no space for the rational capacity in his understanding 
of humanity, but that, in his defence of his model there are times when he can 
deny the place or importance of cognition in human constitution; although this 
denial is clearly a polemic of his argument rather than its foundation. Zizioulas 
is so concerned to denigrate individualism, that he can fail to allow for the role of 
cognition. While we would agree that the Western focus upon cognition has 
distorted theological thinking, we would maintain that it is a vital element in 
human personhood. Just as we would not isolate the cognitive capacity of the 
person as the'ghost in the machine', to echo Gilbert Ryle's phrase, so we would 
not allow that the cognitive capacity plays no role in the determination of the 
person. We will return now to consider the role of the Spirit in the relation of 
humanity to God, for the understanding of how the Spirit engages with 
humanity is central to this issue. 
3.4. Indwelling Spirit 
Zizioulas is adamantly opposed to the notion of an individual union with the 
Spirit. 'When the Holy Spirit blows, He does not create good individual 
Christians, individual "saints",, but an event of communion, which transforms 
everything the Spirit touches into a relational being'. 66 McPartlan notes that 
Zizioulas interprets the biblical references to the indwelling of the Spirit as 
references to the Spirit indwelling the community. 67 When we review the 
biblical texts it is apparent that the bulk of them are not speaking of the Spirit 
indwelling an individual but of the Spirit indwelling the community. Yet, I 
Corinthians 6: 16- 20 clearly speaks of the idea of the Spirit indwelling the 
individual. 68Therefore we must not discount the idea of the indwelling 
65 David S. Cunningham'Review of Persons in Communion'in Modern Theology Vol. 14, no. 1 
Jan. 1998 p. 156, defends Zizioulas understanding of the cognitive capacity by suggesting that 'for 
Zizioulas (as for Orthodoxy generally), cognition is necessarily a knowing-with (co-gnoscere) in 
which God is always present'. 
66 Zizioulas, Coininunion and Otherness p. 354. 
67 McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church p. 278-279. In private conversation, February 1997, 
Ziziou las affirmed his reticence to support the idea of 'indwelling' due to the individualistic 
overtones it carries with it. 
68 'The first text is I Cor 6: 19-20 where Paul reapplies to the individual believer's body the temple 
imagery that elsewhere refers to the Church corporately. Here is the certain evidence that Paul 
understood the presence motif of the Old Testament, which Isaiah 63: 
9-14 has already equated 
with the Holy Spirit, to be fulfilled in the life of the individual believer as well as 
in the gathered 
community of believers. ' Gordon Fee, God's Einpowering Presence : the 
Holy Spirit in the Letters of 
Paid. (Massachusetts: Hendrickson 1994) p. 868-69 'God not only 'dwells' in the midst of his 
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presence of the Spirit altogether. The question we must ask is, how is the 
indwelling of the Spirit to be understood? 
More recently Zizioulas has modified or clarified his position on the notion of 
indwelling. 69 Primarily he is seeking to identify the work of the Spirit with the 
creation of communion. 70 He is not opposed to the notion of the Spirit's 
indwelling a person but this is not to say that the Spirit indwells an individual. 
Lossky, Volf and Zizioulas agree that the Spirit creates communion and 
community yet, where Lossky and Volf suggest that this happens through an 
interior union with individuals Zizioulas insists that it is more complex than that. 
The result of the Spirit's engaging with human persons is the transcendence of 
their brokenness to transform their relations with others in the Church, to 
become persons. The Spirit works in many different ways to bring about the 
unity of the Church yet a coherent account of the work of the 11. ýpirit, given the 
situatedness of human beings, must allow that the Spirit works in our midst 
rather than inside US. 71 We would not disagree with Volf that the Spirit may in 
some way challenge the individual person and draw them into the Church; 
however, we do take issue with the idea that this is the only way or even the 
primary way that the Spirit works. 
The emphasis upon the Spirit creating communion is not Zizioulas' only concern; 
there remains the issue of how the person of the Spirit is understood as well. 
The Spirit seems to have an obsession with freedom. He blows where he wills, 
and does not like to be told what to do. We must certainly try, and we must 
definitely do our best, but when we pray for the Spirit to come we must be 
prepared for the unexpected. 72 
Where today many people use the freedom of the Spirit as grounds for seeing the 
liberty of the Spirit to work independently of the economy of the Son, Zizioulas 
refers to the Spirit's freedom to maintain that we cannot contain or control the 
people by the Spirit, but that has likewise taken up residence in the lives of his people 
individually, as they are indwelt by the life giving Spirit. ' lbid p. 845. 
69 King's College, London summer seminar discussion. July 1998. 
70 '[Tlhere is no kingdom of God outside the work of the Holy Spirit, who is by definition 
communion. ' BC p-205- 
71 'In theory there should be no tension between the individual and the community. In practice, 
however, such a tension must be recognised, for it is due to insufficient recognition being given to 
the provisionality both of the community's life and the individual's experience. ' Carr'Towards a 
Contemporary Theology of the Holy Spirit' pp. 514-15. 
72 Zizioulas, 'Come Holy Spirit Sanctify Our Lives' Sotirozh, 44 1991 p. l. 
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Spirit. 73 The notion of the Spirit indwelling the individual might be taken to 
mean that the Spirit becomes the possession of the individual as though the Spirit 
were a force or a power the individual might use. 74 Zizioulas' emphasis reminds 
us that the Spirit is not something that we should take casually or take for 
granted; the Spirit is not a force which we might utilise. We would qualify 
Zizioulas' emphasis upon the freedom of the Spirit to avoid suggesting that the 
Spirit exercises his freedom in an arbitrary way. The Spirit does not simply 
respond passively to our demands, yet in his consistent presence with us the 
freedom of the Spirit is exercised in responding to and constituting our lives in 
Christ. Therefore this 'unexpectedness' is not because the Spirit blows iN, here he 
wills and therefore appears when he wants; but because, although the Spirit 
remains in relation to us, it is the relation of a person and not a force; by xvhich 
we mean that the Spirit encounters us as a centre of action. 75 While we can, and 
should, expect the Spirit's involvement in our lives we must never forget that the 
Spirit encounters us as another, as a person. 76 The Spirit is never 'possessed' by 
an individual or by the Church: while it is possible to relate to the Spirit, this 
relation is always personal which does not mean 'private' or individual. 
Agreeing with Zizioulas' reaction against the Spirit's relation remaining private 
or interior, we would, nonetheless, suggest that the Spirit's encounter with the 
human person is central to their 'spiritual' life. This is not however a 1pnvate' 
encounter just as nothing about a person is truly private. Rather it is a 'personal' 
encounter in which the Spirit enters into the matrix of constitutive relations 
which form the 'content' of a person. It might appear as though disavowing an 
interior relation with the Spirit is to deny the possibility of 'personal' relationship 
with God. It is important, therefore to be clear in describing what we mean by 
tpersonal' relations. Personal relations are often understood as an exclusive 
relation between two individuals who in reciprocal dialogue are focused 
73 The term 'freedom' carries a lot of connotations which are not helpful to the point that 
Zizioulas is endeavouring to make. As a result Zizioulas' statement does not appear to reflect the 
way the Spirit engages with us nor does it reflect the way in which the Spirit operates as one of 
the three persons of the Trinity. 
74 Lossky guards against understanding the Spirit as a force to be utdised by humanity by 
maintaining that the Spirit engages with us through the uncreated energies. While this might 
guard us from understanding the Spirit as a force it leaves us with other problems in 
understanding how God engages with us and how we are to understand the notion of the person 
as we have already discussed in chapter four of this thesis. 
75 Gunton makes this same point in Tlieology Throiigli Hie Tizeologians , p. 1 16. 
76Thus for Paul, the Spirit is not some merely impersonal 'force' or'influence' or'power'. The 
Spirit is none other than the fulfillment of the promise that God himself would once again be 
present with his people. Fee, God's Ernpowering Presence p. 845. 
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primarily on each other. The model of relation which we want to emphasise is 
not to deny the possibility of entering into dialogue with another particular but 
to deny that this dialogue is excluslVe. Therefore when we speak of the Spirit 
guiding us we are not speaking of turning inward to encounter the Spirit in the 
inner self. The work of the Spirit in the life of a person is to engage with them as 
another, as a person and as such to work to transform the matrix of relations 
within which they are constituted. 
3.5. The Transcendence of the 
Zizioulas makes an important point when he insists that the Spirit remains 
transcendent, yet this only makes sense in the context of the Son's immanent 
entry into the world. 77 Where the Son has entered into the world as Jesus of 
Nazareth, the Spirit remains other than the world. 78 The Spirit does not become 
part of the matrix of creation in the same way as Christ has, for he remains 
transcendent, yet, this is not to deny that the Spirit engages with us 'personally'. 79 
This transcendence does not mean that the Spirit remains spatially dislocated 
from the world. On the contrary the Spirit's transcendence is the very basis of 
maintaining the possibility of the Spirit's unique engagement with us. 80 For, the 
Spirit always remains other than those who are encountered. 81 It is the very 
otherness of the Spirit's relation to human beings which allows us the freedom to 
respond to God through the Spirit in a personal way. In fact, we would suggest 
that in the Spirit's relation to us he remains other than and not possessed by 
human beings in a unique way; there is no other relationship which continues to 
operate with the freedom with which the Spirit relates to human beings. 82 The 
77 The immanence of Christ's entry into the world does not deny that he too transcends creation. 
78 Gunton, Theology Through the Theologians. p. 108, echoing this point states that' the Spirit may 
be active within the world, but he does not become identical with any part of the world'. 
79 It is important at this point to understand that transcendence should not be understood in 
spatial terms. For the Spirit who is always transcendent is nonetheless immanently involved in 
our lives. See McFadyen's discussion of this point in Sins of Praise.. 
80 Gunton Theology Through the Theologians p. 189, suggests that'many of the characteristic 
weaknesses of the Western tradition derive from a failure to maintain the personal transcendence 
of the Holy Spirit. The reason is that if we cannot conceive the Spirit as free lord, then we may 
succumb to the temptation of identifying him with some immanent causal force: with 
ecclesiastical or political institutions, or with some private experiences and beliefs. ' 
81 We would agree with Gunton in TheologY through the Theologians p. 119, that the terms 
transcendent and immanent are problematic and might better be expressed as otherness and 
relation. 
82 Hans Hueber, The Holy Spirit in Holy Scripture' Un 77ze Eciatietucal Reviezv, 41: 3, July 1989 
p. 335, reminds us that neither Paul nor John work out a fully developed pneumatology because 
the Spirit remains other. 
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Spirit enters into the matrix of our world in an intimate way so as to reshape our 
apperceptions and by this creates the freedom for persons to respond to the 
world, not simply out of necessary or causal relations but in response to God's 
desires for us. 
The uniqueness of the Spirit's relation to us is that the Spirit remains distinct 
from us-- the Spirit can never be objectified. Yet, this makes the close relation 
between Christ and the Spirit all the more important. Apart from the Son and his 
objectively entering the created world we could not relate to God 'personallN, '. 
That there are two hands of God, Christ and the Spirit, means that God encounters 
us in two different but totally interdependent ways; there is only one economy of 
God. 83 We cannot encounter God, come to know him, through the Son or the 
Spirit exclusively. Personal encounter depends upon another engaging with us 
both objectively and subjectively. We must have a context in which to enter into 
the relation and this context in terms of the Spirit is the Corporate Christ. 
Zizioulas' dose identification of Christ and the Church provides the concrete 
historical basis of God's engagement with the world. This identification with a 
particular, historical community is saved from institutionalism through the work 
of the Spirit. It is the otherness of the Spirit which continually calls the Church 
forward to find its identity not solely in history but in the eschaton which is 
realised in the present through the eucharistic community. The mystery of the 
Church is that God relates to us through the body of Christ which is instituted by 
Christ and constituted by the Spirit. It is only the body of Christ, the Church, 
which exists as a community in and through which the reality of God may be 
known. This is not to say that the Spirit cannot be at work in the world 'outside' 
of the Church. But, to affirm, with Gunton, that'[ilf the Spirit relates created 
being to God -- thus making them holy, in the sense of finally acceptable to God 
-- he achieves this through the Son, the mediator of creation, for there is no other 
way'. 84 
The Spirit's leading us into all truth Uohn 16: 13) provides one example of the role 
the Spirit plays. (In referring to this role we need to be careful to differentiate our 
argument from those who would see the primary role of the Spirit as 
83 Fee, God's Einpowering Presence. p. 837, insists 'that the risen Christ and the Spirit are clearly 
distinct from one another'. He is careful to discount the Spirit Christologies which would 
suggest that the Spirit is nothing more than the person of Christ. It Is vital that we with the 
Apostle Paul, affirm the distinction of the persons whose operation is nonetheless a single 
operation'. 
84 Gunton, Vie Proynise, 2nd Ed. preface p. xxviii. 
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engagement with the cognitive self. ) The role of the Spirit in particularising a 
person involves, in part, that the Spirit reorients a person's apperceptions in 
perhaps much the same way as an independent third party might serve to 
connect two persons who are locked in an argument. The difference is that the 
Spirit is able to enter into the process at a much more immediate and intimate 
level than any human arbitrator. The Spirit is able to rework our apperceptions 
without becoming part of the matrix which constitutes them. In a very real sense 
the Spirit is the one who is able to function in the role often associated with the 
'inner' self for the Spirit is one who is intimate with us and with God. In this 
sense Lossky and Volf are right in recognising that the Spirit relates to the person 
in a very intimate and immediate way. The difficulty, which we have already 
noted, is that the independent inner self which they are referring to simply does 
not exist. The Spirit does not engage with the consciousness of the inner self as 
though that existed or could exist in isolation from the social constitution of the 
person. Therefore the Spirit's relation to us is not the relation to an inner private 
self. 
4.1. Relations and Inte 
Returning to our discussion of the Church, we would argue that models of the 
Church, such as Volf and Lossky use, which posit the interiority of the Spirit as 
the basis for the transformation of the world, are grounded in a somewhat 
Gnostic assumption that we can step back from this world into a position of 
objectivity. Lossky sought to hold together a basis for freedom with a concrete 
historical instituting, yet, he failed to hold the two together. What we are left 
with is the protological unity and origin of the institution and the free 
transcendence of the person. 85 The paradox between the institution and 
I personal' freedom is, if anything, increased. If we believe that we can encounter 
the Spirit in an interior encounter which allows us to separate ourselves from the 
relations which are negative or institutional then we are engaging in the same 
kind of gnosticism which suggests that we can escape the matrix of relations 
which constitute us. While recognising that our relations with each other need to 
be addressed, Lossky and Volf continue to treat relations as exterior rather than 
intrinsic and constitutive of person, in so far as the emphasis is put upon the 
need to 'choose' right relations. 
85 Once again, Lossky's notion depends upon a capacity for objectivity which is based upon a 
dualist understanding of human existence. MT p. 178. 
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Zizioulas, in turn, is in danger of allowing his concern with individualism to 
shape his thesis. In denying the possibility of an independent interiority to the 
person we would also affirm that the Spirit's relation to the person gives them 
the freedom to respond to be reconstituted in a network of relations alongside of 
their biological relations. This freedom is not therefore a freedom to enter into 
relations as though the biological constitution was not relational, but to 
transform the relations in which a person exists. It is all too easy to suggest, 
with the personalists, that the solution to individualism is simply that human 
persons need to recognise and accept that they are not autonomous but in fact 
are part of a greater whole -- a relational matrix. As we discussed in chapter five 
of this thesis Zizioulas' failure to distinguish adequately between human finitude 
and the corruption which has resulted from human sinfulness can serve to deny 
the relational matrix of the biological hypostasis. 86 As a result there is the 
danger of suggesting, in his correlation of salvation with a relational ontology, 
that the transformation implicit in becoming persons is a move from autonomous 
individuality to a relational matrix. One must be very careful to affirm that 
salvation is not about an entry into a relational matrix but a transformation of the 
relational matrix which already exists. 87 Apart from this affirmation it is all too 
easy to reduce the notion of a relational ontology to a personalist call to value 
relationships without the recognition that it is the corruption of our relations 
which needs to be addressed. 
4.2. Transformation and Growth 
This brings us to the point of saying a few words regarding transformation or 
sanctification. For Lossky, the transformation of the person or ascent to God 
should be the goal of those in the Church. 
[Nlevertheless, this adoption I in the Holy Spirit and the Church] is not the final 
goal, for there is yet a narrower circle within the Church itself -- that of the saints, 
of 'those who have understanding'... --who enter into union with God. 
88 
Zizioulas, in contrast, spends very little time developing the idea or basis by 
which we might discuss transformation. In fact, the little time that he does 
devote to it is to discount the idea of a transformation leading to individual 
holiness. Returning to our discussion about inwardness it is clear that the idea of 
86 This is discussed in more detail in chapters five and six. 
87 Daniel W. Hardy, 'Created and Redeemed Sociality'in Oti Being flie Chtircli: Essays oti tize 
Cliristiaii Coititimitity, eds. Colin Gunton and Danlel Hardy, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989) pp. 21- 
47, argues this same point. 
88 MT p. 178. 
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a private inner union with the Spirit which would lead to the sanctification of the 
individual is impossible unless we subscribe to an inner/ outer dualism. But, that 
is not to say that there is no room for a concept of transformation. Indeed, 
'the cry for transformation and sanctification corresponds to the deepest longings 
and desires of the human being. The world as it is, our existence, as it actually 
is, needs transformation. We cannot be content with things as they are. ý%`e must 
change ourselves and the way things are; but how? 89 
Where for Lossky and Volf the how of the transformation of the world follows on 
the transformation of the individual, for Zizioulas the transformation of persons 
is bound up with the transformation of the Church. 90 'Should we not look for a 
transformation of our ecclesial communities before we speak of sharing holiness 
and sanctification? '91 
Part of the difficulty is surely rooted in the understanding of holiness. The idea 
of individual holiness which has been a central notion in certain parts of the 
Christian tradition is for Zizioulas an impossibility. 'There is no such thing as 
individual holiness'. 92 In the last chapter we mentioned the idea that holiness 
has often been perceived as a completion of the individual or inner wholeness. 
In some senses this appears to follow from the definition of holiness as being set 
apart for God. That means that to speak of an individual holiness suggests that 
we can be whole persons,, set apart for God in ourselves. There are two problems 
with this idea: the first is that we are irrevocably a part of this world in so far as 
our very existence is tied in with and constituted by the relational matrix of this 
world. To be 'in the world but not of the world' means that we remain integrally 
related with the world while living in the freedom the Spirit gives to us to have 
our 'constitution' shaped by God rather than the world. The second is that our 
calling is that 'we are there in the world as the priests of creation endowed with 
the privilege of referring creation back to its Creator. '93 If our calling, and our 
own 'wholeness' involves referring creation back to its creator, how can we claim 
any degree of holiness through an inner piety or righteousness? Is there any 
sense of right living that exists apart from our role within the whole of creation? 
89Zizioulas, 'Come Holy Spirit Sanctify Our lives' p. l. 
90For Lossky transformation happens to those within the Church yet, the transformation of the 
individual continues to be the basis of the transformation of the world. 
91 Zizioulas, 'Come Holy Spirit Sanctify Our lives' p. 2. 
92 Zizioulas, 'Come Holy Spirit Sanctify Our lives' p. 2. 
93'The human calling, as made concrete in the incarnation of the mediator, is, simply put, to 
enable the creation to praise its maker. ' Colin Gunton, Christ and CreatiOn (Grand Rapids: 
Eerd mans 1992p. 102. 
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We cannot separate ourselves from the world for we are constituted in relation to 
it. What we can do is challenge and reorient those relations to the world. Not b), 
obtaining an objective distance, which is complemented with individual holiness 
or wholeness, but through allowing the Spirit to reshape our relations to each 
other. The Spirit does not engage with us in an inner private relation that we 
might then engage with the world as though we become other than the world. It 
is the Spirit who remains other, yet who engages with us to bring us to maturity 
in so far as we are irreducibly related to the world. 
A distinction must be made between the terms 'completion' and 'maturity'. For 
Zizioulas completion is not and should not be the expectation of the Christian 
life. It would seem that for him, completion inevitably carries implications of 
autonomy. In contrast,, the term 'maturity' does not lead to the same 
implications. We may speak of a person maturing without suggesting a 
developing autonomy or individual completeness; this resonates with Irenaeus' 
notion of recapitulation. The person who has entered into the Church through 
baptism has been 'recapitulated' into a relation with God by which they are once 
again able to grow up or mature into all the fullness which God has intended for 
them. This 'growth' has no bearing on their 'being' for being or ontology is not 
determined by maturity, rather it is the premise by which a person may mature. 
Growth is not about moving towards a point of completion-94 Although 
Zizioulas does not elaborate on a process of maturation, we would suggest that 
his model by placing growth outside of the issue of being' offers the opportunity 
for true freedom to grow. No longer does maturing carry the implications of 
being or non being, instead it is simply the possibility of growing more fully into 
the reality which God has called us to and has realised in the tension of the 
already/ not yet. 
Zizioulas' concern to overturn models of individual transformation and growth 
can mean that at times he seems to discount the role of the human persons as 
agents for change within the ecclesial community and indeed the world. 
Although he has not devoted much time to describing how the particular person 
might be seen to play a role in the transformation of the community it is, in our 
estimation, not because he does not envision such a role but because he is 
primarily concerned to overturn the very individualistic ways in which this is 
often understood. He holds with the Orthodox tradition that, 
94 Lossky echoes this thought as well when he refers to Nvssa's concept of eternal progression. 
For Losskv perfection is not about arriving at a state of completion. 'The more perfect one 
becomes, the more one is aware of one's own imperfection'. MT p. 205. 
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a spirituality involving a deep respect for nature is strongly conditioned by the 
view that nature acquires sacredness only in and through the human person. 
This gives humanity decisive importance and responsibility. A human being is a 
priest of creation as he or she freely turns it into a vehicle of communion with 
God and with others. 95 
To speak of the Church as the instrument for God's change in the world is for 
Zizioulas to speak of the person's role as well. For Zizioulas to speak of the 
person as an autonomous agent apart from the Church fails to account for our 
relational constitution. This should not be taken to mean that the person cannot 
act as an agent but to affirm that the person lives integrally in the relations Nvhich 
constitute him or her. 
Conclusion 
Zizioulas' ecclesiology spells out the particulars of his theological anthropology 
as it is firmly grounded in his understanding of the relational dynamic of the 
three persons of the Trinity. The comprehensiveness of his scheme is at times 
overly idealistic and the scope of his claims sometimes overlooks the complexity 
of the issues (as we witnessed in chapter six of this thesis). These concerns are 
aggravated by the unsystematic presentation of his argument. Nonetheless there 
is a real coherence to his position which challenges us to look at ecclesiological 
issues in a new light. Furthermore his close identification of'communion' with 
the eucharistic community serves to ground his whole thesis concretely without 
giving in to the dualism which so often arises between institution and event or 
history and eschatology. 
The logic of Zizioulas' understanding of an ontology of relations is carried 
through to the specifics of God's engagement with the Church and the world. 
Zizioulas makes it clear that in speaking of Christ and the Church we are forced 
to speak at the same time of the Spirit's relation to Christ and the Spirit's relation 
to the persons who constitute the Church. To say that Christ entered into our 
world means that he entered into the dynamic of created existence in a 
permanent way. The Spirit's role, as the one who remains 'other', is to again and 
again transform that dynamic of created existence through creating communion 
in union with Christ. The distinction of the roles of the Son and the Spirit allows 
the eschatological role of the Spirit to be grounded in the historical incarnation of 
Christ because the Son and the Spirit are constituted in relation to each other and 
the Father. The particularity of Christ and the Spirit like the particularity of other 
95 Zizioulas, 'Ecological Asceticism: a Cultural Revolution'in Soin-ozh 67 1997 p. 23. 
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persons is not threatened by their constitutive relations but guaranteed by God's 
being as three persons in relation. 
The whole thrust of the relational dynamic of Zizioulas' scheme allows no room 
for a model of private or interior faith. However, the rejection of a 'private' 
interiority is not a denial of the importance of particularity nor is it a denial of 
human cognititve ability; rather, it is to suggest that the basis in which 
particularity is understood must be challenged to more adequately reflect human 
situatedness. Salvation in offering the possibility of enduring particularity does 
not require simply the change of our own inwardness but the transformation of 
the relations which constitute us. 
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Conclusion 
In seeking to understand how theological anthropology might be understood 
from the context of the doctrine of the Trinity we have begun by returning to 
the formative definitions of the Trinity by the Church Fathers. Chapter one 
of this thesis describes the Cappadocian understanding of the God who is one 
ousia /three hypostases as the basis for a relational ontology. It continues by 
affirming the distinction between God ad intra and God ad extra as a 
fundamental distinction not only to uphold the freedom of God but also to 
affirm the freedom that God allows to the world. This distinction is vital in 
establishing a relational ontology that holds unity and particularity together. 
In the debate over the concept of the Father as cause, in chapter two, we 
affirmed the need to describe an ordering of the divine persons as true to God 
ad intra as well as God ad extra. Recognising the possible danger of using a 
concept of causality we sought to highlight the need to allow for an ordering 
to the persons of the Trinity that respects the 'priority' of the person of the 
Father. The affirmation of an ordering to God ad intra challenges us not to 
project human notions of equality on to the divine persons and allows that 
the transcendence of God must always call into question the presuppositions 
of ontological models. The paradox of an ordering that does not deny equality 
raises significant questions regarding the modern concern with an equality 
that tends towards homogeneity. 
In chapters 3 to 5, we turned to examine John Zizioulas' theological 
anthropology in the context of modern thought. ffis understanding of the 
doctrine of the Trinity has significant resonance with the Cappadocians' 
model in spite of the fact that he is unashamedly operating in a modern 
context and is taking the implications of the doctrine much further than they 
did. Yet, in spite of Zizioulas' willingness to move beyond the tradition, he 
lacks a systematic presentation of his thesis, which can cloud the central ideas 
of an already complex thesis. Furthermore, in developing the Cappadocian 
doctrines there are points where Zizioulas is too strongly influenced by 
existentialist thought. Not only must we take account of the influence of 
existentialist and personalist thought but we must also seek to understand 
Zizioulas' relationship with Eastern Orthodoxy; a failure to appreciate his 
Orthodox roots will inevitably lead to misunderstanding his position. In 
establishing these influences Nve sought to clarify some aspects of his model. 
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Fundamental to Zizioulas' insights is a desire to work towards an ontology of 
communion which challenges our understanding of personhood for both 
divine and human persons. The impact of his thought has been significant 
in part due to a modem interest in relational models of being. Therefore our 
concern is not simply to promote his thesis as a relational understanding of 
reality but to develop and express the aspects of his position which serve to 
distinguish it from some popular expressions of relationality. Rather than 
comparing Zizioulas' model solely to other relational ontologies we have 
compared him with other theologians who have attempted to understand the 
doctrine of the Trinity as foundational to a contemporary theological 
anthropology. 
Two primary concerns which we have discussed in this thesis are closely 
connected. The first involves the need for Zizioulas to distinguish carefully 
between human finiteness and the corruption which has resulted from the 
fall. His description of a transcendence of human limitations can tend 
towards a denial of human situatedness. As a result he can appear to be 
proposing that salvation involves a transcendence of individuality in order 
to enter into a relational mode of being. To suggest that salvation involves 
an entry into relationality rather than a transformation of our corrupted 
relations distorts the understanding of the human situation and the process 
of redemption. 
The second area, which is the question of how relations and relationships are 
to be understood, has been one of our primary concerns. The interest in the 
place of relations in our modern world has been evidenced in many different 
fields. We have noted that Zizioulas has been influenced by existentialism, 
particularly in the form of personalism. Yet we have also argued that 
Zizioulas is not simply defending the importance of relations for their own 
sake, nor does his understanding of a relational ontology inevitably lead to a 
idealist monism. His defence of the doctrine of the Trinity anchors his 
understanding of relations in Trinitarian theology and differentiates his 
model from other relational models such as that of Buber. Furthermore with 
his understanding of the eucharistic community Zizioulas establishes a solid 
basis from which his whole theoretical discussion proceeds. 
Nonetheless, Zizioulas' model would benefit from a more thorough 
development of his understanding of the context of relations. His failure to 
distinguish between a transcendence of corrupt human relations and a 
transcendence of human limitedness is further confused by his unwillingness 
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to describe the juridical element to the human/ divine relation, as discussed 
in chapter 6. The ordering of the persons which we described in chapter two 
must have implications for us here as we attempt to understand a 
relationality which is qualified yet not displaced by a moral ordering. 
In the discussion of person and relation Zizioulas has directed our attention 
towards the context in which particularity is to be understood. In chapter 7 
we looked at this context through an understanding of the dynamic relations of 
Christ and the Spirit to human persons. The relation of the Spirit to the 
human person must be foundational to the enablement of particularity. We 
have argued that this relation should not be understood as exclusive, through 
an emphasis upon the interiority of the person, yet it must allow for the 
freedom which is given to the particular; not a freedom of choice which 
depends upon a capacity for independent objectivity but a freedom to be 
constituted in relation to God and the world. Zizioulas' concern is to talk 
about the importance of freedom within the context of the Church, the 
corporate Christ, as a eucharistic community with an eschatological. 
orientation. His ecclesiology challenges the tendency to define the Church as 
either institution or event; it also provides a locus in which the concepts of 
person and relation may be grounded. 
Our discussion of theological anthropology, which began with the 
Cappadocian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, has finished by 
looking at two important areas, ecclesiology and harmartiology. Zizioulas' 
theological anthropology provides the basis for a fruitful discussion of many 
issues. Nonetheless, the understanding of the relations of Christ and the 
Spirit to the people of God and an understanding of the implications of the 
fall are of central importance in working out a balanced understanding of 
persons and relations. By examining these two areas and highlighting some 
other important issues we have endeavoured to advance the understanding 
of theological anthropology. 
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